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PREFACE
Thls report was prepared as a dissertation In partial fulflllJnent
of the requirements of the doctoral degree in policy analysis at The
Rand Graduate Institute. The faculty coumlttee that supervised and
approved the dissertation consisted of Bruce Goeller, Chairman, R.V.L.
Cooper, and L. V. Sellers.
The repo " includes comparative prosram costs associated with
the use of various standardized spacecraft for A/r Force Space Test
Progranalsslons to be flown on the space shuttle during the 1980-1990
tlne period (the original study was completed under the Joint sponsor-
ship of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the De-
partment of Defense). The first phase of the study considered a va-
rlety of procurement mixes couposed of existing or programmed NASA
standard spacecraft designs and a new Air Force standard spacecraft
deslgn, the results of which were briefed to a Joint NASA/AIr Force
audience in July 1976. The seoond phase considered additional pro-
curement options using an upgraded version of an exlstlnsNASA de-
sisn; this phase was presented to the cllents In Noveuber 1976.
For thls report, the results of the two-phase study are cast in
I the broader policy context of NASA-DaD cooperation in space activities
I by exmlnln8 the experience gained by NASA and DaD durln8 the 1958-i
I 1965 tlm period. Aioo analyzed ere the orsanlsatlonal interactions
I surrounding the caAs study, as well as the problmn and prospects of
! 8pplyln8 the lessons learned from the NASA-DoD cooperation experience
'_j to other 8ttustiona.
I
i The study results should be useful to NASAsnd Air Force space
_ pro8ran offices involved in operational or exparimmtel missions end
-. to those concerned with the I/ASA-DoD coordinstion and cooperation in
apace activltlss. Because the Inpact of various tariff rates is ex-
shined, the results should a18o be of interest to those concerned wtth
dsterntntn8 the shuttle tariff rate structure or with shuttle operations.
ktthoush the study exmainss procurement options sffscttn8 both
NASA and Air Force prosrmss, the results should not be interpreted
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as representing the official views or policies of NASA or the Air
Force. Preparation of this report was supported by The Rand Corpora-
tlon from its own funds.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
_,* Thls dissertation presents a case study that analyzes some of the
procurement considerations involved in selecting an unmanned standard
spacecraft for the Air Force Space Test Program mlssions to be flown
,
during the space shuttle's inltlal ten-year opetatlonal period. The
selection process included a comparative evaluation of a number of
procurement options derived from four candidate Air Force and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) standard spacecraft designs.
The case study is placed within the broader pollcy context of the Con-
gressional requirement, embodied in the National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958, that "close cooperation among federal agencies [will be
maintained] to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities,
and equipment."
The case study examined in this dissertation was accomplished in
two phases. During the first phase, the Space Test Program Standard
Satellite (STPSS)--a design proposed by the Air Force--and two NASA
candidates--the Applications Explorer Mission spacecraft (A_O and the
Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS)--were considered. During the
second phase, a fourth candidate was introduced--a larger, more
capable AEM (L-AEM), configured by the Boeing Company under NASA spon-
sorship to meet the specifications Jointly agreed upon by NASA and the
Air Force. Total program costs for a variety of procurement options,
each of which is capable of performing all of the Air Force Space Test
Program missions during the 1980-1990 time period, were used as the
principal measure fo_ distinguishing among procurement options.
Four major conclusions have been drawn from this case study. _iDgt,
program cost does not provide a basis for choosing ar_ng the AEM, STPSS,
and MMS spacecraft, given their present designs. S_co_d, the availability
of the L-AEM spacecraft, or some very similar design, would provide a basis
for minimizing the cost of the Air Force Space Test Program. The L-AEM
could be used individually or in combination with the AEM or _ as
,
See footnotes, pp. 2 and 5.
m
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the missions required. Third, the program costs are very sensitive to
the maximum number of payloads flown per spacecraft. An increase from
6 to 13 in the maximum number of payloads per spacecraft would re-
_ suit in about 30 percent lower program cost. Fourth, launch costs, as
determined by a variety of formulas, generally did not affect the pre-
ferred procurement option, although they substantially change the total
program costs. The modified NASA shuttle tariff rate structure, con-
: sidered during the second phase of the case study, corrects the drastic
cost imbalance that the original NASA tariff imposed on DoD launches
,
from the Western Test Range.
Some observations have been made concerning organizational features
of NASA-DoD cooperation during the case study. The study was funded by
NASA and conducted with the full cooperation of both NASA and the Air
Force; it was done with the approval and acknowledgment of the Aero-
nautics and Astronautics Coordination Board. Because of a variety of
motivational factors, the cooperation and support of the two NASA pro-
gram offices and the Air Force Space Test Program Office involved in
the study were exemplary.
Between the first and second phases of the study, the Air Force
initiated a memorandum of agreement that: (I) supported the develop-
ment by NASA of a Small Multimission Modular Spacecraft (SMt_) that
would meet the Air Force requirements, (2) agreed to procure the SMMS,
and (3) offered advance payment of $i million to accelerate the SMMS
development schedule. NASA declined to undertake the SMMS until it
could be justified by NASA missions and suggested that the Air Force
procure the mS (in accordance with the first phase results of this
**
study), but declined to support the upgrading of the AEM.
For a discussion of the economic framework for determining the
price of a space shuttle launch, sec C. Wolf et al., Pricing and Re-
ooapment PoZiaie8 for Co_ne_oia_y Usef_Z Technology ResuZti_ 3 from
NASA Programs, The Rand Corporation, R-1671-NASA, January 1975.
The results of the first phase of this case study showed that
the preferred procurement option consisted of a combination of the t_S
and an upgraded AEM. Without the upgraded AEM, the Air Force faced a
$I00 million higher program cost.
I
%-_, -! im_ m _ JL I1_ _
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The introduction of the L-AErl spacecraft during the sectnd phase
of the study led to a superior procurement option that did not ueces-
sarily include the MMS or AEH. The L-AE_I spacecraft is very similar
to both the Air Force STPSS and the proposed Sb_IS_ Since NASA had de-
_lined to proceed with tile SHMS development in response to the Air
Force-proposed memorandum uf agreement, the results of the second phase
of this case study provided the Air Force Space Test Program Office
with justification for developing its own standard spacecraft, i.e.,
the L-AEM. At tile present time, the Air Force is requesting bids from
_,_U=LLy for designs ef the _pacecrnft te support its next two missions.
Whether or not the resulting spacecraft designs will represent the be-
ginning of an Air Force standard spacecraft design must await tile out-
come of a number of future Air Force decisions. In any event, it
appears that the possibility of procuring NASA spacecraft for the Air
Force Space Test Program will be determined case by case.
Finally, some observations are presented concerning the prospects
and problems of applying the NASA-DoD cooperation experience to other
situations. This is done in recognition of the increasing interest in
interdepartmental and international cooperation as a means of either
achieving economic efficiency or of undertaking projects that one
agency or country cannot support on its own. The two prin¢:ipal under-
lying factors that were essential to the ultimate success of t_e NASA-
DoD cooperation experience are: (i) a common subset of missions and
resources--manpower, data, spacecraft, launch vehicles, facilities,
etc.--where cooperation was possible and desirable, and (2) a common
organizational responsibility to the Executive Branch (the President
and the Bureau of the Budget), which in turn was responsible to
Congress. But even given these two principal factors, it took four
to five years before successful cooperation and the formal organiza-
tional machinery became a reality for NASA and DoD. The principal
impediment to establishing coordination earlier was the open disagree-
ment between President Eisenhower and the Congress over the need for
NASA-DoD coordination and their respective space missions. However,
during the Kennedy Administration, cooperation betveen NASA-DoD became
institutionalized after the Soviets' first manned orbital flight.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Aeronautics and Space Act, enacted on July 29, lO58,
requires that NASA and DoD "avoid unnecessary duplication of e_fort,
facilities, and equipment" in performing their portions of the U.S.
space program. Although the Congressional Justification for this
requirement was to minimize expenditures on duplicative space-related
activities, the requirement has created other kinds of problems. It
has compelled NASA, DoD, the Executive Branch, and Congress to deal
with a wide variety of policy problems related to the establishment
and maintenance of two separate organizations for carrying out the
civilian and military portions of the U.S. space program. Many of
these policy problems associated with NASA and DoD interagency coopera-
tion have varied throughout the nineteen-year history of NASA. Some
have involved role and mission issues, such as the delineation of NASA
and DoD unique mission areas; the identification of common requirements
for services, data, and space equipment; and the determination of
responsibilities for Joint programs. Others have been concerned with
the development of organizational arrangements for interagency coopera-
tion.
As the U.S. space program matured within the context of a changing
polJ_ical and economic environment, many such policy problems kept
recurring. The expected advent of the space shuttle early in the 1980s
as the standard launch vehicle for both NASA and DoD payloads, for ex-
ample, has again raised a NASA-DoD roles and missions policy problem.
In this instance, there are two parts to this issue: the shuttle's
suitability (i.e., responsiveness and survivability) for launching
operational DoD payloads and the separation of civilian and military
space programs. The latter problem centers on the use of a NASA
launch vehicle for placing c_assifled military payloads into orbit.
The space shuttle era also brought with it a renewed interest in c_z_-
i_rd spaJeen2It da_ig_ that can be used for a variety of mission pay-
loads. Use of this type of spacecraft with the space shuttle offers
operational cost savings over the use of specialized spacecraft because
_R _
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of the standardized interface between the spacecraft and the launch vehi-
cle. However, the use of standardized spacecraft necessitates an assess-
ment of the commonality of NASA and DoD mission and spacecraft needs in
keeping with the requirement that they cooperate to minimize duplication.
This dissertation examines the issues surrounding NASA-DoD coopera-
tion for a specific case study--DoD use of NASA standard spacecraft.
Using this case study, the primary purpose of this dissertation is to
examine some of the procurement considerations involved in an Air Force
decision to develop its own standard spacecraft cr to use NASA standard
spacecraft designs. In addition, this dissertation (i) places the
above decision within the broader policy context of the overall evolu-
tion of NASA-DoD cooperation in space programs; (2) analyzes the
NASA-DoD organization interactions surrounding the case study; and (3)
discusses some of the problems and prospects of applying the NASA-DoD
experience with interagency cooperation to other situations where co-
operation may be an important ingredient.
The policy context of this dissertation is the development of the
NASA-DoD interagency cooperation that has taken place during the nine-
teen-year history of NASA. A review of this cooperative experience
helps reveal the organizational problems that arose from NASA's con-
flicting goals of both competing with and cooperating with DoD, an
organization that had similar objectives and, in some instances, greater
capabilities. This review also illustrates the sensitivity of success-
ful organizational arrangements for interagency cooperation to (I) the
political environment, (2) the intentions of the agencies and their de-
clsionmakers, and (3) the availability of adequate time for organizational
This analysis examines only some of the economic considerations
concerned with the Air Force's standard spacecraft procurement deci-
sion. It deals mainly with the direct cost and benefits associated
with the development, procurement, and operation of the spacecraft
needed to accomplish the Space Test Program missions. A number of
assumptions limiting the extent of the economic analysis are made to
keep the study context, as defined by the client's (Air Force's Space
Test Program Office) organizational responsibility, the study budget,
the status of related studies, and the expected impact of the space-
craft procurement decisions on other areas, within practical limits.
These assumptions are summarized in the footnote, p. 5.
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development. Finally, the policy context provides not only the under-
]ying rationale for the case study examined in this dissertation, but
also the basis for understanding the organizational interactions sur-
rounding the case study.
,_* .The case study used in this dissertation examines the relative
costs of using one or more of several possible unmanned standard space-
,
craft for Air Force Space Test Program missions during the initial
ten-year operational period of the space shuttle. During the first
phase of this case study, the Space Test Program Standard Satellite
(STPSS)--a design proposed by the Space Test Program Office of the Air
Force Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO)uand two NASA
candidates--the Applications Explorer Mission spacecraft (AEM) and the
_lultimission Modular Spacecraft (HI_)--were considered. After com-
pletion of the initial study, a fourth candidate was introduced--a
larger and more capable AEM (L-AEM), configured by the Boeing Company
under NASA sponsorship to meet specifications Jointly agreed upon by
NASA and the Air Force. The evaluation of that spacecraft is also
included in the results of this case study, and procurement options
derived using all four spacecraft are compared for the Space Test
Program missions. The case study was funded by NASA and conducted with
the full cooperation of both _ASA and the Air Force.
In the past, the Space Test Program Office procured specialized
spacecraft as required for specific missions, which generally meant
designing and developing a new spacecraft for each new mission. The
Space Test Program Office has tried to reduce the cost of these space-
craft by requiring that (1) the contractor use flight-proven components
whenever possible; (2) a minimum amount of demonstration testing be
done; (3) high technology solutions be avoided; and (4) the institu-
tional aspects of the program, e.g., program office size, be minimized.
The Air Force Space Test Program. a triservice activity under the
management of the U.S. Air Force, is discussed in detail in Sec. III.
It is responsible for providing the spacecraft and launch vehicle, for
placing the spacecraft in orbit, and for collecting the required data
from space experiments derived from the military service and other
operating agencies.
i
...... _ -" -w
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To date the Space Test Program Office has been very successful in de-
veloping spacecraft at a cost substantially lower than the experience
of more traditional programs would lead one to expect.
Recognizing that a standard spacecraft produced in accord with
_p these principles could generate substantial savings, the Space Test
Program Office contracted for a spacecraft configuration study by TRW,(1)
which is used as the baseline configuration for this case study. Asso-
ciated studies of other aspects of the STPSS operation and design were
(2-4)
also available.
: Concurrent with the Air Force activity, for the past six years
NASA has been working on another standard spacecraft configuration,
the MHS. (5) Many of the low-cost aspects of the Space Test Program
concept are a part of the HMS design and operational philosophy as
well. The principal distinction is an emphasis by NASA on spacecraft
retrieval and on-orbit servicing that would be possible with a space
shuttle, resulting in design of a spacecraft more capable than those
necessary for the Air Force Space Test Program missions. The _4S
program is ahead of the STPSS chronologically--some of its components I
have been developed, the design is firm, and contractor bids have been
received. Thus the _ will be developed at no cost to the Air Force,
and it is r_asonable to ask whether both the _S and STPSS are needed.
The availability of the AEM further complicates the issue. The
AEM is more advanced in the development cycle. Boeing is under contract
to NASA to develop and build AEM spacecraft for the Heat Capacity Mapping
Mission (HCMM) and the Stratospheric Aerosol Gaseous Experiment (SAGE)
and, again, NASA is emphasizing low cost in the spacecraft design. .
Although the AEM is designed specifically for two missions, It has a
modular design that makes it suitable as a standard spacecraft.
An additional complication is that the AEM can be upgraded to per-
form some or all projected Space Test Program missions, depending on
the kind of attitude control subsystem used. To answer the question
These cost savings are in addition to those realized because of
the standardized interface between the space shuttle and the standard
spacecraft mentioned earlier.
J
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of which spacecraft would enable the Space Test Program Office to meet
its mission responsibilities at the lowest cost requires a comparative
analysis of program costs for alternative procureNent options. This
dissertation describes such an analysis and places it within the broader
policy context of the evolution of NASA-DaD cooperation in space ac-
tivities since the Space Act of 1958 established NASA. Section II
The following assumptions are used in this analysis:
(1) A constant performance comparison is made of alternative
spacecraft procurement options, i.e., an inelastic demand curve for
Space Test Program payloads is assumed over the relevant range of total
program costs. Although this was one of the c;ient's ground rules for
the case study (Sec. lII), a sensitivity analysis is made varying the
number of payloads included In the mission model to determine the
effect on selection of the preferred procurement option.
(2) A mission model consisting of only Space Test Program pay-
loads is used, i.e., no NASA payloads are included. As indicated in
Sec. Ill, this was a client's ground rule, but in_ofar at the overall
performance requirements as derived from the Space Test Program pay-
loads are representative of NASA performance requirements, the above
sensitivity analysis illustrates the effect of including NASA payloads.
(3) Only standard spacecraft launched by the space shuttle are
included in the study, i.e., zero cross price elasticity is assumed
for both spacecraft and launch vehicle. This ground rule stems from
the U.S. policy to phase out expendable boosters once the space shuttle
is operational and the client's interest in evaluating only standard
spacecraft designs for use with the space shuttle (Sec. IIl).
(4) No estimate is made of the employment impact in the geo-
graphical location where the standard spacecraft would be manufac-
tured. This is ignored because the manufacturers of most of the space-
craft under consideration in thls case study have not been selected.
(5) A fixed price is assumed for an Air Force-dedicated space
shuttle launch over the relevant number of launches. This assumption
is based on the preliminary output provided by NASA from their parallel
study to establish the price of a space shuttle launch for various
users: U.S. commercial firms, foreign users, NASA, and other U.S.
government agencies. As discussed in Sees. llI and IV, a sensitivity
analysis is used to evaluate the effect of the price of a dedicated
shuttle launch on the selection of the preferred procurement option.
(6) A fixed tariff formula is used to allocate the cost of a
dedicated shuttle launch to Air Force Space Test Program missions
flown in proportion to the services rendered, e.g., percentage of
total shuttle payload weight-capacity used. A parallel NASA study
evaluating various tariff formutas for allocating the cost of a shut-
tle launch to users of partial shuttle capacity (weight or volume)
provided inputs for a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the effect of the
various tariff formulas on the selection of a preferred spacecraft pro-
curement option_ (See Secs. Ill and IV.)
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traces the development of NASA-DoD cooperation in the U.S. space pro-
gram from the establishment of the Eisenhower space policles through
the mid-1960s. It deals with the creation of the National Aeronautics
_ and Space Act, the organizatlonal arrangements to ensure coordination
between NASA and DoD, and the resulting NASA-DoD relatlonshlp as it
evolved over the years. Section III presents the case study objectives
and guidelines, describes the spacecraft configurations and the neces-
sary modifications needed for use by the Air Force for the Space Test
Program missions, analyzes the mission model, and presents the estl-
mates for the spacecraft nonrecurring and recurring costs, as well as
the costs of the various launch options. Section IV summarizes and
compares the program costs of alternative spacecraft procurement op-
tions, the results of the sensitivity analyses conducted, and the con-
clusions of the case study. Section V presents a discussion of the
organizational interactions between NASA and DoD during the case study.
Section VI briefly examines some of the prospects and problems of
applylng the NASA-DoD cooperation experience to other situations where
interagency or international cooperation may be an important ingredient.
Separate appendixes briefly discuss the spacecraft and program
cost analyses, and the technlcal assessments of the relatlve state of
the art of the major spacecraft subsystems in the AE_, STPSS, and MS.
Also included is some correspondence about NASA and DoD Joint partici-
pation in providlng a standard spacecraft to satisfy the Air Force
Space Test Program Office requirements.
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II. U.S. SPACE PROGRAM: DEVELOPMENTOF NASA-DOD COOPERATIONIN SPACE
In this section, the evolution of HASA-DoD cooperation in the U.S.
space program will be traced from the pre-Sputnik era through the mid-
1960s. First, factors that may have influenced the passage of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Act viii be reviewed. These include the J
role that the DoD played in Project Vanguard and the ICBM program, the im- I:]pact of the Soviets' launch of Sputnik, end the expected decline in im-
portance of the manned bomber for the Air Force. These factors will be ]!
cast wlthln the context of the Eisenhower space policy. Next, the main
features of the National Aeronautics and Space Act deallng with NASA-DoD
relationships will be presented along with some of the background organi-
zational behavior of leading pcwer groups that attempted to influence leg-
islatlon. Following this, the formal and informal organlzatlonal arrange-
ments that were made to ensure coordination of the NASA and DoD space pro-
grams will be outlined. Finally, the NASA-DoD relationships during the
early years of the national space program will be discussed.
EISENIIOWER SPACE POLICIES
During the early 1950s, the problem of distinguishing between
peaceful and military uses of outer space was not nearly as complex or
important as it became later in the decade, with the mutual and simul-
taneous requirements of clvilians and the military for improving conmu-
nicatlons, weather predictions, navigation, and the mapping and scien-
tific study of the surfaces of the earth. In 1951, the Internatlo_,al
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), a nongovernmental organization,
appointed the Comit_ Special de l'Ann_e Geophysique International to take
charge of the worldwide cooperative effort that resulted in the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (IGY). During the ICY, individual countries
were invited to cooperate in carrying out space-related research with
international dissemination of the results. In February 1953, the
United States organized the National Committee for the International
Geophysical Year, which proposed to launch a peaceful scientific satel-
lite into orbit during the ICY. (6) In approving this project in 1955,
4 •
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President Eisenhower first articulated what was to become the basic
z
policy for the U.S. space program, i.e., that it is essential to main-
tain a clear separation between civilian and military space-related |
activities. (7) J
,_ All three military services proposed satellite programs for she i
IGY; these were evaluated by the DuD committee called the Committee on
Special Capabilities, chaired by Dr. Homer J. Stewart. The Air Force
proposal assumed the use of the Atlas missile, the Army's assumed use
of the Redstone rocket with clustered Lcki solid propellant upper stages,
and the Navy's assumed use of the Viking research rocket with the Aero-
bee second stage. The Navy's proposal was accepted, as it did not in-
terfere with the top priority ballistic missile programs of the Army
and Air Force. Thus began the Vanguard satellite project. U.S. mlli-
tary achievements in the development of the balllstlc missile Just
before the Vanguard decision were not at all spectacular. For example,
the Atlas had two unsuccessful flights, four of the five Thor flights
were unsuccessful, and only two of the four Jupiter flights had been
(8)
successful.
The orbiting of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, was a dramatic tech-
nical achievement that brought i_medlate repercussions. It was clear
that the Soviets had made no distinction between "mJ.litary" and "scien-
tific" projects. The four tons of total payload of Sputnik I (including
184 ib of instruments) contrasted drastically with the U.S. plans for
the Vanguard satellite with a total weight of only 3 Ib in orbit. The
Soviet success revealed that their competence in rocket technology was
much greater than generally believed. It also tended to confirm the
Soviet claim of August 1957 that they had the capability to build an
intercontinental ballistic missile, and thus the Soviets were a much
more immediate threat to U.S. national security than had generally been
Before the Vanguard decision, U.S. interest in ballistic missiles
as a _eans of delivering thermonuclear warheads peaked when it was dem-
onstrated that lightweight warheads could be developed. Significant
funds began to flow into the ballistic missile prograBs in 1955. All
of the services were involved: The Air Force was developing the Atlas
and Titan ICBMs and the Thor IRBM; the Army, the Redstone and Jupiter
IRBMs; and the Navy. the Polaris IRBH.
m
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thought. (8) The launchlng of Sputnik contributed further to the de-
clining credibility of the massive retaliation defensive posture of the
U.S. "New Loo_' strategy of 1953. It was evident that "massive -e-
(9)
tallation" had become a two-way street.
The prestige that the Soviets gained from their spectacular Sputnik
success helped magnify their worldwide image. The fact that the Soviet
Union was first in space _arnished the world image of the United States
as a technological leader. To make matters worse, before any signif-
icant U.S. actions were made public, Svutnik II (weighlng over ii,000
Ib with 1120 Ib of scientific instruments and carrying a dog) was or-
bited (November 5, 1957). _7)"
For the U.$. military, and especially the Aix Force, the success-
ful launches of Sputniks I and II introduced considerable uncertainty
about the continued viability of the manned Jet bomber as a global
nuclear weapon delivery system. This concern led many in the mill-
tary to emphasize and champion the military space program and es-
pecially the potential of manned space systems• To support the Air
Force's continued role, they argued in terms of a continuum of space
that included everything above the earth.
The United States achieved its first space success by drawing di-
rectly upon military resources• The Army Balllstic Missile Agency
(ABMA), ualn 8 a Jupiter C booster, placed Explorer I into orbit on
January 31, 1958, 84 days after the Army project was approved in the
wake of Sputnik. Subsequently, the Vanguard project was successfully
completed within its original time schedule and made significant sclen-
,
tlfic and technological contributions; and the Air Force launched
Project Score on December 18, 1958. The fact that all these projects
were carried out reflects the dramatic impact the Soviets' Sputnik I
had on the U.S. satellite program. Fault, therefore, cannot be attrib- ]
uted to the Vanguard system or its developers but to the decisions,
priorities, and organlzatlonal structures that represented the meager
American space effort before Sputnik. (I0)
After two successful test shots out of four, the first Vanguard
aatelllte was orbited on M_rch 17, 1958, 5-1/2 months after Sputnik and
1-1/2 months after Explorer I. Observation of the orbit of Vanguard I
resulted in the discovery that the earth was somewhat pear-shaped.
o
m
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The fundamental effec of the concern generated by the
Russian success was recognition within the U.S. Gov,:n-
ment that the enti=e spectrum of space technology had
to be given the same high priority afforded the b_tlistic
missile program. A high priority space program in turn
called for strong, new government organizatlons. (II)
_P
Although President Eisenhower allowed the military to assume a
t _ first U.S. satellite rhan that originallylarger role in launching '
planned, and never apparently really grasped the international polit-
ical significance of the Soviet technological successes, he stead-
fastly held to the policy that the U.S. space program should be scien-
tific, peaceful, and under civilian control. President EJsenhower's
view was that space provided no military significance and that it was
important to maintain a clear separation Furthermore, hl was deter-
mined not to disturb the balance between military expenditures and a
healthy nondefense economy, which meant that the space program would
not be fully supported. (9) This position was maintained e,en in the
face of the negative recommnendatlons of the Gaither Committee that
were published before the launching of Sputnik. The Galther Committee
had been appointed by Elsenhower in the spring of 1957 tc evaluate
proposals for a $40 billion program of civil defense shelters. The
committee broadened its charter to produce an overall assessment of
the state of national defense, The committee concluded that "...if
the United States did not change Its policies, it was in danger of be-
coming a second-cla_s power ...,'*a conclusion that President Elsenhower
chose to ignore until forced to consider it by the Sputnik launches. _121""
Although attempts by Eisenhower to contain the political losses
because of Sputnik were strongly motlvatcJ by hls personal Judgment of
its limited significance, it is also likely that:
Eisenhower'a position resulted from careful delibera-
tion--Sputnik I was convincing evidence of the Sovie_ i
breakthrough in long-range missile power. If Eisenhower
For example, the President told an October 9, 1957, press con-
ference that "The Russians have only put one small ball in the air."
Repeatedly. the Pres'_ent and his associates asserted that the United
States would not bect_me involved in a "space race" with the Soviets.
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had shown great alarm or acknowledged a serious re-
duction of American prestige, he would have tended
to undermine confidence at home in the security of
the country and belief abroad in its power, and this
would have been disconcerting to friends and allies.
Moreover, Eisenhower would have made himself even
_D more vulnerable to charges that he and his adminis-
tration were at fault for not having pressed the
developr_ent of missile and space capabilities sooner
and more vigorously. (7)
Within this context, the Eisenhower Administration, Congress, and
the DoD began to organize to redress the U.S.-Soviet space imbalance. A
lengthy recounting of the specific decisions and actions is outside the
scope of this study but are recounted elsewhere in great detail. (7'8'13)
In the next subsection, many of the events that directly affected the
formulation of the National Aeronautics and Space Act will be discussed.
However, in considering the formulation of NASA, it should be recognized
that perhaps the most important and lasting impact of the Eisenhower
space policy was his insistence on separating civilian and military
space efforL_ and on giving primary emphasis to civilian efforts. This
decision later came under repeated and intense attacks from the military
services, but Eisenhower was able to prevail in his view that the Ameri-
can space program should be conducted openly, not behind the cloud of
military secrecy. The dissent sprang from a variety of expected sources:
Congress, the space-oriented positions of the Army and Air Force, defense
and aircraft contractors anxious to see an ambitious space program, and
space-oriented orofesslonal societies and organizations.
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT
In response to the obvious lead over the United States it,space
capabilities that the Soviet Sputnik launches had demonstrated, active
Congressional investigations into the U.S. ballistic missile and space
programs, DoD's rapidly expanding space program, and pressure from the
The only attempt by the Eisenhower Administration to provide im-
mediate direction to the U.S. space program after the Sputnik launches
was the establishment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA), on February 12, 1958, for the purpose of providing coordination
%
1981006400-028
-12-
civilian scientific co=munlty, President Eisenhower, on March 5, 1958,
approved a memorandum recommending the establishment of a space agency
using the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) structure
as the core. The memoranduml declared that "...an aggressive space
program will produce important civilian gains in general scientific
knowledge and the protection of the international prestige of the
" and the " .long-term organization for federal space programsU.S ...., ..
... should be under civilian control. ''(8) The memo acknowledged DoD's
competence and leadership in space activities but recommended against
DoD because of the desire for civilian emphasis and DoD's deep involve-
ment in the missile programs. The memo indicated that relationships
between NASA and DoD would have to be worked out.
Subsequently, the administration' s draft legislation establishing
NASA was submitted to Congress on April 2, 1958. This bill was drafted
by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) ,,ith assistance from the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and Dr. Killian's office. The DoD
was not brought into the picture until the end of March 1958, when the
draft bill was sent to various agencies for comment. (7) The Eisenhower
schedule for introducing this legislation was driven by his interest
in getting it to Congress before the Easter recess, which left insuffi-
cient time for a thorough department review. (7) The administration
described this draft legislation as a "...bill to provide for research
into problems of flight within and outside the earth's atmosphere and
and leadership not only for the U.S. antimissile missile research pro-
grams, but also for space projects already under way or envisioned in
DoD. ARPA's mission, as prescribed by law, was to cut across the tradi-
tional levels of authority of the military services and to fund and
manage outerspace projects. At the time ARPA was established, it was
viewed by the administration as an emergency and temporary agency be-
cause of tileanticipated Congressional resistance of setting up DoD as
an operating agency for space programs. (6,11)
One Eisenlower Administration reaction to Sputnik I was to grant
American scientists increased access to the highest echelon of national
policymaklng. In the two weeks following Sputnik, _ore scientists met
with tilePresident than in the previous I0 months.(14) This access was
institutionalized by Eisenhower's announcement in his November 7, 1957,
speech that he was establishing the position of Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology and appointed Dr. James R. Killian,
president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as his first science
advisor.
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for other purposes. ''(15) It would conduct research in these fields
through its own facilities or by contract, and would also perform mili-
tary research required by the military departments. Interim scientific
space projects tha= were under the direction of ARPA would be trans-
_ ferred to the new civilian space agency. A National Aeronautics and
Space Board, consisting of members both outside the government and from
government agencies, was to assist the President and the Director of
NASA.
The most significant differences between the Space Act that was
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Eisenhower on
July 29, 1958, and the administration's draft legislation centered
around the relationship between space and national defense and the
issue of NASA-DoD coordination. The administration's proposals had an
overwhelming civilian emphasis, whereas Congressional concern following
Sputnik was largely in the area of military security. (15) To reconcile
these differences, changes in the Space Act, specifically pertaining to
the Statement of National Policy and Coordination Machinery, were made.
Statement of National Policy
The dominant issue throughout the Congressional Committee hearings
and deliberations was not so much overall policy determination as it
was the specific problem of determining the civilian and military juris-
dictions. The initial view of this issue as one of "civilian versus
military control" soon proved to be a gross oversimplification and not
a meaningful statement of the problem. Without exception, ultimate
civilian control was supported by both military and civilian activities.
However, concern was evident that the concentration on civilian space
might hamper activities concerned with national defense; Congress was
interested in avoiding this problem because the need for military pre-
paredness in this field was obviously all too vital, tllJ""
There was considerable feeling that a sharp legislative line should
not and could not be drawn. This view came largely from military offi-
cials who feared undue restrictions on space activities of the DoD.
This view is exemplified by Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker:
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It is possible that the bill under consideration could
be interpreted so as to restrict unduly the activities
of the Department of Defense in the astronautics and
space field. It is frequently difficult to determine
as we embark on so vast and unknown an enterprise as
space exploration just what facets of this exploration
will have application to weapons systems and military
operation. I do not believe it tr be the intent of
the administration or of the Congress to prohibit re-
search in this area by the agencies of the DoD. (15)
The legislative line should not be drawn too sharply
between what the DoD and its agencies can do and what
they cannot do in the field of space development.
That is a matter which ought, in my opinion, to be
dealt with administratively between the DoD and the
NASA. It should also be clearly emphasized that the
NASA, like the Atomic Energy Commission, is a part of
the Executive Branch. It is imperative that the char-
acte£ of the NACA, an executive agent of which the
NASA will be the successor, should be preserved. If
the U.S. is to cope with the fast-changing conditions,
and kaleidoscopic developments in the field of space,
full discretion in the planning and operations of such
an important agency should be left to the President. (15)
After all of the effort in attempting to clarify this jurisdictional
problem, the Space Act declares that the policy of the United States is
"...that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes
for the benefit of all mankind...," and sets forth the Jurisdictions
of NASA and the DoD as follows:
The Congress declares that the general welfare and
security of the United States require that adequate
ptovlsion be made for aeronautical and space activi-
ties. The Congress further declares that such activi-
ties shall be the responsibility of, and shall be di-
rected by, a civilian agency exercising control over
aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the
United States, except that activities peculiar to or
primarily associated with the development of weapon
systems, military operations, or the defense of the
United States (including the research and development
necessary to make effective provision for the defense
of the United States) shall be the responsibility of,
and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense;
f
>
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and that determination as to which agency has responsi-
bility for and direction of any such activity shall be *(15)
made by the President in conformity with section 201(e).
Having divided major space responsibilities between NASA and the De-
partment of Defense, the Act provides for the most effective use of
U.S. scientific and engineering resources and close cooperation among
federal agencies "...to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, fa-
cilities and equipment .... " U.S. space activities are to be conducted
so that they will materially contribute to the objective of "...maklng
available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of dis-
coveries that have military value or significance, and furnishing by
such agencies, to the civilian agency established to direct and control
nonmilitary aeronautical and space activities of informatioL_ as to dis-
coveries which have value or significance to that agency .... "
Coordination Machinery
The existence of a "grey area" in military and civilian interests
and difficulty in demarcating Jurisdictions made all the more necessary
the establishment of machinery for resolving disputes. It has been noted
that the administration bill not only failed to provide for overall
policy determination, but also made no provision for either solving
Jurisdictional disputes or for coordination and cooperation between
NASA and DoD.
_le House and Senate committees dealt with the problem of coordina-
tion machinery in different ways; the Conference Committee reconciled
these differences and called for the establishment of a nlne-member
National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC). The function of the
Council was to advise the President in their performance of the follow-
ing duties: surveying aeronautical and space activities, developing a
comprehensive program of such actlvltles to be carried out by the U.S.
Section 201(e) refers to the functions of the National Aeronautics
and Space Council, Nation_iZ Aeronaut{_8 and S;,aoe Aot o_ 1958, Public
Law 85-568 (72 Star. 426; 42 U.S.C. 24_I). The only significant change
made in the draft legislation was a general "tightening" of the language
concerning the space role of DoD. (8)
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government, allocating responsibility for major aeronautical and space
activities, providing for effective cooperation between NASA and DuD,
and resolving differences arising among departments and agencie_ of the
United States. These duties represented the primary means for carry-
ing out the mandate to devise a comprehensive and integrated policy in
this field. (16) (The draft legislation provided for a Space Board ad-
vising the NASA Director; the Space Act provided for a Space Council
advising the President. The two provisions bear almost no resemblance
to each other.) (!7)
In the original wording of this provision, Congress intended that
the appointmen_ of the executive secretary of the NASC be mandatory,
but because of Whlte House pressure "shall" was changed to "may."
Throughout the Eisenhower Administration no appointment was made and
the Council never really functioned as Congress had intended. This
was consistent with the administration position that there was no need
for a coordinated national space,policy because the civilian and mili-
tary functions in space development are separate responsibilities re-
(18)
quiring no coordinating body.
The Congress also provided machinery for direct day-to-day mili-
tary-civilian coordination by providing that a Civilian-Military Liai-
son Committee (CMLC) be established (See. 204). A chairman appointed
by the President, together with at least one representative from DoD
and each of the three services, matched by an equal number from NASA,
would serve as a means by which NASA and DoD could "advise and consult
with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions
relating to aeronautical and space activities" and keep each other
fully and currently informed with respect to such activities. If DoD
or NASA could not come to an agreement on some matter, either agency
head was explicitly authorized to refer the matter to the President
for a final decision. (No provision for such a liaison con_nlttee was
included in the draft legislation and the push for it came largely from
the House of Representatives.) (8)
ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
As mentioned previously, the Space Act required the formulation of
two groups to facilitate both the formulation of the U.S. national space .
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program and the coordination of DoD-NASA programs. These were the NASC
and the CMLC. In addition to these two organizations, other organiza-
tions influenced the formulation of the DoD and NASA space programs and
hence the degree of cooperation needed between the two agencies. These
"_ included the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional committees.
National Aeronautics and Space Council
The Space Act provided for the formulation of the Space Council.
It was to consist both of statutory members (the President as Chairman,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of
NASA, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission) and of not more
than four others appointed by the President. Its formal purpose was to
advise and assist the President, as he might request. President
Eisenhower chose to make little use of the Space Council. He convened
it only eight times; and he did not create a staff for it, allowing
other agencies (NASA and the Office of the Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology) to provide successive acting ex-
ecutive secretaries. (17) In January 1960, he recommended to Congress
that the Space Council be abolished. Before this was done, the Kennedy
Administration took office and revived the Space Council and appointed
Vice President Johnson as its Otalrman. The Space Council continues to
exist for the purpose of advising the President concerning the U.S.
space program.
Civilian-Military Liaison Committee
The Space Act also provided for the formation of the _4LC, con-
sisting of repreJentatives of NASA and DoD, plus a Chairman who was to
be an independent third party. Congress, unfortunately, did not grant
the Chairman or Committee any power; the Committee was _ assed with
impunity. In an attempt to make the CMLC work, the part-tlmc chairman-
ship was changed to a full-time position and President Eisenhower rede-
fined its function to allow the CMLC to initiate actions involving NASA
and DoD programs rather than dealing only with those problems brought
by either NASA or DoD. These changes did not cure the organizational
problem with the CMLC, and it ceased to operate.
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Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordination Board
As it turned out, rather than submitting problems to the CMLC, in-
formal arrangements between a number of different organizational levels
within both NASA and DoD were used for day-to-day coordination. This
informal organization was formalized by an administrative agreement in
1960 between NASA and DoD establishing the Aeronautics and Astronautics
Coordinating Board (AACB). The agreement laid down the principle that
liaison should be maintained "in the most direct manner possible" at
the various bureaucratic levels. To do this, officials having the au-
thority and responsibility for day-to-day decisions within their respec-
tive offices are assigned to the AACB. Initially, the Deputy Adminis-
trator of NASA and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
served as Co-Chalrmen, but each side has come to delegate this responsi-
bility. ,,
The Board is supported by six panels dealing with the follo_ing
specific areas of the space program: (i) manned spacecraft, (2) un-
manned spacecraft, (3) launch vehicles, (4) spacecraft ground equipment,
(5) supporting space research and technology, and (6) aeronautics.
These panels and the Board itself serve as forums for the exchange of
information and for the discussion and resolution of problems. Much
of the preparation of the written formal agreements between NASA and
|)oDconcerning a variety of subjects, e.g., launch vehicles, were the
responsibility of the AACB. This Board has been effective primarily
because it is in the self-interest of both NASA and DoD to settle
issues between themselves, especially if issues fall totally within
their jurisdictions. If the", fail to reach a settlement, the result
could be worse for both, because of the uncertainty about the view of
the third party that would be drawn into the decision.
Co__res sional Commit tees
The initial select committees established by the Senate and the
House for creating legislation for the Space Act have been replaced by
!
permanent standing committees. In the Senate, the c_ommittee on Ae_-
, _utieal _nd S?_c,e Seie_zc.e8 was formed on .July 24, 1958. All proposed
m
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legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters related
to the following subjects are to be referred to this Committee:
i. Aeronautics and space activities, as that term is defined
"_ in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, except
those peculiar to, or primarily associated with, the de-
velopment of weapons systems or military operation.
2. _tters relating generally to the scientific aspects of
: such aeronautical and space activities, except those pe-
culiar to, or primarily associated with, the development
of weapons systems or military operations.
3. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
In addition, the Committee was given jurisdiction to survey and
review the aeronautical and space activitles--including activities
peculiar to, or primarily associated with, tiledevelopment of weapons
systems or military operations(19)--of all agencies of the United
States and to prepare studies and reports of such activities.
In the House, the Co_ttee on Science and Astronautic8 was es-
tablished in 1958. 'Re Jurisdiction of this Commlttee was delegated
to the following five major subcommittees:
i. Aeronautics and Space Technology--deals with legislation
and other matters relating to the Office of Aeronautics
and Space Technology and the Office of Tracking and Jata
Acquisition.
2. International Cooperation in Science and Space--de_Is with
all international agreements and activities of NASA, the
National Science Foundation, and tileNatio1_l Bureau of
Standards, inc]uding other international matters of astro-
nautical research and development_ outer space, and scientif-
ic research.
3. Manned Space Flight--deals with legislation and other matters
relating to the Office of _nned Space Flight.
{
r,
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4. Science, Research and Development--deals with legislation
and other matters relating to the National Science Foundation,
National Bureau of Standards, and scientific research and
_ development.
5. Space Science and Applications--deals with legislation and
other matters relating to the Office of Space Science and
the Office of Appllcatlons. (20)
In addition to the formation of these two standing comm_ittees to
specifically handle legislation for the space program, the A_edSe_-
vice8 Comr_ttae holds hearings relating to military aspects of the
space program. Also, the Committee o_ Government Operation8 of the
House has taken particular interest in the civilian-military roles and
(11,21)
relationships in carrying out the U.S. space program.
Bureau of tileBudget
Normally, the military space program is in competition with all
the other military programs for funds. This competition has tended to
keep the military space program realistic relative to DoD's other
priority requirements. NASA, however, because it is strictly associ-
ated with space, generally does not have to subject its program to
such severe competition for agency funds. The BoB regularly judges
the recommendations made by the various departments and agencies. For
NASA, convincing the BoB is where the battle begins for its space pro-
gram appropriations, whereas for DoD, the competition occurs within the
department as well as at the BoB because of tileDoD's narrower range
of ends and means. As a consequence, the military space programs are
generally well defined and justified to survive the internal DoD re-
, view process.
!
NASA-DOD RELATIONSHIP
1958-1960
As noted earlier, the Eisenhower space policy was very conserva-
tive. It did not recognize the importance of the political implications
l
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of tl_ continuing Soviet accomplishments in space. P2cause of the mul-
tiplicity of motivations underlying opposition to the Eisenhower space
policy, his administration was able to withstand all challenges. Sup-
porters of an aggressive, coordinated space program were not able to
agree on the specific features of such a program. Rivalry between the
Air Force and the Army, within DoD, and between the military services
and NASA, helped to fragment the opposition. The administration's
attempt to keep the space budget at a low level meant that the govern-
mental space agencies were not able to win significant support from
the industrial constituency, especially in comparison with the in-
dustrial support for the Air Force and Navy strategic missile programs.
The DoD had the initiative in space activities during the early
part of this period, primarily because 90 percent of the U.S. space
competency was based on military systems. While NASA was busy organiz-
ing itself and deciding on which projects to pursue, the DoD continued
to support big projects with funds much larger than those available to
the new agency. ARPA and Air Force work was in part related to missile
activities, such as that involving solid rockets, launch facilities,
and test ranges. Other work combined both space and missile activities,
including satellite identification, antisatelllte defense and the mis-
sile early warning satellite Midas. Beyond this, the list of 195B
military space prolects was impressive: orbital gliders, new boosters,
and satellites for reconnaissance, communications, weather forecasting,
and navigation. In addition, manned spaceflight was considered to be
a priority project for the DoD, with all three services vying for ARPA
(Ii)
support.
In March 1958, three weeks after the establishment of ARPA, that i
J
agency acknowledged that the "Air Force had a long-term development
responsibility for manned spaceflight capability, with the primary
objective of accomplishing satellite flight as soon as technology per-
mits. ''(21) In the manned spaceflight area, the Air Force plan included
not only earth-orblting satellites, but also lunar circumnavigation and
lunar-landlng missions. Because of the urgency surrounding the Soviet
Sputnik II launch, the manned earth-orbiting satellite project, "Man-in-
Space-Soonest," had top priority. In addition _o the Air Force project,
m-
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there were two other manned military space systems seeking ARPA approval
in the summer of 1958. The Army's proposal was put forward by Wernher
Von Braun's team at the Redstone Arsenal. It had a faster time schedule
than the Air Force "Soonest" program but involved only a suborbital
_
flight. The Navy also proposed a manned satellite study called Manned
Earth Reconnaissance I. (22)
Following the establishment of NASA, the DoD, ARPA, and NASA agreed
upon aivesting the DoP of many of the above-mentioned space-related
projects, facilities, and personnel. By Executive Order, issued in
December 1958, NASA acquired the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Air
Force transferred to NASA its contract and funds to develop a 1.5 mil-
s
lion Ib thrust, single-chamber engine. By these and other moves,
NASA quickly gained competence in electronics, guidance, tracking, pro-
pulsion, and systems analysis. Through the years, NASA and DoD reached
agreement on numerous cooperative efforts tnvotving, for example,
launch sites, tracking stations, and launch vehicle development. At
this level the cooperation was exemplary. From the outset, however,
there were numerous projects in a gray area between military and
civilian, including the very important man-in-space project. NASA and
DoD initially attempted one solution to this problem by :asking the
project a Joint one. The Bureau of the Budget, however, frowned
on jointly managed projects; consequently, this approach was dropped.
By August 1958, the Elsenhower Administration clearly assigned NASA
specific responsibility for the manned spaceflight mission, thereby
cancelling the "Soonest" project and leaving the Mr Force with Project
Dy.na--Soar as its only near-term manned-spaceflight opportunity.
NASA actually wanted part of the ABMA (Wernher Von Braun's team)
transferred to give the agency an in-house capability for large rocket
engine and booster development. This transfer was delayed until July 1,
1960, by DoD objections that the ._,B_ group was needed for Army missile
development. To support this transfer, I;ASA and DoD endorsed a memoran-
duta for President Eisenhower declaring "...there is, at present, no
clear military requirement for superboosters, _lthough there Is a real
possibiitty that the future will bring military weapon systems require-
ments .... ,,(7)
A list of 88 joint NASA-DoD agreements made during the 1958-1964
time period are presented in Appendix V of gef. 11.
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Subsequently, the Director of ARPA, Roy Johnson, implied that NASA
would concentrate on scientific space exploratlons and DoD on military
applications. Specifically, he said that the NASA manned-spacefllght
program (Mercury) was a continuation of NASA projects llke the X-series
of aircraft, but that after ea-ly experiments, the military would do
_" (21)
the follow-on work in near-earth space systems: That is, NASA
would de_eZop the manned system and DoD would ope_zt¢ it. This was
the DoD's new stance on the manned-spacefllght issue.
During this time period, there were two NASA policy problems that
affected the NASA-DoD reiationshlp. The first policy stemmed from the
general guidelines for NASA's program as authorized by the Space Act.
Not only was NASA concerned with defining its own role in the nation's
i
space program, but there was evidence that Congress intended that NASA
have a special role in formulating the space program for the nation as
a whole. In a prepared statement, Dr. Keith Clennan said: (8)
A most important duty placed on the President by the
Space Act is to develop a comprehensive program of
aeronautical and space activities to be conducted by i
agencies of the United States. i
Preparation of such a program for ultimate approval
by the President has been delegated by him to NASA
with assistance and cooperation of the Department
of Defense.
Very substautlal progress has been made in developing
national space programs...the national booster pro-
gram--the national tracking and communication pro-
gram--the national space science program.(23)
Eleven days later, Clemmn retracted the statement that the Presi-
dent had "delegated" to him the responsibility for preparing the rm-
tional space program. Rather, NASA had been asked "to initiate and
bring together, with the assistance of DoD, a total program which
would then be submitted to the President. ''(21) No such integrated
space program ever emerged, partly because of the Eisenhower Adminlstra-
tion view, supported by IX)D, that NASA and DoD space activities should
be treated separately, and not as a comprehensive national space program.
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Another NASA policy problem that affected its relationshtv with
DoD centered around the realization that the Soviet challenge was the
most important factor shaping U.S. space policy. From NASA's point of
view, it was absolutely essential that tb _.American public realize that
space superiority should not be confused Ith military superiorlty and
that the U.S. space program should not be construed as the leadin 8 edge
in the cold war. NASA felt uhat it must be free to move ahead on a
vigorous course of action without having to worry about its every move
being thought of in national security t eLias. (8) The DoV and much of
Congress, however, continued to view the U.S. space prograr in national
security terms, especially when the Soviets conrinued to accomplish
spectacular space feats while the United States was slowly progressing
with a variety of earth-orbiting satellite programs.
During this period, the machinery set up in the Space Act for co-
ordination between the DoD and NASA fell into disuse. After two years,
the S?ace Co_a_ showed little sign of life. No full-tlme staff or
Executive Secretary were appointed by the Eisenhower Administration,
despite provisions made for them in the Space Act. As mentioned above,
the comprehensive, integrated space program for the United States, also
called for by the Space Act, was not forthcoming, The operation of the
C_ui_i_n-,qi_i_a_y L':a{8on Co.r_'ttee was affecte_ by delays i,,appointing
its membership, some of whom were not directly associated with _he
management of space projects. In July 1959, President Eisenhower re-
vised the CHLC charter to allow it to take the initiative in dealing
with Jurisdictional differences between NASA and DoD rather than waiting
,
The spectacular Soviet achievements in space co_%tinued after the
original Sputnik launches. In the Lunlk program, the Soviets first hit
the moon on September 13, 1959, and then photographed the lunar far side
on October 18, 1959. In August 1960, the Soviets succeeded in recover-
ing i 5 ton satellite containing two dogs, which was obviously developed
for eventual manned flight.(11)
After Explorer and Vanguard, the United States program consisted
of the orbiting of the Tiros weather satellit_ on April I, 1959; the
navigational satellite, Transit I-B, on April 13; the Midas missile de-
tection satellite on May 24; the passive communication satellite, Echo
I, on August 12; and the communication sat_lllte, Courier, on October 4.
Tiros and Echo were NASA proJec:s; Transit, Midas, and Courier were DoD
projects. (11)
i
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to be asked by one of the agencies. But this alteration did not cor-
rect the situation. The Chairman, Mr. W. M. Holaday, called the Com-
mittee "nothing more than a post office.''(21)
On January 4, 1960, President Eisenhower asked Congress to enact
amendments to the Space Act "to clarify management responsibilities
and to streamline organizational arrangements ....,(8) Basically, the
President declared that the Act should be purged of the concept that
a comprehensive program for both civilian and military space interests
needed to be prepared. Without the need for a comprehensive plsn, the
Space Council was not needed and he asked that it be abolished along
with the Civilian-_Xlitary Liaison Committee.
In subsequent Congressional Hearings, Senator Johnson blocked the
disestabllshment of the Space Council in the Senate and it became known
that an informal arrangement had evolved to coordinate DoD-NASA inter-
actions that bypassed the CMLC. The Space Act was amended, institu-
tionalizing this informal coordinating structure called the Aeronautic8
and Astronautics Coordinating Board.
In contrast with the CMLC, the substantive power of the AACB and
its panels was based on the inherent power of the individual members.
With top-level officials serving on the Board and panels, the number
of unresolved problems was small; normal deci_ionmaking channels were
to be used for resolving disagreements.
Perhaps the best evidence that the AACB system worked was that the
responsibility for accomplishing interagency planning for the very im-
portant national launch vehicle program was entrusted to the AACB and
this arrangement was confirmed by the new NASA-DoD leadership that came
into being with the Kennedy Administration. (8)
The AACB was to be responsible for facilitating (i) the planning
of NASA and DoD activities so as "to avoid undesirable duplication and
...achieve efficient utilization of available resources"; (2) "the co-
ordination of activities in areas of common interest"; (3) the "iden-
tification of common problems"; and (4) the "exchange of information. ''(8)
The AACB was to be supported by six subboard organizations called panels,
each dealing with a different aspect of the space program--manned space-
flight, unmanned spacecraft, launch vehicles, spaceflight ground en-
vironment, supporting research and technology, and aeronautics.
l
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1961-1967
At the start of 1961, the situation with regard to the future of
any manned-spaceflight program, much less one intended to land man on
the moon, was extremely gloomy. President Eisenhower and his advisors
remained unconvinced that the country needed, or should invest in, an
!
_ expen._ive manned-fllght program for propaganda or military purposes.
This conviction led them in late 1960 to refuse approval of NASA's
Project Apollo. i
It was generally assumed, in view of the Kennedy-Johnson campaign
statements, that space matters would receive greater emphasis in the
t
new administration. There was no assurance that NASA's clvilian-ori-
programs would be expanded or even maintained, Many Kennedy ilented
statements stressed the military and national security aspects of space. _
The military services argued that the Soviets were concentrating on the i_
development of a "near-earth" operational capability for military pur-
poses, something which NASA's civilian-scientific program could not
counter.
In the power vacuum following the November election, the military
services not only asserted their point of view, but they also announced
unilaterally a number of new starts. For example, on December 6, 1960,
the Air Force announced plans for orbiting a monkey into the Van Allen
radiation belts; on December 8 the Air Force announced plans for orbit-
ing a communication satellite; the Navy also announced its intention
(8)
to start a new space satellite project.
Within this context, President Kennedy appointed an Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Space (headed by Jerome Wiesner of MIT) to evaluate the na-
tion's space program. Both NASA and DoD were found to be inefficient
in the administration and management of their space programs. The Com-
mittee recon=nended the reestablishment of the National Aeronautics and
Space Council for improving the coordination between NASA and DoD.
Another consequence of this review was the reorganization of DoD space
activities, making the Air Force responsible for all of DoD's R&D for
At this time, Project Apollo was much less ambitious than the one
later approved by President Kennedy.
.. ,.,
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space systems; operational systems were assigned to services Individu-
ally. While this reorganization followed tlleCommittee's observation
that "...each of the military services has begun to create its own in-
dependent space program...," it created considerable interservice con-
ia_ cer_ for its own requirements for space systems. (24)
In accepting the Wiesner Committee recommendations for the rein-
statement of the Space Council, President Kennedy indicated that he
wanted the Council to advise him on how the nation could overtake the
lead of the Sovlet Union. lle also appointed Vice President Johnson as
Chairman of the Council.
On April 12, 1961, _jor Yurl Gagarin of the Soviet Union became
the first man to travel in space when he successfully orbited the earth
in his Vostok space capsule weighing over 5 tons. This feat focused
immediate attention on American manned space efforts. _le President
had already committed himself to gaini_tg space superiority; Project
Mercury no longer would suffice. On Hay 25, 1961, President Kennedy
called for the nation "to commit itself to achieving the goal, before
the decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him
safely to the earth. ''(25)
The significance of the Cagarin flight and President Kennedy's
selection of a manned-lunar-landing mission as the means of challeng-
ing the Soviets in space exploits is that it conclusively ended DoD's
challenge for leadership of the U.S. space program. To accomplish the
manned lunar landing before 1970 meant much larger budgets for both
NASA and DoD, increased cooperation between DoD and NASA on a wide
variety of projects, and, for the short range, increasing reliance of
NASA on DoD's competency. For a while this patterL_ obscured the fact
that NASA was becoming the donr_c_z_ space agency. As it gained a posi-
tion of dominance, NASA began to acquire autonomous capabilities;
As of April 1961, Project Mercury had nearly completed the urnnanned
flight portion of its schedule. The remaining schedule called for two
manned suborbital flights (accomplished in May and July of 1961--18
months behind the original schedule) and four manned orbital flights
(February, May, and October 1962 and May 1963). 111etotal program was
completed nearly three years behind the original schedule, with the
first orbital flight 14 months after the (;agarin fllght.(22)
• m"
1981006400-044
-28-
it also began to exercise its increasing bargaining power by asking for
a voice in milltary-managed projects needed by both DoD and NASA. NASA
also asserted its identity in the DoD complex by establishing inde-
_ pendent field installations at both the Pacific and Atlantic missile
launch sites. (II)
1963-1965
During this period, both NASA and DoD faced the problem of rapidly
increasing program costs and the resulting program reviews_ cancella-
tions, and realignment. For the DoD, their last remaining connection
with the manned spaceflight program, Project Dyna-Soar, faced ultimate
cancellation because of technical problems, increasing cost_ and com-
petition with NASA projects. Nevertheless, with NASA concentrating
mainly on the lunar-landlng mission, the Air Force surfaced a variety
of manned space projects for operation in low earth orbit. These in-
cluded the Manned Orbital Development System (MODS) and Blue Gemini.
These projects were returned to the Air Force for further study.
In 1963, Defense Secretary McNamara stated the following criteria
for DoD space programs:
First, it must mesh with the efforts of _he NASA in
all vital areas .... Second, projects supported by
DoD must promise, insofar as possible, to enhance
our military, power and effectiveness.(II)
As a consequence, DoD Joined forces with NASA on a number of projects,
one of which contained the agreement "that the DoD and NASA will in-
itiate major new programs or projects in the field of manned space-
flight aimed chiefly at the attainment of experimental or other capa-
bilities in near-earth orbit only by mutual agreement. ''(II) These
agreements _ffectively blocked all DoD manned space projects until
Secretary McNamara unilaterally assigned the Air Force a new program
for the development of a near-earth manned orbiting laboratory (MOL)
on December I0, 1963, at the same time that he cancelled the Dyna-Soar
program. In justifying his decision on MOL, Secretary McNamara said:
"Their [NASA] program is related to the lunar program ... they have
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no near-earth orbit manned operations planned co_parable to th_s.''(II)
It was further recognized that the MDL was a necessary first step in
developing military operational systems in near-earth orbit.
The Department of Defense had found that joint NASA-DoD projects
._ have their limitations. There is generally a dispersion of authority
and responsibility. If an agency regards its share of this work as
merely a service for another agency, or if full agency prestige is not
on the llne, support tends to dimlnish--"buckpassing" develops. These
potential weaknesses are not limited to joint projects between agencies
but also apply to those carried on within agencies. For example, the
split responsibility between defense-civil agencies, the Air Force, the
Army, and NASA in the advent military communications satellite projects
contributed to the troubles and later demise of that project.
Subsequently, MOL ran head-on into competition with NASA space
station plans. In 1964, separate DoD and NASA efforts appeared to be
subject to only a minimum of coordination. Demands for coordination
resulted in a joint DoD-NASA agreement that study information would be
exchanged at the conclusion of the respective space station studies.
1965-Present
After 1965, DoD's MOL program was cancelled, NASA successfully
completed Project Apollo and the near-earth-orbit Skylab program using
Apollo hardware, and NASA began to develop the Space Shuttle. Concen-
tration has been on international cooperation and arms agreements ban-
ning the basing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. The
DoD has been concentrating its space activities on the use of unmanned
spacecraft for its traditional missions of surveillance, communication,
command and control, and early wa_ning.
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!II. STANDARD SPACECRAFT ACQUISITION FOR THE AIR FORCE: STUDY BACKGROUND
_ND OBJECTIVES t SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTION_ MISSION MODEL_ AND COST ESTIMATES
As discussed in Sec. I, changes in the political, economic, and
i_ technological environment of the country often affect the policy prob-
lems faced by the organizational machinery set up to ensure continued
NASA-DoD cooperation. In Sec. II, the evolution of that organizational
machinery is traced through the mid-1960s, at which time its institu-
tionalization was assured. Since that time, a number of important de-
velopments have taken place involving the ongoing NASA-DoD relation-
ship, including: (i) the successful completion of Project Apollo and
the concomitant NASA expansion; (2) the demonstration of the long-dura-
tion capability of the manned Skylab; (3) the increasing sophistication
of unmanned spacecraft and their mission successes; and (4) the recent
national commitment to the space shuttle as the principal launch vehicle
for both NASA and DoD beginning in the early 1980s. One of the objec-
tives of this dissertation is to evaluate a current case study involv-
ing NASA-DoD cooperation in the procurement of a standard spacecraft.
That evaluation also demonstrates the NASA-DoD cooperation process as
it now exists, nineteen years after NASA's founding.
The advent of the space shuttle as the only operational launch ve-
hicle for the 1980s (and thereafter) has provided the context for the
case study selected for this dissertation. In the shuttle era, standard
spacecraft designed to support a wide variety of payloads are expected
to receive greater attention from NAS_ and DoD because of their potential
cost savings (mainly recurring costs) over the use of specialized space-
craft designs. The case study evaluated in this dissertation deals with
an Air Force decision about the possible use of NASA standard spacecraft
des igns.
The Air Force decision is whether to design and develop its own
standard spacecraft or to procure NASA designs for accomplishing its
Air Force Space Test Program missions during the initial ten-year opera-
tional period of the space shuttle. In this section and the one that
follows, the detailed analysis is presented to support the evaluation of
the relative costs of several procurement options for accomplishing the
?
l
s •
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Air Force missions. Here, the case study background and objectives are
presented along with a description of the four unmanned standard space-
craft used in the case study and the necessary modifications needed for
use by the Air Force for the Space Test Program missions. The Air ForceL
mission model is also presented and analyzed with respect to the capa-
bilities of the four standard spacecraft. Finally, the estimated non-
recurring and recurring _pacecraft costs are presented, as well as the
costs for the various launch options considered in the analysis dis-
cussed in Sec. IV.
STUDY BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
As mentioned above, all of the missions to be examined in this case
study involve the Air Force Space Test Program and are to be flown on
the space shuttle. To provide a context for the cost-benefit analysis
that follows in See. IV, th_ Air Force Space Test Program is briefly
described in terms of its origin, mission, organizational links, operat-
ing philosophy, kinds and types of payloads (experiments) flown, and
rationale for the standard spacecraft. Following this, the case study
objectives and guidelines are presented. Finally, the operation of the
space shuttle, as it affects this case study, is described.
Air Force Space Test Pr0 r_
The Space Test Program, formerly known as the Space Experiments
Support Program, was organized in July 1966 as the central flight-support
project for all DoD experimental payloads. It is a triservice activity
under the management of the U.S. Air Force. Organizationally, it is as-
sociated with the USAF Space and Missile Systems Organization's Advanced
Space Programs. As currently organized, the Space Test Program pro-
(27)
rides the following services:
Payload, as used here, could consist of a single experiment or a
number of related experiments. As will be discussed later in this sec-
tion, the Space Test Program Office mission model is composed of a num-
ber of different experimental groupings and each of these groupings--
distinguished by being on a single page of R_f. 26--Is referred to as
one payload.
i
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I. A method for collecting, reviewing, and assigning priorities
to potential payloads (experiments).
2. A system for defining the number and method of securing
spaceflight for these payloads.
•_ 3. An a_ency for managing and funding of booster and spacecraft
procurement, payload integration, and launch and orbital
support.
The Space Test Program Office has provided these services for over
i00 different payloads derived from the three military services and
other operating agencies. These payloads have ranged from alpha-particle
detectors to x-ray monitors. Some have weighed less than a pound, while
others have weighed over a thousand pounds.
The selection process for payloads to be included in the Space Test
Program originates with a request from a DoD laboratory, or some other
agency, for a spaceflight of a specific experiment. The Director of
Space, USAF Headquarters, processes these requests and, with the concur-
rence of the Office of the Director of Defense, Research and Engineering
(DDR&E), and interested military services, determines which payloads, will
be included in the Space Test Program. The Space Test Program Office de-
fines the spaceflight for as many payloads as possible, given funding
limits, and submits the program to the Director of Space and DDR&E for
approval. When the plan is approved, the Space Test Program Office con-
tracts for the necessary spacecraft, launch vehicle, and payload integra-
tion.
To increase the proportion of the funds available for payload devel-
opment, the Space Test Program Office has followed a low-cost strategy
consisting of:
1. Using "secondary" space on spacecraft and _aunch vehicles
of other programs, i.e., viggybacking.
2. Using existing space vehicle designs whenever possible.
3. Using backup spacecraft designed and built for other
programs.
4. Using selective redundancy in Space Test grogram-procured
spacecraft.
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5. Using off-the-shelf, space-qualified hardware whenever
possible.
6. Staffing a project with a small, responsible teem (about
_ ten individuals per major project).
The type and number of payloads flown on a Space Test Program mission
vary widely. For example, one upcoming mission consists of experimental
payloads from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and ARPA. The mission includes
seven payloads having a total weight of 700 lb. Three of the payloads
require a sun-polnting orientation, while the remainder require earth
scanning. The spacecraft therefore must be three-axis stabilized
with the capability of scanning the earth. Another mission includes
twelve small payloads to investigate the same phenomenon--spacecraft
charging at altitude--having a total weight of 200 lb.
As will be discussed later in this section, a Space Test Program
_ission model consisting of descriptions of a number of experiments proposed
by various agencies and departments was used in the evaluation of the stan-
dard spacecraft acquisition decision. These payloads can be arrayed in a
variety of dimensions, as discussed later, but for the sake of providing
some understanding of the nature of the problem that these payloads present
to the Space Test Program Office, the following ranges of requirements are
included in the 1980-1990 Space Test Program mission model: (26)
Operating
PArameters Typical Range of Requirements
Weight 1 to 525 ib
Electric power 0.001 to I00 W
Data rate 0.001 to 64 kbps
Stabilization Three-axls or spinning
Orientation Sun-polntlng or earth-pointlng
Pointing accuracy + 0.5 to + 15 deg
Apogee altitude TOO to 20_000 n ml
Perigee altitude 100 to 20,_00 n ml
Inclination Equatorlal to polar
#
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The approach used by the Space Test Program Office in the past to
satisfy the heterogeneous array of payload requirements on she space-
craft has consisted of minimizing the interaction of one experiment with
another. However, with the recent availability of a new fault-tolerant,
_ general-purpose spacecraft computer, it is possible to consider coupling
two or more payloads. Information may be extracted from individual pay-
loads and computationally reduced on board, thereby lowering the bandwidth
of information transmitted to the ground. (27)
The Space Test Program Office became interested in the standard
spacecraft concept because of _he possibility of combining this capa-
bility with the possibility of further reducing the spacecraft cost by
procuring a fairly large number of spacecraft at a given time. This
concept was especially interesting with the advent of the space shut-
tle, where the match between launch vehicle and mission is not as
critical as it has been when expendable boosters were used as launchers.
As a consequence, the Space Test Program Office sponsored the design of
a modularized standard spacecraft (STPSS) that has the capability of
meeting all of its payload requirements, while also conforming to their
icw-._os_ design philosophy.
Objectives and Guidelines
The two objectives of this case study are to develop internally
consistent cost estimates for the AEM, L-AEM, STPSS, and MMS spacecraft
and, using these estimates, to determine the variation in program cost
for a variety of spacecraft procurement options capable of performing
the Space Test Program missions during 1980-1990. The emphasis is on
relative, not absolute, accuracy in the estimates developed. The con-
clusions that are drawn concerning the various procurement options,
although discussed in terms of total program costs, are dependent upon
the relative costs of the various spacecraft (see Sec. IV). They are
not affected if the magnitude of the total program costs is underestl-
mated or overestimated.
The study guidelines are summarized below:
Before the space shuttle, the Space Test Program had the option of
selecting th_ launch vehicle to fit the particular mission requirements,
e.g., in 1976, both the Titan III and Scout launch vehlcles were used.
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i. Spacecraft configurations are based on descriptions provided
by Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) for the MS, by TRW
for the STPSS, and by Boeing for the AEM and L-AEM.
2. Space Test Program payloads described in Cz_nt STP Payloac_ (26)
,j (the so-called "Bluebook") are considered representative of
those that would be flown during the period 1980-1990.
3. All spacecraft are compatible with the use of solid rockets
for orbit translation, which usually requires spin stabiliza-
tion. The AEM and STPSS are designed with that in mind.
The MMS normally uses a hydrazine propulsion module or the
Interim Upper Stage (IUS) for orbit translation in a three-
axis-stabilized attitude, but according to GSFC it can also
be spin stabilized for orbit translation.
4. Space Test Program missions are intended to be flown as
secondary payloads, which implies that Space Test Program
payloads would rely on solid rocket kick stages for
translation from the nominal shuttle parking orbit to the
desired mission orbit rather than on changing the shuttle
orbit altitude and inclination to meet the payload require-
ments.
5. Nominally, two Space Test Program flights per year are sched-
uled; the minimum is one.
6. All payloads are launched using the space shuttle.
7. Servicing of payloads in orbit or retrieval of spacecraft
for reuse is not considered.
Space Shuttle Operations
As just mentioned, this study is restricted to consideration of the
space shuttle for t_e primary launch vehicle. As currently envisioned,
the space squttle will have the capability of placing 65,000 Ib of pay-
load into a 150 n mi earth orbit with an inclination of 28.5 deg when
operating out of the Eastern Test Range (ETR). To place payloads in
Although the IUS uses solid rockets, its use by the Space Test
Program is considered a special case because of the high cost of that
design.
• "m
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either higher orbital altitudes or inclinations will degrade the on-orbit
space shuttle payload. For example, to increase the orbit altitude to
300 n mi (with an inclination of 28.5 deg), the payload decreases from
65,000 Ib to about 53,000 ib; an increase in the orbital inclination to
_ 56 deg results in a similar payload reduction. For a polar orbit with
an altitude of 150 n mi, the space shuttle payload is about 39,000 lb.
In addition to the payload weight constraints, the shuttle payload
bay is also limited in size. The ma_n cargo bay is 15 ft in diameter
and 60 ft long. As will be discussed later in this section, the method
of allocating the cost of a space shuttle launch to the various users
has not yet been determined, but payload length and weight and orbital
altitude and inclination are being considered by NASA as parameters for
determining the shuttle tariff schedule.
Because of the Space Test Program Office's interest in retaining
the option of operating as a secondary payload status, nominal shuttle
parking orbits with an altitude of 150 n ml and an inclination of 28.5
and 90 deg are used for this study. Nearly all of the Space Test Program
missions require orbital translations from the shuttle parking orbit to
the desired mission orbit. To accommodate this translation, solid pro-
pellant rockets sized for the specific veloclt_ requirements and mission
payloads are osed. Generally, two rockets ave requlred--one for apogee
and one for perigee. In this study, all of the solid rockets are drawn
from the inventory of existing solid rocket motors.
In special cases where large velocity increments are required and
the Space Test Program payload is large, the IUS is used as the transla-
tion stage. This stage is being developed by the Air Force to support
the _pace shuttle operat!ons. It consists of two solid rocket stages
and an instrument module capable of guiding the payload into orbit.
The translation is accomplished in a three-axis-stabilized mode as com-
pared to a spin-stabilized mode when the smaller solid rocket motors are
used.
Secondary payload status refers to the case where the Space Test
Program mission does not determine the shuttle altitude, inclination,
or launch schedale and flies on a space-available basis.
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STANDARD SPACECRAFT DESCRIPTIONS
Four unmanned standard spacecraft designs are involved in this case
study. As mentioned in Scc. I, during the first phase of this case
A' study, the Space Test Program Standard Satellite--a design rroposed by
the Space Test Program Office of the Air Force Space and Missile System_
Organlzation--and two NASA candidates--the Applications Explorer Mis-
sion spacecraft and the Multlmisslon Modular Spacecraft--were considered.
After the initial study phase was completed, a fourth candidate was
Introduced--a larger and more capable AEM (L-AEM) configured by the
Boeing Company under NASA sponsorship to meet specifications Jointly
agreed upon by NASA and the Air Force. In the material that follows,
each of the spacecraft configurations is described, then a comparison
is made of the spacecraft requirements, followed by a detailed descrip-
tion of the modifications needed for their use by the Air Force Space
Test Program missions.
The purpose of a standard spacecraft is to provide all of the house-
keeping functions for the Space Test Program payloads during the llfe of the
mission. For example, once in orbit, the spacecraft stabilizes the payload
and points it in the correct direction, it provides the necessary power and
power conditioning to run the experiments and provide thermal protection to
the payload, and it provides the communication and data h_ndling equipment
necessary to control the experiments and transmit the data back to earth.
In most of the cases examined in this study, the spacecraft also provides
the guidance and control necessary to translate the payload from the shuttle
parking orbit to the mission orbit.
The STPSS deslsn (Fig. I) consists of four modules: core, orientation,
propulsion, and payload cluster. The core module is common to all missions,
regardless of whether the spacecraft is spin- or three-axls stabilized. Two
types of orientation modul_s provide for the two stabilization modes. The
propulsion module, which fits into the circular space of the core and orien-
tation modules, is tailored for the specific mission weight, final orbital
parameters (perigee and apogee altitude and inclination), and the shuttle
parking orbital parameters. The STPSS is designed in a hexagonal, torus-
shaped configuration, which surrounds the solid propellant propulsion modules.
1981006400-054
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The payload cluster, while unique for each set of payloads, has a common
mechanical, thermal, and electrizal interface with the STPSS. As can be
seen in Fig. i, the configuration of the solar cells is different for the
three-axis- and spln-stabillzed versions of the STPSS. These panels are
also _odular, thereby allowing the electrical power generated by the space-
craft to be tailored to the payload demand.
The three-axls-stabillzed version of the STPSS has a dry weight of
about 1000 ib without payload or propulsion system. It is about 7.5 ft in
diameter, a_._ about 32 in. thick. One of the reasons behind this "pancake"
design was to minimize the length of the spacecraft so that it would fit
into the space shuttle without occupying primary bay space, allowing the
Space Test Program missions the option of flying on board the space
shuttle as a secondary payload.
The MMS design, depicted in Fig. 2, consists of a centrally located
trlangular-shaped module support structure having attach points for:
(i) the power module, (2) the attitude control and stabilization (ACS)
module, (3) the communications and data handling (C&DH) module, (4) the
mission adapter-payload module, and (5) either a small or large impulse
propulsion module. In this design, all missions are flown with the first
four modules; the propulsion module is optional, depending on the mis-
sion. For missions requiring large orbital transfers, either the IUS or
other appropriate solid motors replace the propulsion modules shown in
Fig. 2. As will be discussed later in this section, several equipment
options are available within each of the three main modules (power, ACS,
and C&DH) to accommodate mission-speciflc requirements. For example,
the solar array design shown in Fig. 2 is generally considered to be
similar to that of the stabilized version of the STPSS. Again, it is
modular and may be tailored to the mission power requirement. The MMS
is designed for remote on-orblt replacement and servicing and, as a re-
sult, is a much more sophisticated design than the STPSS. The payload
interface (power, thermal, mechanical, and data handling) is constant
for all missions.
The MMS weighs about 1400 ib without the solar array or space pro-
pulsion system. The overall width is about 4.5 ft and its length, without
• J'
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payload or propulsion, is about 5 ft. The _R_S design is suitable only
for operation in the main payload bay of the space shuttle.
The third standard spacecraft design included in the initial phase
of the study was the AEM (Fig. 3). Boeing is currently building two i
•_ versions of the AEM: the HCMM and the SAGE. The outward physical appear-
ance of the two versions is very similar in that most of the differences
involve components housed within the spacecraft. The AEM is three-axis
stabilized and can be matched with appropriately sized solid rocket motors
for orbital translation. In its current design, it is limited to opera-
tional altitudes less than i000 n mi because it relies on magnetic
torques rather than reaction Jets to unload the momentum wheels (Appendix
D). It is a low-cost expendable design that uses off-the-shelf components
throughout. The physical configuration of the AEM is a "hexagonal nut"
36 In. across the flat and 25 in. long (excluding payload and propulsion).
It weiNhs about 210 lb.
The fourth standard spacecraft, the L-AEM, is a derivative of the AEM
that has been increased in diameter to a nominal 5 ft (Fig. 4). The L-AEM
design can be procured in tbree different configurations: the baseline
option (L-AEM-BL), the spin-stabilized option (L-AEM-S), and the precision
option (L-AEM-P). The ccnflguration changes are achieved by modifying the
equipment list. The L-AEM-BL weighs about 670 ib without propulsion or pay-
load.
SPACECRAFT COMPARISONS
Spacecraft Requirements
The nominal spacecraft requirements for the AEM, L-AEM, STPSS, and MMS,
categorized by mission, communication, electrical power, stabilization and
control, and reaction control system and propulsion, are shown in Table I.
Of the four spacecraft, the AEM is the smallest and has the least capability.
It is about 3 ft in diameter, can carry a 150 Ib payload, and is limited
to operating altitudes less than i000 n ml.
All three configurations of the L-AEM have a minimum llfe of one
year and a payload capability of I000 lb. Both the L-AFhi-S and L-AEM-P
can operate from low earth orbit to geosynchronous altitude; the L-AEM-BL
is restricted to altitudes less than i000 n ml.
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The STPSS can carry a nominal payload of about i000 Ib, can be
operated at altitudes up to geosynchronous, and weighs about i000 lb.
It can be procured in three different configurations--a spinning version
(STPSS-S), a low-cost, three-axis-stabilized version (STPSS-LC), and a
' three-axis-stabilized precision version (STPSS-P).
The MMS is the most sophisticated of the standard spacecraft con-
sidered in this study: it is designed for on-orbit servicing and reuse.
It can carry a payload of about 4000 ib and can also be operated up to
geosynchronous altitude.
AEM and MMS spacecraft have communications systems that are compati-
ble with the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition Network, while the L-AEM
and STPSS are compatible with the Space Ground Link System. This dif-
ference in the communication system needs to be corrected before the AEM
and MMS can be used for Air Force missions. (The modifications nec.ssary
to make this correction are discussed later.) Another difference is in
the data rate capability of the communication systems. Both the AEM and
MMS have data rates considerably less than that of the L-AEM and STPSS,
i.e., 8 and 64 kbps,* respectively, as compared with 128 to 256 kbps.
All of the spacecraft use 28 V electric power systems. The basic
differences are in the solar array designs and batter> _harging systems.
The AEM has a fixed solar array capable of providing about 40 to 50 W for
experimental use. The other designs treat the solar array as a mission-
specific item. The peak array power for the L-AEM is I000 W, almost as
much as the 1200 W of the STPSS output; the _HS power system can handle
arrays having a peak output of up to 3600 W. The battery-charging system
of the MMS is different from those of the L-AEM and STPSS. All three pro-
vide for more than one battery, but an individual charging system is used
by the L-AEM and STPSS, whereas a parallel charging system is used for the
MMS.
In stabilization and control capability, the MMS is again superior to
the other spacecraft with a pointing accuracy of ± 0.01 deg and a pointing
stability of ± 10-6 deg/sec. The L-AEM design provides essentially the
The communications data rate is given in kbps, the power system
capacity in volts (V), and the solar array output in watts (W).
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same variety of options for stability and control of the spacecraft as
the STPSS. The spin-stabillzed options are identical in capability,
while the capability of the precision option exceeds that of the STPSS-P
_ but is less than that of the MMS. The L-AEM-BL option is more accurate
than the STPSS-LC option in the pitch and roll axes and identical in
the yaw axis.
Both the AEM and MMS have hydrazine attitude control systems; the
STPSS uses a cold gas system in combination with solid rockets for orbit
translation. The MMS hydrazlne propulsion modules (SPS-I and SPS-II)
provide a choice of module configurations tha_ can be selected depending
upon the delta velocity required. The reaction control system used in
the L-AEM is a derivative of the hydrazine system of the SAGE version
of the AEM. The major difference is that the L-AEM-P configuration has
a reaction control system sized to provide three-axis stability during
the solld-rocket-powered orbital translation phase. Consequently, it
includes nozzles with relatively large thrust levels (65 and 155 ib) in
addition to the normal thrusters. There seems to be no reason why the
L-AEM-P configuration cannot be spin-stabilized during orbit translation,
therefore it has been assumed to have this capability, especially for
the geosynchronous missions where larger-size solid motors are required
than those discussed in Ref. 28. In Ref. 28 the overall length of the
L-AEM, payload, and solid rocket kick stages was restricted to less than
the diameter of the shuttle. This allowed placement of the spacecraft
perpendicular to the shuttlf longitudinal axis and hence minimized the
length of the shuttle bay used for the flight. The application of the
L-AEM in this case study has not been restricted in this manner.
The individual spacecraft configurations and the modifications
considered necessary to allow their use by the Air Force in carrying
out the Space Test Program missions are described below.
AEM
As mentioned earlier, there are two basic AEM configurations--
HCMM and SAGE--whlch consist of the same base module wJT . dzfferent
mlsslon-speclflc equipment. The HCI_ configuration u_es a hydrazlne
• #t
Space Propulsion System (SPS).
J
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orbit-adjust module, while the SAGE configuration includes a second
momentum wheel and a tape recorder.
For Air Force use, the SAGE configuration was selected as being
most appropriate. The only modifications that were considered relate
to the conversion of the communication system to make it SGLS-compatible.
These changes are itemized below and discussed in detail in Appendix C.
Basically, the changes involve replacing some of the AEM communication
equipment with the appropriate SfPSS communication equipment.
o Replace S-band transmitter with STPSS S-band (SGLS) transmitter.
o Replace S-band transponder with STPSS S-band (SGLS) transponder.
o Replace command demodulator with STPSS dual signal conditioner.
o Modify pulse code modulation (PCM) encoder for dual baseband.
o Modify co.and decoder/processor.
Although the power system of the AEM is very limited (_'50 W),
no changes were made in this system for Air Force use. Also, the non-
redundant design of the AEM was unaltered. In addition, the current
AEM design does not allow for the use of encryption equipment--this
was not changed because it is not a requirement for all Air Force
missions considered in this study.
STPSS
Each of the three available STPSS configurations (summarized in
Table 2) consists of a core and an orientation module (or a spin-control
module in the STPSS-S case). In addition, a variety of mission-speciflc
equipment is available for each configuration. The core module is the
same in all cases. The orientation or spin module determines the atti-
tude stability and pointing accuracy of the spacecraft. The configura-
(i_
tions used in this study are those identified by TRW in their study,
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No changes were made except, by direction of the Air Force, the hydrazine
reaction control system (RCS) designed by TRW for the STPSS was not con-
sidered in this analysis because of its relatively high cost compared
with tllecold gas reaction control system/solld rocket option.
Table 2
ST, SS CONFIGURATIONS
STPSS-P STPSS-LC STPSS-S
Core Module Core Module Core Module
+ + +
Orientation Module Orientation Module Spin Control Module
• 3-axls • 3-axis • Spin
• Precision (±0.1 deg) • Low cost (±1 deg) • Low cost (±1 deg)
• 1 deg freedom solar • 1 deg freedom • Cold gas RCS
drive solar dr.
• Cold gas RCS • Cold gas RCS
+ + +
Mission-Speclfic Mission-Specific Mission-Specific
Equipment Equipment Equipment
• Solar panels (max. Same choices as Same choices as for
1200 W_ for STPSS-P. STPSS-P, ex,mpt
• Extra 10 ° tape • Solar panels
recorder (max. 380 W)
• Encryptton unit (GFE)
• Orbit transfer module
(solids or IUS)
• Antenna
i
l
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MMS
The basic MMS, su_rized in Table 3, consists of three primary
modules, plus a variety of mission-specific equipment, all of which
"" are attached to a structural subsystem. For Air Force use (i) the at-
titude control module is retained without modification, (2) one 20 Ah
battery is added to the power module so that it would have the same
Table 3
MMS CONFIGURATIONS
MMS MMS-AF
Attitude Control Module Attitude Control Module
+ +
Power Module Power Module
s Two 20 Ah batteries • Three 20 Ah batteries
+ +
C&DH Module C&DH Module
• TDRSS- and STDN-compatible • SGLS-compatible
+ • [Data rate 128-256 kbps] a
+
Mission-Speciflc Equipment
$ Antenna Mission-Specific Equipment
s Solar panels (as required) Same as above, except
• Space propulsion (SPS-I, • Solid rockets for orbit
SPS-II, IUS) translation
• Solar drive
• Extra tape recorders
(8 x 109 bits)
• Extra batteries (one 20 Ah
or three 50 Ah)
aAddltional option.
• b
7_._ _ _ ._ .o
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energy storage capacity as the STPSS, and (3) the communications system
is changed to be compatible with SGLS.
Listed below are the detail modifications to the MMS communica-
tion module needed to achieve this compatibility. Again, these _#d-
iftcations consist mainly of replacing MHS communication equipment with
,
_" STPSS equipment that performs a similar function. The necessary
changes to increase the data rate to 128-256 kbps have not been
considered as requirements.
SGL__SComa_tbtltty
• Replace S-band transponder with STPSS S-band S(;LS
transmitter and receiver.
• Replace or modify command decoder with STPSS decoder.
• Replace premod processor with STPSS dual baseband unit.
Increase Data Rare
• Replace data bus controller with STPSS bus
• Replace clock and format generator _ controller (data
• Replace standard computer interface) k formatter).
• Replace remote interface unit with STPSS data _nter-
face unit.
Although the parallel battery-charging design used in the MMS
power module has been of some concern to tht_ Air Force, it was not
considered necessary to change it (see Apperldix B)_ since the power
regulation unit will tmve adequate redundancy to meet Air Force re-
quirements, and the _S power system will be a flight-proven design
before the missions considered in this study are undertaken.
SPACE TEST PROCRA,_I MISSION MODEL
In accordance with the directions provided by the t#ork Statement
for this study, Space Test Program missions (26) to be flown during the
It should be noted that if the Air Force Solar Infrared Experi-
ment (SIRE) is flown on the ._t_lS, these changes in the communication
module will have already been made before any of the missions considered
in this study. As noted later in this section, the M24Scost estimates
are based on this assumption, hence the nonrecurring cost associated
with these changes is not included in the study.
• •
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1980-1990 time period are divided into three payload groups (Table 4).
The principal distinguishing feature of each group is the spacecraft
requirements. For example, payloads in groups I and Ill all require '_
a spacecraft with nornina_ capability and either _hpee-czx_8 or 8pin
•_" stabilization. We have taken this to mean chat these missions could
be flown on the AEM, STPSS-S, STPSS-LC, L-AFt-S, or L-AEM-BL space-
craft. Those payloads in group II require a spacecraft wlth a hi.jh
capability and three-cz.r._.8stability. This requirement can only be met
by the STPSS-P, L-AF2_-P, or M_IS.
Of the estimated twenty flights to be flown between 1980 and 1990,
the Work Statement indicated that about 75 percent (15 flights) would
be in payload group [, I0 percent (2 flights) in payload group Ill,
and 15 percent (_ flights) in payload group II. Uslr.g the estimated
division between large (over 150 Ib) and small payloads given in the
Work Statement for each of tilepayload groups, we can presume a total
of 114 payloads for the nominal case or about 6 payloads per spacecraft.
A.qmentioned previously, Ref. 26 provided a listing of c ", 52
Space Test Program payloads that were to be considered as representa-
tive of those that would be flown between 1980 and 1990. These payloads
were analyzed in terms of their spacecraft requirements for accuracy,
stabilization, and weight. The results of that analysis are shown on
the right-hand side of Table 4 to allow direct comparison with the
guidance given in the Work Statement for this study.
We found that the overall division of payloads between group I1
and groups I and Ill was a little different from that suggested by
the Work Statement, i.e., only iI percent, rather than 15 percent, of
the payloads fell into payload group If. We also found that the per-
centage of small payloads in groups I and Ill was '.arger, i.e., 90
percent, rather than 85 percent. Appropriate adjustments for these
relatively minor mismatches caused an increase in the total number of
Space Test Program payloads from I14 to 151, which is equivalent tc
_t
For :his reason, group II is distinguished from groups I and
III in the discussion that follows.
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about 7.5 payloads per spacecraft. In addition to this, the prelimi-
nary status of the mission model suggested that the number of payloads
in the program and the number of payloads per spacecraft should be
included in the sens_tlvity analysis.
_ As indicated on Table 5, t,e Space Test Program missions (26)
are divided into eight different orbits that distinguish between
orbit altitude, inclination, and spacecraft o_ientation. The first
orbit (I-S and l-E) is a low earth orbit with an altitude of about
250-300 n ml. The mlssicna of this orbit are divided into those
that are sun-oriented and these that a_e earth-oriented. As you may
see, 45 percent of the Space Test Program payloads would fly in this
orbit. The second orbiL is a highly elliptical one (7000 x 200 n mi)
!
having an additional 28 percent of the Spacz Test Program payloads.
Table 5
SPACE TEST PROGRAM MISSION CATEGORIES
Orbit Inclination Launch Percentage No. of
Number Type (n mr) (deg) Range of Payloads Payloads
h.
l , Sun-synchronous, 250-300 98.4 Western 17 20
sun-oriented circular
1-E Sun-synchronous, 250-300 98.4 Western 28 32
earth-oriented circular
2 Elliptical 7000 x 200 Polar Western 28 32
3 GecJynchronous, 19,372 Low Eastern 8 9
sun-oriented circular (28.5)
4 -- I0,000 Low Eastern 4 5
circular (28.5)
5 12 hr 21,000 _ 900 63.4 Eastern 7 7
7
6 Geosynchronous, 19,3_I Low Eaetern 2 3
earth-oriented circular
7 -- 3200 x 150 30 Eastern 2 3
8 -- 180 circular Polar Western 2 3
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The missions in both of these orbits are launched from the Western
Test Range (WTR). The missions flown on the WTR (orbits i, 2, and 8)
represent about 75 percent of the Space Test Program payloads. The
payloads flown out of the Eastern Test Range (ERR) all require large
orbit translations; e.g., up to geosynchronous. The last column in
Table 5 indicates the number of Space Test Program payloads in the
nominal case that are flown in each of the orbits during the 1980-1990
time period. The total number of Space Test Program payloads in the
nominal case is 114.
In Fig. 5 these orbits are related to the perigee and apogee altl-
tude ranges of individual payloads. The payloads are identified by
page number in the bluebook (26) at the top of the figure Each payload
generally has a wide range of acceptable operating altitudes, which
has made it reasonably easy to collapse the Space Test Program payloads
into eight orbits.
In addition to ordering the Space Test Program payloads according
to erbit parameters, they were also matched with each of the ._pacecraft
being considered in this study. In making these assignments, the fol-
lowing were considered: payload weight, maximum altitude, orientation,
power availability, data rate, pointing accuracy, and stability. The
resulting match between individual Space Test Frogram payloads and the
various spacecraft is illustrated in Table 6. Space Test Program pay-
loads are identified by bluebook page number. Of the 52 payloads in
the bluebook, 6 were not included in the mission model for various rea-
sons (see footnotes to Fable 6). Of the remaining 46 payloads, the AEM
with its 150 ib payload capability and i000 n ml altitude l_mitatlon
can accommodate only i0 (22 percent). The spinning versions of the
L-AEM (L-AEM-S) and STPSS (STPSS-S) can both handle 26 percent of the
total payloads. The baseline version of the L-AEM is limiteJ to uLbital
altitudes o[ less than i000 n mi and to earth-oriented misslens and
therefore can accommodate only 28 percent of the payloads. The low-co3t
It is recognized that when these payloads are actually flown, a
larger number of orbits may be used depending upon the capabilities of
the spacecraft and payload requirements- this should not affect the
results of this study.
5,
I
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Table 6
SPACECRAFT MISSION CAPABILITY
Spacecraft
..
Space Test Program AEH
Payloads (Bluebook (150 lb,
Page Number) <1000 n mi) L-AEN-S L-AEM-BL L-AEH-P STPSS-S STPSS-LC STPSS-P NNS-AF
_._ I X X X X
• 2 X x X X
3a X X X X
6 X X X X
7 X X X X X X
8b X X X X
lO X X X x x X
II X X X X
12 X X X X
13 X X X X
14 x X X X
15 X X X X
16 X X X X X X
17 X X X X
18 X X X X X x
19 X X X
20 X X x
21 X X X X
22 X X X X
23 X X X X X X X X
24 X X X X X X
25 X X X X
26 X X X X X X X X
27 x X X X X X
28 X X X X X X X
29 X X X X X X
30 X X X
31c X X X X X X
32 X X X X
33 X X x X
34 X X X X X X X X
35 X X X [ X X X
36 X X X I X X X
37 X X X X
38 X X X X X X
39 X X X X X X
40c X X X X X X X
41d X X X X X
43 X X X
44_ X X X X
46 ! X X X X X X
48 x X X
_9 x X X X X X
50 X X X X
51 X X X X
; 52 X X X X
Total payloads lO 12 13 46 12 41 46 46
aPsyloads 4 and eliminated--excesRlve altitude (69,000 n mi) and already flown.
bpayload 9 eliminated--excesslve altitude (69,000 n mi).
CAssumes that only a portion of the payload is spun.
dpayload 42 eliminated--inconsistent data.
epayload 45 elimlnated--SIRE mission exceeded TRW STPSS design power level.
tPavload 47 elimlnated--insufflclent data.
t
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STPSS (STPSS-LC) spacecraft can handle 89 percent of the payloads,
whereas all three precision configurations (L-AEM-P, STPSS-P, and MMS)
can handle all of the payloads.
Consistent with the Work Statement guldelines, we have assumed
that those payloads that require spinning can be accomplished on a
,_ three-axis-stabilized spacecraft by allowing portions of the payload
to spin. It is also assumed that the total payload integration costs
for the mission model will not vary substantially as a function of the
procurement option. A further assumption that was made is that those
payloads having accuracy requirements in excess of the capability of
the L-AEM-P, STPSS-P, and _4S really have attitude determination re-
quirements rather than pointing accuracy requirements.
In the analysis of program costs that follows (Set. IV), only
those spacecraft and combinations of spacecraft that can accommodate
the entire Space Test Program mission model were considered. The
various procurement options will be evaluated on a constant performance
,
basis. To expand the mission model up to 114 payloads of the nominal
case, a linear extrapolation of the characteristics of the 46 payload
model given in the bluebook has been used.
SPACECRAFT AND LAUNCH COSTS
Spacecraft
Estimating the costs of the AEM, L-AEM, STPSS, and MMS presented
an interesting problem because each was at a different stage of develop-
ment. The AEM was well along in the development process, and the con-
tractor, Boeing, was confident that the ceiling price would not be
exceeded. Should the L-AEM be developed, Boeing would have AEM experi-
ence to build on. The three STPSS configurations were the result of a
short study by TRW, and they lacked the specificity of the AEM and MMS.
Since preliminary designs generally change, and changes generally
It is clear that some procurement options, such as the pure MMS
option, will have excess capability. However, no attempt has been made
to determine the value of this excess capacity for the Space Test Pro-
gram.
." • b
.
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increase cost, one needs to question whether an estimate of current STPSS
designs would be representative of final cost. The MMS was somewhere
between the AEM and STPSS; some hardware had been developed, design was
complete, and NASA had gone out to industry for bids. Thus the sltua-
,_ tion was one in which some costs were known, some were partly known,
and others were unknown. It was necessary to develop estimates that
would reflect relative differences in the size, complexity, and capabil-
ity of the spacecraft as currently specified.
Eecurring Costs. An examination of existing parametric cost-
estimating models showed that they had been developed from data on
conventional spacecraft, i.e., spacecraft for which low cost was not
a dominant consideration. Thus a procedure was required that would
provide comparable estimates of the various spacecraft but estimates
in keeping with current experience. The method adopted was to develop
a model calibrated to reflect AEM experience, in essence saying that
AEM costs are known and those of the other spacecraft can be extrap-
olated from that base using conventional scaling techniques. Estimates
of Unit 1 cost for each spacecraft are shown in Table 7. These estimates
include allowances for modifications of the AEM and MMS to meet Air
Force requirements.
By using the same model for all estimates it can be argued that
they should be comparable. The point has been made, however, that such
a procedure ignores an important element of spacecraft cost. The AEM
and L-AEM are not comparable to the STPSS and MMS, because they consist
of a single module produced by a single contractor. With two, three,
or even four contractors involved in production, integration, and test
of the different modules, additional costs could be incurred. Whether
that would produce a significant cost difference is a matter of some
disagreement, but the assumption made here is that it would not. While
that assumption may favor the STP£S somewhat and the MIIS even more, if
it had any effect at all it would be to strengthen the conclusions of
the study.
As a check on the spacecraft estimates, they were plotted against
weight (Fig, 6) and compared with a regression llne from the SAMSO Un-
manned Spacec_,aft Cost Mode_ (third edition). (29) All are within the
1981006400-075
!
J
I
-59- i
Table 7 i
ESTIMATED UNIT i COST !
(In millions of i
1976 dollars) i
i
AEM ....................... 2.3
L-AEM ,
Spin .................... 3.9
Baseline ................ 4.8
Precision ............... 5.7
STPSS
Spin .................... 4.6
Low-cost ................ 5.7
Precision ............... 6.9
MMS
Basic ................... 8.9
SPS-I ................... 9.4
standard error of estimate (the dashed lines) of the regression line.
The AEM has a higher relative cost than the other spacecraft because of
a lower percentage by weight of structure. All other spacecraft have
costs lower than would be predicted by the SAMSO model, and that seems
appropriate because the model was derived from data on conventional
spacecraft.
#
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Fig. 6--Spacecraft unit cost versus weight
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Cost-quantlty effects in spacecraft depend more on the size of
each individual procurement than on the cumiilative quantity procured,
A block buy of six may reduce total cost by 20 percent, but a buy of
six spacecraft one at a time may produce nc cost reduction. Since the
manner of procurement could not be specified in this study_ cost reduc-
tion was related to annual production rate according to the following
empirically derived schedule:
Annual
Production Cost (%)
1 i00
2 90
3 87
4 85
In estimating spacecraft costs it was further assumed that_
I. Procurement of the AEM by the Space Test Program Office
begins at Unit 9. The f_rst eight units will be procured
by NASA befor_ 1980.
2. Procurement of the MMS by the Space Test Program Office
begins at Unit 5. The first four units will be procured
by other agencies before 1980.
3. NASA procures two MMS per year during the decade considered.
The Air Force buy is incremental to NASA procurement.
4. The Air Force procures MMS for SIRE, which means that an
Air Force-compatible communication and data handling sub-
system would be developed for _S and would be available
to the Space Test Program Office for the missions discussed
in thi_ study at no additional cost.
A block buy usually means accepting delivery from the contractor
of all the spacecraft at one time or over a short period of time. The
alternative is to spread the delivery uniformly over a much longer time
period.
I
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Nonrecurring Costs. Nonrecurring costs were estimated for the
STPSS and L-AEN only; for the other spacecraft those costs would not be
borne by USAF and would be irrelevant in comparisons of USAF outlays.
The SAMSO U_n_zned_acecraft Cost ,_del provided the basic estimating
equations, which were derived from a sample of up to 28 space programs
over the period 1959-1972. Some spacecraft had been deleted from the
sample because they were developed "under tight monetary constraints
and under a philosophy that required the use of proven technology."
STPSS is precisely such a program, so the output of the SAMSO model
was modified to flt the Space Test Program Office philosophy.
An initial assumption was that the first spacecraft manufactured
and tested would be a flight model, i.e., there would be no qualifica-
tion test model. It was later decided that a qualification test model
would be desirable, and the estimates were modified to reflect that
decision. The higher estimate is the one included in the final program
costs.
For the L-AEM nonrecurring costs the basic estimate provided by
Boeing was scaled up to include a test model, but as shown in Table 8,
the difference between L-AEM and STPSS nonrecurring costs is striking.
When L-AEM costs are estimated in the same manner as those for the
STPSS, the differences ar_ far less. It is possible to construct a
rationale for some degree of difference, e.g., L-AEM would be a follow-
on to AEM, and there _uld be some transfer of learning. Also, STPSS
consists of modules that are developed separately, then integrated,
and each module is essentially a separate spacecraft. Configuration
changes in L-AEM are handled on the basis of different kits rather
than different modules. Nevertheless, the discrepancy between the
estimates based on the S_MSO model and those based on Boeing figures
is too great to be ignored. In the discussion of program costs in
Sec. IV the impact of that discrepancy on the issue of space_raft se-
lection will be examined.
_k
Sample size varied for each spacecraft subsystem.
I
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Table 8
SPACECRAFt NONRECURRING COSTS
(In millions of 1976 dollars)
Estimates Based Estimates Based
on SAMSO Model on Boeing Study
Spacecraft STPSS L-AEM L-AEM
Spin 15.9 ....
Low-cost (baseline) 20.7 18.0 8.6
Precision 23.4 19.6 9.1
Spin + low-cost 25.3 ....
Spin + precision 28.1 23.0 11.3
Low-cost + precision 26.1 25.3 11.9
Spin + low-cost + precision 30.9 28.7 14.5
Launch Costs
The other major category of cost in the lO-year program considered
is the cost to launch spacecraft and place them in orbit at the speci-
fied altitude and inclination. The basic launch vehicle is the space
shuttle, but at present neither the cost nor the guidelines for allo-
cating cost among users has been determined. Estimates of cost range
from $15 million to $30 million, of which the users may pay all or
nothing. The intent of the study was not to estimate launch costs but
to examine whether those costs could influence the choice of spacecraft.
Consequently, launch costs were assigned to each payload based on a
range of assumptions: Space shuttle launch cost was $15.4 million or
$30 million. Co,sts are allocated on a basis of weight or according
to either of two NASA-proposed tariff schedules, or are not allocated
at all, i.e., only a service charge i,_" incurred.
In the initial phase of this study a ._ASA formula was suggested
as a basis for prorating launch cost; it considered weight, length,
incl ination, and altitude as independent variables, i.e.:
_;RU - .00215 length + .0238 length 2 + .000203 weight
- .00000000169 weight 2 - .000122 inclination
+ .00442 inclinattun 2 + .00109 altitude + .0002_2 altitude 2
• m°
I
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where SRU = Service Rendered Units, which may not exceed IOO. It repre-
sents a percentage of total launch cost. Length is in feet, weight in
pounds, inclinatlon in degrees, and altitude in nautical miles. If
the SRU exceeds 100 ft it is assumed to be truncated at 100.
A formula proposed since the earller phase* consists of prorating
the d@alcated shuttle cost on the basis of whichever of the load-factor
ratios below is larger:
1. payload length (in f-_*_60
t** payload weight (in Founds)2.
shuttle orbital capacity (in pounds) to the
deslred Incllnatlon and altltude
In this study, we have assumed a direct relationship between load
factor, as determined above, and the cosr factor for prorating the
dedicated shuttle cost. In some formulations of this tariff rate, the
load factor is multiplied by as much as a 1.4 cost factor; this has not
been used in this study. Because the launch cost is vet" sensitive to
payload length when using this NASA tariff, an attempt was made to
minimize launch cost by placlng payloads laterally rather than Iongl-
tudlnally in the shuttle bay whenever the payload length was less than
13 ft. Launch costs estimated using the above method are identified
as the modified NASA tariff.
The other cost-allocation schemes considered were: a full allo-
cation by weight, i,e.,
e
Private conversation with Hr. Edwin G. Dupnlck at the Johnson
Space Center of NASA, October 1976.
|
" i **Payload length is the sun of the lengths of the Spece Test Pro-
_" _ 8ram payload, spacecraft, and solid kick stages.
*_" i eeeFor this study, nominal shuttle capacltles of 65,000 lb for
ErR launches and Jg,000 Ib for vtrR launches have been used. A nominal
' altitude of 150 n ui has been used. Solid rocket kick erases are u_,:
to translate the spacecraft to higher orbits. Payload weighs i_ t_
i sun of the weights of the Space Test Program payload, spacecraft, md
kick stageG.
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payload _ei_t
x $15.4 _illion ,
shuttle orbital capacity
plus a service charse of $1 million; an allocation of only h_:f the I
t shuttle cost plus a service charse; and, a service charae only.
Kick StaBes
A variety of solid propellant kick stapswere required, ami to
slmpllfy the task of asslpin8 a cost to each klek stese a simple
cost-estimmting relatlonshlp yes 6erived from the coat of several
exlstln s stages:
C = 2900 W"585
vhere C - stage cost in 1976 dollars, and
W - stnse velght (Ib).
- Where the IUS yes used, a cost of $h.3 mllllon vas charsed.
#
1981006400-081
-65-
XV. STANDARDSPACECRAFTACQUISITIONS FOR "i_JEAIR FORCE:
PROGRAMCOSTSAND COIqCLUSIONS
_. PROGP.q4COSTS
Xn thls sect/on, the tot_ prosrms costs are discussed for a variety
of procurenant option_, each of which is copabls of psr_ormin 8 six of
the Alr Force Space T_.st l_rosrms sd_slons. For this constant-perfotnance
comparison, prorras cost is used as the principal Nasure for diet/Jr
8uishin8 anon 8 procurement options. The analysis described in this
section was accos_lished in two phases. In the first phase, procurement
options nstn 8 the AEH, ST#SS, and )_S spacecraft were ccmpartJ. In the
second phase, sddtttousX procurement options nstu8 the L-AEH opacec-.aft
were defined partly as a result of the outcome of the first phase of this
analysts; for that reason the sequential nature of the analysis ls pre-
served in the discussion that fellers. Finally, the conclusions are pre-
sented for the case study of the Air Force standerd spacecraft procurmant
decision, k11 costs are In m£11tons of 1976 dollars.
_ominsl Case
A n_n81 case yes defined as 8 baseline for estinatins the cost
to carry out the Space Test Proarsn uissions dur£n8 the 1980-1990
period, and 8 nmher of excursiou£ frou that heasline were -,,do to test
the sensitivity of the results to aesmptions about the nunbar of pay-
leeds, payloads per spacecraft, etc. The ncltnsl case includes all three
versions of the STPSS. The u_n81 proarsn size to 114 paylnsds, with 8
sunLtmm of 6 payloads per spacecraft. In heopin8 with the Air Force
S
As mentioned in Sac. Ill, the Work Statement for this study indi-
cated that the number of payloads (defined as the set of experiments
_.-_ coublnsd on one pass of the bluebook)(26) to be flmm per spacecraft
' could very frc, s 8 coabinstion of I large payload plus 4 snail payloads
to as many as 12 small payloads. In Sac. llI It was found that for the
_.. noui_l site prosran (114 payloads), the avsraas number of payloads per
spacecraft would be about 6 but that it nisht increase to 7 or 8. For
this study, this assumption has been treated as s aaxheun value rather
than as an avarase value vhile allocstin8 the Space Test Prosran pay-
loads to specific spacecraft; this vLtl be discussed later In this
section when the sensitivity excursions are described.
-_-- o v
4s' .i _
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Space Test Prol;ram poslrion that its payloads always have a secondary
status, they are always taken to an altitude of 150 n mi by the shuttle;
solid rocket kick stages (not the IUS) are the_ used for translation
into the proper orbits. Both ETR and k'rR launches of the shuttle are
i_,_., considered. It has been assumed that the shuttl_ cost of $15.4 million
will be prorated by weight and that. a service charm ._f $I mill_-on per
launch will be sade.
The number of spacecraft that would need to be procured for each
of four different procuremnt options is shown in Table 9. The four
options are: alI-STPSS, all-_S, AEM plus STPSS, and AEIq plus MS.
An option ,..onsistinB of all three types of spacecraft would not be
cost-effective in view of the magnitude of the nonrecurrin$ cost asso-
ciat_,d with providing the STPSS-P, stven that the pros_am already ._.n- -_
cludes the I_IS.
Table 9
|
NUHBER OF SPACEt,I_AFr
(Somlnal case) '
Procurement Options
Spacpcraft .
Type STFSS }_qS AEH/STDSS AEN/)@tS
k_l 0 " 3 4
STPSS-S 0 0 0 0
STPSS-LC 19 0 16 0
STPSS-P 5 0 $ 0
_S 0 ;_ 0 20
Total 24 24 24 24
t
It can be seen that the STPSS-S conflauratlon Is never proc:_red
in the nominal case. because there are only a few payloads that can b,.
spin stabilized, and they ire distributed over the eight different
"* _ orbits In such a ray that it Is 81vays more c:atly to use an s'rPss-s
i spacecraft than to lo_d up the STFSS-LC or STPSS-P spacecraft. _hen i
considerin8 proar_ trlth a larser number of payloads, the Apin con-
flauration 4j included in the procurement six.
Jr , _" ....
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The costs associated with these procurement options are shown in
Table 10t broken out by the spacecraft, kick stages, and launch opera-
tions. The cost of the all-solld kick stages is nearly insignificant
,_ (about 2 percent of the total). Launch costs represent about 25 per-
cent of the t6_al cost.
Table 10
PROCUREMENTCOSTS IN NOMINAL CASE
($ millions)
I Procurement Options
C,-_t Item STPSS NNS AENISTPSS AENIFMS
opacec_dft 167 190 155 172
Kick stages I
(solids) 4 6 4 5
Launch
(100% prorated) 51 67 51 63
Total 222 263 210 240
The lowest-cost procurement option is the AEM/STPSS combination,
but the alI-STPSS option i- within I0 percent of the AEN/STPSS cost. i
Give_ the uncertainties of the various spacecraft designs used in this
study, pro_ro_ o_tiort8 hav_ co8t8 within 10 percent of each other are _ •
considered as indistinguishable. Consequently, for the nominal case,
both the AEN/STPSS and alI-STPSS cases are preferred alternatives. 1
The alI-F04S case is not a good option for the Space Test Program mls-
sions, because it offers more c_oability than is needed by most of the
payloads, and that capability must be paid fJr.
Payload Varis=ions _
Those results can be _onsldered valid only if they obtain for con-
ditions other than these established somewhat arbitrarily. To test
i their sensitivity to the original assumptions, several other cases were
exsmined: (l) The maximum number of payloads per spacecraft was ln-
crea_ed fr_a 6 to 1_; (2) the number of payloads in the program was
it allowed to range from 92 to 228; (3) the IUS was used as a kick stage
1981006400-084
-68-
for missions wlth large payload weights and high altitude requirements;
(4) the percentage of shuttle costs prorated to Space Test Program pay-
loads was varied from 0 to I00 percent; (5) criteria other than weight
were used for allocating shuttle cost; (6) shuttle cost was increased
from $15.4 to $30 million; and (7) lower development cost was assumed
: for the STPSS to reflect the elimination of the qualification test model.
Of the above cases, maximum payloads per spacecraft, payloads in the
Space Test Program, allocation criteria for launch costs, and shuttle
cost were found to be the most important in terms of program costs.
The variation of total program cost wlthmaxlmumpayloads per
spacecraft is illustrated in Fig. 7. As the maxlmum increases, the
reduction in program cost for the a11-HHS case 18 much larger than for
any of the other options. This is partly because of the large payload
_00
STPSS
o MMS
• AF.M-STPSS
o A£M-MMS
2OO
PROGRAM
COST
(millions
of
dollors) 100
I I I
Oi | lO 13
MAXIMUMNUMB[ROf PAYLOAOSPERSPACECRAFT
Fig. 7_Effect of the maximum number of payloads
_ per spacecraft (nominal cam)
capability of the _S. The result is that the ability to dlstln_Ish
_" between the procuremeLtt options on the basis of cost disappears vhen
the _usximum number of payloads increases above 10. IIo_,_ver, the t,o_aZ
program cost.ie about 30 percent lower than in the nominal oaee (r_zi-
mum number of pa_Zoads = e) when the number of payZo_de is aZ1owsd
..
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to increase to 13. That was found to be t_e •cross a wide number of
excurslons.
It should be noted here that assuming a maxhnuanumber of payloads
per spacecraft of 13 results in an average number of payloads per space-
' _ craft of only 5 to 8, depending on the procurement option. The largest
benefit is from orbits 1 and 2 where the majority of Space Test Program
payloads are scheduled to be flown. To illustrate that, Fig. 8 presents
a detailed breakdown of the distribution of the actual maxlmumnumber of
payloads per spacecraft by orbit for the aI1-STPSS procurament option.
For orbit l-S, for example, if the •ssumedmaxlmumnumber of payloads
per spacecraft is allowed to Increase from 6 to 13, the actual maximum
number of payloads asslgned to • spacecraft Increases from 5 to I0.*
The difference between the actual number of payloads assigned to a
spacecraft and the upper limit occurs in •Ii orbits because of the
limited numbez of payloads in each orbit. In orbit I-S, for example,
the mission model includes only 20 payloads, which were dlstrlbueed
evenly between two spacecraft when the assumed maximum number of pay-
loads per spacecraft was Increased to i0. Consequently, the average
number of payloads per spacecraft for • given procurement option does
not _ncrease substantially •s • result of allowing the assumed naxlmum
number of payloads per spacecraft to Increase from 6 to 13.
The main difficulty associated with increasing the number of pay-
loads per spacecraft lles in the payload-lntegr•tlon area. Although
the specific performance limits of each spacecraft were imposed while
allocating payloads, payload-integratlon problems and costs were not
explicitly examined. Based on the saving in program costs identified
• s a result of incre•slns the maximum number of payloads per spacecraft,
it appears that • systematic stuay of the payload Integrstlon problems
and costs would be useful.
_o _ Figure 9 illustrates the vari•tlon in program cost as • function
' _ of Space Tes_ Program size. Here program sise was doubled to • total
of 228 payloads to see if economies _f scale might preferentia:._y bene-
fit the _4S and thereby alter the ordering of the procurement options.
While 13 payloads are never allocated to a spacecraft in the
example shown in Fig. 8, this is not the case for other procurement
optlon8, especlally those includln 8 the HHS.
1981006400-086
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Fig. 9nEffect of Space Test Program
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As shown, no such effect was found. The ordering of the various pro-
curement options remained unchanged, whereas the program cost increased
nearly llnearly.
Launch Cost Variations
Table 11 displays program costs for the nominal case where the
shuttle launch cost is assumed to be $15.4 mi]llon prorated among users
on the basis of payload weight. Excursions were performed to test the
sensitivity of the rank ordering of program costs to shuttle launch
cost and the procedure adopted for allocating shuttle costs among users.
The results of the variations considered are also shown in Table ii.
For ease In reading the table, all costs more than 10 percent above the
lowest cost in each row are enclosed in parentheses--all other costs
_" are considered to be essentially the same.
In looklng at the other cases it is clear that increasing the
shuttle cost to $30 million per launch has no effect on relative re-
sults, although the magnitude of program costs increases about 15 per-
cent. Assuming that Space Test Program payloads get a free ride on
the shuttle and pay only a service charge of $1 million per launch
does not change the copclusions either. The STPSS looks slightly worse
L
J i -_7 .... [
1981006400-088
-72-
Table Ii
EFFECT OF SHUTTLE COST AND TARIFF SCHEDULES a
No. of Max. No. Program Cost
Payloads of Payloads ($ millions)
..,_ in perCase Programs Spacecraft STPSS NNS AEN/STPSS AEN/_4S
114 13 160 162 157 156
Shuttle cost = 114 6 222 (263) 210 (240)
$15.4 million 228 13 244 247 244 240
_ 228 6 373 (418) 342 (392)
: 114 13 181 189 178 183
Shuttle cost = 114 6 249 (306) 237 (279)
, $30 million 228 13 279 290 279 284
228 6 424 (489) 391 (461)
114 13 139 135 136 129
Service charge 114 6 195 (220) 183 201
of $I million only 228 13 209 204 209 196
228 6 322 (347) 293 (323)
114 13 202 204 199 198
114 6 297 (342) 286 (321)
NASA tariff 228 13 315 316 333 321
228 6 514 (553) 490 538
114 13 161 (181) 156 (173)
Modified 114 6 226 (277) 210 (258)
NASA tariff 228 13 244 (267) 240 (265)
228 6 (376) (454) 339 (432) ,,,,,
aFor a given row, program costs within i0 percent of the lowest value are
r_ in parentheses.
and the AEH/bg4S slightly better, but the only definite conclusion is
still that the HNS is not attractive when the maximum number of pay-
loads per spacecraft is 6.
The effect of two different NASA-proposed tariff schedules is also
shown. In the case called NASA tariff, where launch cost is allocated
on a basis of payload length and weight, altitude, and orbital incline-
_>- tlon, relative costs are unchanged from the first two cases. Adaptation
of a more recent tariff schedule, modified NASA tariff, altered these
results somewhat; both the pureMMS and the AEH/_S options have rela-
tively higher program costs because the average length of the spacecraft-
payload combinations for these options is greater than for the options
using the STPSS.
1981006400-089
-73-
The implications of the foregoing analysis for spacecraft selec-
tion that has included the AEM, STPSS, and MMSmay be surMaarized as
follows:
1. When the upper limit on the number of payloads that can be ,.
assigned to a spacecraft is 10 or more, program costs are
essentially the same in all cases.
2. When the number of payloads per spacecraft is limited to 6,
the STPSS and AEM/STPSS offer lowest program costs in vlr-
tually all cases.
3. When shuttle charges are determined largely by payload length
as is the case when the modified NASA shuttle tariff is used,
the AEM/STPSS combination has the lowest program cost.
4. Given the stipulated AEM, STPSS, and HMS capabilities, the
uncertainties in the Air Force Space Test Program mission
• odel, and the uncertainties in the shuttle tariff schedule,
none of the alternatives considered offers a clear-cut ad-
vantage over the others, although those options that include
the STPSS are generally preferred.
Upgrad_ AEM
As an additional excursion, the possibility of modifying some
spacecraft designs to give them greater capability was considered.
Specific modifications considered include: increasing the STPS_ pay-
load capability to 1500 Ib; increasiv _ the AEH payload capability to !
300 ib; and changin_ the ADd capabili_l to allow sun orientation or
i
geosynchronous altitude operation. Of t_,ese, only the last promised a _ ,
sizable impact on program cost because of the increasod number of Space !
_ Test Program payloads that could be captured (from 22 to 72 percent).
_i To obtain a first-order approximation of the cost of an AEM having such
a capability, the cost of the S_PSS cold-ga.: reaction control system
was added to the cost of the basic AFh4. Such a reaction control system
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would be needed for the AEM to operate at geosynchronous altitude. This
configuration is referred to henceforth as the upgraded AEN.
Table 12 compares the cost of upgraded AEM/STPSS and upgraded _
AEM/MMS combinations with those considered in the previous nominal case.
_ In that excursion the upgraded AF_/I_IS combination ppeared to have _Iiiprogram costs more than 20 percent below those of the other procurement
The principal reasons for this are: (i) With the additional ["options.
!
performance capabilities, the relatively low-cost upgraded AEH is a i:
substitute for the more expensive STPSS on nearly all missions, and
(2) when the upgraded AEM is used in combination with the MMS, the non-
recurring cost of the STPSS is not incurred.
11.
Table 12
EFFECT OF THE UPGRADED AEMa
No. of _x. No. Program Cost (S milllons)
Payloads of Payloads
in per Upgraded- Upgraded-
Case Program Spacecraft STPSS I_IS AEN/STPSSAEM/_S AEM/STPSS A_/_$
114 13 (160) (162) (157) (156) (148) 99
Nominal 114 6 (222) (263) (210) (240) (172) 146228 13 (244) 4247) 4244) (240) (233) 175
228 6 (373) (418) (342) (392) 298 294
Increased esti- 114 13 (160) 4162) (157) 4156_ (175) 121
matesof 114 6 (222) (263) (210) 4240) (215) 183
upgraded At3q 228 13 244 247 244 240 (281) 231
cost 228 6 373 (418) 342 (392) 368 371
aFora givenrow,programcostswithinI0 percentof the lowestvalueare _t inparentheses.
To test the sensitivity of the above result to the estimated cost
of the upgraded AEM, nonrecurring cost was increased by $I0 million
and unit I recurring cost was increased from $2.44 million to $4.88
, million. The results, also shown in Table 12, indicate that the up-
.... graded AEM/MMS combination continues to be the preferred pzocurement
We have assumed t|mt the upgraded AEH is limited to a payload of
150 ib, a data rate of 8 kbps, experimental power of 40-50 W and no
encryption capability--the same as the basic AF.M.
m
1981006400-091
-75-
option. Other can=ildates become competitive only when the program
size is expanded to 228 payloads.
In this last case, an upgraded A_d spacecraft with costs of that
magnitude would probably also have greater payload, power, and data
rate capabilities. Furthermore, it would probably also be a redundant
design to minimize the single-polnt failure modes. Because f the
potential value of such a spacecraft it seemed highly desirable that
a_zupgraded AEM having many of the above characteristics be designed
an:ievaluated for use in the Air Force's Space Test Program.
Imrge-Diameter Shuttle-LaunchedAEH (L-AEM)
Under NASA sponsorship the Boeing Company undertook ""conflgura-
cion and cost study for a 5 ft diameter AEH that would be designed for
shuttle launch and would include the capabilities ascribed above to
the upgraded AEH. Revised Boeing cost estimates (as described in
Appendix A) were used to compute program costs for a variety of pro-
curement options including the L-AEH. Table 13 shows those options
compared with others for the nomlnal case. Where the L-AEH is used,
all three configurations (basellne, spin, and precision) were con-
sidered; but for the same reasons discussed earlier for the STPSS, the
spin configuration is included only when the mission model includes
228 payloads. I
Two procurement options are included that use the HHS but none
that uses the STPSS in combination with the L-AE_4. There are two
7easons for this. First, the HHS has been used primarily when its use
would decrease the total number of spacecraft necessary to fly the
' designated payloads as a result of its larse payload capability (4000 !
Ib); the payload capabilities of ti_e STPSS and L-AEH are Identlcal, !
so we always chose the lower-cost L-AEH. Second, consideration of
i both the L-A_I and STPSS in a single procurement option would mean i
that the nonrecurring cost associated with developing both spacecraft
would have to be included in the total program cost.
_he use of the modified NASA tariff increases the program cost
of the MMS and A_llt_S options relative to the ether options shown in
"_able 12, and thereby would not alter th!s observation.
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Table 13 i
!
EFFECT OF THE L-AEHa !
No. of Max. No. Pro|ram Cost ($ millions)
Psylolda of Payloads! ..... • ...... .,
in per kml/
Case Program Spacecraft STPS5 _ ADI/STPSS AIDI/)IIS LoAI)I AID_L-Am L-AI_/IQI_ L-Am/I_IS
m , ,,
114 13 (160) (162) (157) (156) 135 133 139 132
Nomr_X 114 6 (222) (263) (210) (240) 186 181 187 186
• ',_ 228 13 (244) (Z47) (264) '240) 198 208 212 199
vw 228 6 (3P3) (618) (342) (,92) 306 29P (373) 323
Nigher L*A_4 j 116 13 (t60) (162) 157 156 168 166 150 163
nonrecurring 114 6 (222) (263) 210 (260) 199 19_ 200 197
cost 228 13 (266) (247) (264) (260) 212 222 223 2116 (373) (416) 3_2 (392) 320 311 (384) 33S
aFor a siren rm. pro ram costs within lOpetcent of the lowest value ate -st In parentheses.
Table 13 illustrates that all of the procurement options that use
the L-A_ are preferred over those made up of the three original space-
craft. In fact, the lowest-cost L-AEH option is about 15-20 percent
less costly than the lowest-cost non-L-AEM option, and that assumes
that the nonrecurring cost of the L-AEMwould be paid for by the Air
Force• If the L-AEH is developed by NASA, the L-AEM options are even
more attractive.
In Sec. III, the uncertainty surroundln8 the estimates of the non-
recurring costs of the L-AI_ spacecraft configurations was discussed.
The nominal case in Table 13 Includes the lower set of estimates, be-
cause it is felt that they more closely reflect the nonrecurring costs of
the L-AEH• However, the effect of higher nonrecurring costs for the
L-AEN on the choice of a procurement option has been examined. The
second set of estimates in Table 23 shows that when L-AEH develolmer_t
c_,st is increased, the AEN-STPSS combination is also attractive for
some conditions• As mentioned earlier, however, it is not known whether _
the L-AEH would be developed (if it is developed) by NASA, the Air Force,
or Jointly. The L-AEM would probably be suitable for NASA missions as
well as for the Air Force Space Teat Program mlssiorm used in this anal-
ysis. In the case descrlbed here, it i8 assumed that the Air Force would
underwrlte all the nonrecurrln8 costs of the L-AEH. If either of the
othe_ tvo developrent alternatives was followed, the attractiveness of
the L-AD4 would be enhanced. Consequently, _t {8 oo.oZu_d _ thG#e
thatdoozo .o. of theL-AEM zaouZd be_o,_ _-,_rop_,_ate fop
J
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the A£.," Force 'e Space Test Program than the deoelot_nen_; of the S_'PSS
and that the use of the L-AEI4in oombination _i_h _he A_4 ,or the I_W1S
would constitute alternative eost-effectioe procurement options.
In the analysls of the L-AEM spacecraft for Air Force Space Test
,_" Program missions, the L-AEN-BL configuration was found to be able to
accommodate only 28 percent of the missions, prlmarily bet. ase of
limitations on its maximum operating altitude and orientation. Conse-
quently, in the L-AEN procurmnt options the more expensive and more
versatile L-AEN-P conflsuratlon has been used when the L-AEN-BL
conflsuratlon would have been adequate except for those limitations.
To evaluate the effect of increasing the capabtl*.ty of the L-AEN-BL
configuration to a11ow geosynchronous altltude and sun-orlented oper-
atlons, the cost of the L-AEN-BL was increased to allow for an In-
crease in size of the hydrazlne reaction control system. Options
containing this configuration are labeted L-AEN-I.
Table 14 compares the to,,r procurement options baaed on the L-AEM,
with four options based on the L-AEM-1 design, As expected, the pro-
gram costs for the proc_remnt options based on the L-AEN-I design are
lower than those based o- the L-AEMdesign; but, given the accuracy of
the spacecraft designs and cost-estlmatlng procedures, most of the
op.lons ate comparable. Th_s means thut giving the L-AEbf-gL more capa-
biZity _ worthwhile but not essentiaZ in deciding on the procurement
option for eonab_ctingthe Air Force Space 2eat Pro_m missions.
Earlier in this section, it was shown that an upgraded ARt4 in
combination with the _S provided the lowest total program cost. The
upgraded AEMdiffers from the L-AEN in that it has the payload, data
rate, and power limitations of the original AL'_t;L-AEH capability is
greater in all of these areas. Table 15 displays a comparison of the
program costs for the four procurement options derived from the L-AF2t
and the two options using the upgraded ADt. Again, the upgraded A_/_IS
procurement option is the preferred _olutlon (as indicated by the
parentheses), but by less of a cost margin than before. This result
It is assumed that the additional sun sensor required for _un
orlentatlon would be part of the payload package end therefore would
, not affect the cost of the L-AEM-BL.
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Tabte 14
EFFECTOF UPGRADINGTHZ L-AEMa
(L-A_-I)
F
Pro|ram Cost ($ sllltono)
No. of _s. No. , -,.
Pay1_adu of Payload AI_II AI_I
in per Ai_/ L-AI_I L-JUg¢I MOUI L-AJ_-II L-AIM-I/
Case Prosrm Spacecraft L-AID4 L-A_ ! PgiS MHS L-M_-I L-A_-I ! IN _S
114 13 135 133 139 132 130 127 135 129
114 6 185 181 187 18_ 174 171 177 178
_oainal
228 13 19_ 208 (212) 199 190 200 (2113 194 +
228 6 (306) 297 (373) (323) 292 276 (365) (315)
, m
aFot a ;Lyon roy, prolru cesta within |0 percent of the l_st value are _ot In parentheses. .
Table 15
COHPARISOHOF THE L-AI_4 AND UPGRADEDAEMa
Program Cost ($ millions) +
No. of Has. No. __.
Payloads of Payloads AEMI
in per AEM/ L-AI_/ L-AEM/ Uplraded- UplPraded-
Case ProKram Spacecraft L-AD4 L-_[_ _.S HHS /_H/STPSS AEMIW4S
.iJ,
114 13 (135) (133) (1391 (132) (148) 9_
Nominal 114 6 _185) (181) (1871 (186) (172) 1_6
228 13 (1983 i (208) (2123 (1993 (233) 175
228 6 306 277 (373) 322 298 294
114 13 (135) (115) (1393 (134) (167) 113
With AEH 116 6 185 186 187 (196; (209) 175
redundancy 228 13 198 217 212 217 (275) (224)
228 6 306 318 (373) 337 (363) (369)
aFor a 81yen roy, ;re&ram costs within 10 percent of the lowest value are ,_ * in
parentheses.
occurs for the same reasons as stated earlier (p. 75), ex -_pt in thl_:
_- case the I.-A_I spacecraft is displaced by the cheaper upgraded AFt!
i
rather than the STPSS. However, the ltmtted capability of the up-
graded AE,M, l.e., 50 W of power and a maximum payload of 150 lb, makes
this concluslor, so_ewl_t tenuous in view of the uncertainty associated
_ith Air Force Space Test Program missions for the 1980 to 1990 period.
Any _sJor growth In p.yload power or weight requlreaents would mean
procurement of more ,_qS and fewer up_,raded AE._; that uould qutckl
1981006400-095
decrease any total progra._ cost -_,vantage that the option might have.
To illustrate this, three to four additional )@IS in the u._graded AEM/}@SS
; op=ion would eliminate the difference n program cost between the pu;-e
L-AEMoption and the upgraded AEM/_0_Soption for the nomln81 case.
In addition, one of the current Air Force requirements of new
spacecraft is to minimize slngle-polnt failure modes in the spacecraft
design. As indicated in Appendix I, that was one of the specifications
for the L-AEH design ana mac been accounted for in Its recurring cost.
To illustrate the effect on prosram cost of increasing AEH red,ndancy
so that the L-AEH and the upgraded AEH options will be more comparable,
an excursion was made in which it we4 assumed that whenever an AEMor
up_sraded AEMis included in an option, two spacecraft would be flown
t
in the same shuCLle. The results are shavn in Table 15. It can be seen
that for the case of 114 payloads and 6 payloads per spacecraft, several
L-AEM options are within the lower I0 percent cost category; for a mls-
sion model with 228 payloads, the L-AEMoptions are clearly preferred
over the upgraded AEM/_/b option.
Considering that the program cost advantage indicated for t.he up-
graded AEH/)@SSoption over the L-AFJ4 option could be lost in either of
the two ways nentloned above, i.e., by growth in the power and/or weight
requirements of the Air Force Space Test Program mlsslon model, or by
J
spacecraft design requirement for mlnlmlzlng single-point failure modes, I
i_ ie oonoZ_d tha_ _he L-A_ epao_o_s.a._., o2"eon_ ve_ e_Za_ cZeei_, i
wouZd provide a haole for miniminin_ tl_ Air Forc_ S_ee Teet Progr_ua j
ooete. The L-AEM could be used individually or in co_binatlon with the 1
AEH and/or the 14qS. This conclusion Is reinforced by the ana_y_ia of i
a vart_.ty of procurement options that considered the uncertainties in
t_
the spacecraft costs and designs, the Air Force Space Test Program
mission nodal, and the shuttle cost ard tariff schedule.
=, . The procurement results _.or the nominal case that include the
_ , L-AI_4 are shown in Table t6. A comparison of these options Indicates
_t
Thls idea was suggested bF Boeing as _ way of achieving the de-
clred level of redur_lancy witl_>ut redeslgnln_ the entire spacecraft.
PhysL:ally it is possible to have two AE_4spacecraft side by side
within the envelope of the L-AEH.
_.,r •
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Table 16
PROCURE_qENTRESULTSUSING L-A_q
(Nomlnal case)
NuMber of Spacecraft i
Spacecraft
Type L-A_I AE:qlL-AIQI' L-AEH/H)/S AEIq/L-A_III_IS
^___ __ L _.
,,,,,,
L-AEH-$ .... N
L-AEH-P 12 I0 /
18 " 18
4 31_IS ....
---- 2
Total 14
24
NOTE: maximum number of payloadslspececreft,
!
_hat the L-AE_-P conf_guratlon comprises about 75 percent of the buy.
with the balance being shred by the Al_. L-AIOI-BL, and/or _S; the
L-AF:4-S is never used in the nominal program.
Th_ distribution of the program cost of the p.:_a L-AEH procurement
• option is illustrated in FIg. IO, Abuut $134 mill£on is spen_ procuring
_ spacecraft and solid rocket kick sta_es. The )aunch costs are shorn for
"_ both k'T.Ramt ETR. For th_ TR launches, the _aunrh costs are very ._im--
liar for the three allocation schemes. However, the original NASA tariff
rate that is a function of spacecraft paylc,-_ _might and length, alti_
rude, and orbftal inclination imposes a d:sproporttonally high cost on
;rrR lau_chea. For the $15.4 mlilion shuttle case, the _ launch cos_.s
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COST LAUNCHCOSTS
Millions of
Dollars _ 100%PRORATED
2502_0f "" r_ NASA TARIFF
MODIFIEDNASATARIFF
•._&,'_
LSO NOMINALCASE: kPl PAYLOADS6 MAX.PL/SC
% , S % . J • - •
SPACECRAFT$]5.4 Million $3) Million I[5.4 Million $30 Million
SHUTTLE SHUTTLE. _ SHUTTLE SHUTTLE
WESI_RNTEST'RANGELA_H EASTERNI_ST I_ANGELAUNCH
COSTS COSTS
Fig. lO_Distrlbutlon of program costs
(L-AEM option)
exceed $I00 million. The most significant factor is the orbit inclina-
tion. The use of the modified NASA tariff rate redresses this drastic
cost _mbalance. The variation in shuttle cost considered in thls study
does not appear to greatly alter the launch costs, providing the earlier
NASA tariff rate is not used.
CONCLUSIONS
Four major conclusions have been drawn from this case study. First,
progrw_ cost does not provide a basis for choosing among the AEM, S_PSS,
and_4S spacecraft, _iven their present desi_. Only when the modified
NASA tariff schedule was used for allocating the shuttle launch cost did
the STPSS options become preferred; with the uncertainty in the appropriate-
ness of this tariff schedule, this case does not provide sufficient basis
: for recommending the STPSS development.
Second, the availability of the L-AE'! spacecraft, or some very similar
design, would provide a basis for minimizing the cost of the Air Force's
Space Test Program. The L-AEM could be used individually or in combina-
tion with the AE:! and/or !_IS as the uissions require. The upgraded AEM
options, although having program costs similar to th_ I,-AEM options,
provide less capability for handling growth in the Space Test Program
mission model.
i
1981006400-098
-82-
Thz_pd, the pi_og_ _.o_tsane t_ery sensitive to the _xizrt_m n_nb_,,
of pa!¢Zoads f_own per spacecraft. An increase from 6 to 13 in the mazi-
mum number of payloads per spacecraft would result in about a 30 percent
lower program cost; the major portion of this savings occurs by Increas-
,*_ Ing the maximum number of payloads to tO. An analysis of this potential
should be undertaken.
Fou1'th, /amlch soars, as determined b9 a variety of fol_u_s, gen-
or,ally did not affeat the preferred procurement option, a_though they
_n_bstantiaZly ahar_de the total p_offvam costa. The modified NASA shuttle
tariff rate structure considered during the second phase of the case
study corrects the drastic cost imbalance that the original NASA tariff
imposed on Air Force launches from the Western Test Range. Secondary
payload status, an underlying assumption for the Air Force's Space Test
Program, is not yet accounted for in any of the NASA tariff rate struc-
tures for the shuttle. Incorporation of the concept of a secondary pay-
load could reduce the total program costs presented in this dissertation,
but it probably would not affect the spacecraft procurement decision.
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V. NASA-DOD COOPERATION: ORGANIZATIONALOBSERVATIONS
FROM THE CASE STUDY
In this section, the NASA and DoD organizational interactions that
occurred throughout the case study are discussed within the context
of the results of the cost-beneflt analysis _or each phase of the study.
Observations are made concerning the direction the Air Force and NASA
might take with regard to the Air Force decision on acquisition of a
standard spacecraft a_d how this direction might be influenced by the
economic analysis and organizational factors. Observations are also made
on the impact of the future dependence of the Air Force on NASA's space
shuttle for launching its payloads, Finally, some of the organizational
factors that contributed to the successful completion of this case study
are discussed.
MOTIVATIONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE STANDARD SPACECRAFT SI%IDY
Although the procurement decision analyzed in the case study dis-
cussed in Sees. llI and IV was strictly that of the Air Force Space Test
Program (_fftce. two program offices at the NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center became voluntarily involved to the extent that they shared in the
funding of the study and provided access to the details of their space-
craft deslg,_s and costs. It was clear from the start of this study
that the NASA program offices were Interested primarily in having their
respective spacecraft designs considered for tileAir Force Space Test
Program missions and hoped that by cooperating in the study they could
best ensure that their designs were represented fairly, This allowed
them to argue their case at all of the progress reviews, thereby avoid-
ing waiting until the study results were published before reacting to
the outcome.
The discussion of the behavior of the Air Force and NASA that fol-
lows must be cast within the context outlined in Sec. II for NASA-DoD
cooperation in space. This context includes 15 years of operating ex-
perience with the Space Council and AACD. This coordination machinery
has demonstrated the authority on a number of occasions to inquire into
a wide range of NASA-DoD activities to ensure that unnecessary duplication
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does not occur. For this study, the AACB is the appropriate coordinat-
ing body that could be expected to inquire into the Air Force procurement
of a new standard spacecraft. As will be discussed later in this sec-
tion, the AACB inquiry took place between the first and secoml phases
•_ of the study. In addition to the pressure of the AACB, the Air Force
faced the traditional budgetary cycle that involves the DoD and the
Office of Management and Budget _OMB). The budgetary process consists
of a detailed review of both expenditures and objectives on a line-item
basis. The Air Force usually justifies expenditure of funds on a "new
start" by demonstrating its economic feasibility, especially when there
appear..;to be alternative means to accomplish the same task. While the
O._IBobstacle loomed large for the Air Force Space Test Program Office,
it also represented a significant factor in shaping the behavior of the
NASA t_4S Program Office as well. At the time of this study, NASA au-
thorization for procurement of the complete _IS program had not yet been
given and it was possible that the O_B review of thls line item in
NASA's budget could be mooted by having addltional support for the re-
quired expenditures or additional applications for the MMS, i.e., Air
Force Space Test Program missions.
In addition to the OMB and AACB, the staff of the Senate Committee
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences inquired at the outset of the study
about the objectives of the study, the motivation of the Air Force Space
Test Program Office regarding the developmental responsibility for the
new spacecraft, and the objectivity and independence of The Rand Corpora-
tion in accomplishit_ this study. As far as is known, no further Con-
gressional inquiry has been made concerning this study of the Air Force
standard spacecraft procurement decision. Nowever, should the Air Force
go fcr_'acd wltn its own standard spacecraft design, the Congressional
inquiry may be reopened as part of the budgetary review.
_S Program Office
Participation by the _IS Program Office was not without risk, be-
cause this study, while concentrating on the relative accuracy of the
costs of the candidate spacecraft designs, did produce estimates of the
absolute procurement cost of the MMS. As mentioned above, the risk for
I
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the MMS program stemmed from the fact that NASA was not firmly committed
to the procurement of the _@_Sat the outset of this study and the pro-
curement cost of the l_ISwas to be a major consideration in NASA's de-
•_" cision. Too high a cost estimate for MMS from this study might have
created problems for the MMS Program Office with respect to the timing
of its request for proposals for the major spacecraft subsystems. On
the other hand, the advantage of participating in the study was twofold:
First, an independent validation of the _IS cost estimates relatively
close to those that N&SA was quoting would provide substantiation for
the MMS program; and second, if the study results showed that the Air
Force procurement option for the Space Test Program should include some
MMS, then the _IS program could use this information to help Justify
going forward with M_IS.
The program manager of the MMS had funded a substantial amount of
fabrication, design, and subcontractor work before this study, providing
him with the confidence in the range of the cost estimate outcomes,
This preliminary work was a valuable input to the Rand study.
A_{ Program Office
The situation with the other NASA Program Office (AEM) was sub-
stantially different from that of the MMS Program Office. The AEM pro-
gram was under contract and two missions had been Justified and approved
by NASA. Consequently, the A_! Program Office not only knew what the
procurement costs were going to be, but also had an approved program, i
Any application of the AEM to the Air Force Space Test Program would J
be an augmentation for the AEM program. We were interested in includ-
ing the A_I in this study not only because of its potential application,
but also because it represented a base case for our relative cost and
technology analyses.
The initial position of the AEM Program Office, described above,
changed. After initiation of this study, the AEM Program Office in-
dicated that they were also interested in the application of a larger
diameter AEM-type spacecraft that would be shuttle_compatible. This
larger spacecraft was viewed by NASA as a small MMS (SMMS) that would be
. the follow-on spacecraft for the AWl. The Introductlcn of this space-
' craft (L-AFhi) into the study created _ problem with respect to reporting
I
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the results of the initial study. The dlfflculty centered around the
Air Force requirement to make procurement decisions during the summer
of 1976 for the spacecraft that would be used on the initlal Air Force
shuttle fllght. The L-AEH spacecraft design had not been defined
technically; this would take two months of study by Boeing and would
thereby postpone the Air Force decision point.
One interest of the AEH Program Office in having the L-AEHdeslgn
considered in the Rand case study was based on the hope of providing
some justification for initiating the SF_S program, albeit for Air
Force missions. At the time of this study, the AE_!Program Office had
not established a NASA requirement for the SHHS.
As indicated in Sec. IV, the results of the first phase of the
case study illustrated that a spacecraft having some of the characteris-
tics of the L-AEH (the upgraded AEM) would be part of the preferred pro-
curement option for the Space Test Program missions (see Table 12).
Consequently, it was our feeling that conslderatlot, of the L-AEM space-
craft should be encouraged because it offered substantial cost savings
for the Air Force, even if it meant postponing the midsummer Air Force
procurement decision.
Air Force Space Test Program Office
The Air Force Space Test Program Office had for several years con-
tracted for indlvldual spacecraft designed to handle a specific set
of experiments. This involved contracting for the launch vehicle,
spacecraft development, and pqyload integration. As discussed in
Sec. III, its interest in the standard spacecraft approach for carry-
ing out its missions centered eround the availabillty of the space
shuttle and the possibility of reallzlng substantlal budget savings
by applying its low-cost design philosophy to a standard spacecraft
design. The Space Test Program Office had been selected for one of the
first Air Force missions to fly on the shuttle, hence its critical
schedule problem if it were to use a standard spacecraft design.
NASA funded Boeing during the spring of 1976 to make a preliminary
design for the L-AEM spacecraft and to estimate its cost using the same
approach as used for the AE_!spacecraft.
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The Air Force had studied the standard spacecraft approach for
several years and was convinced that substantial savings could be
realized, but to be able to support this position during the FY 77
budget review it needed an independent economic assessment, hence
._- its interest in having the Rand study supported. The AACB panel
on unmanned spacecraft also supported the need %r an economic evalua-
tion of the various standard spacecraft of both NASA and DoD that
might be applicable for the Air Force Standard Test Program missions.
While the Space Test Program Office emphasized throughout the
study that it was not necessarily interested in an outcome that in-
cluded its standard spacecraft design (STPS_), this position was, to
some degree, contrary to the role that the Space Test Program Office
had played in carrying out its missions in the past. As indicated
earlier, it had been involved largely in funding the development of
its own spacecraft. The ixtteraction that occurred throughout the study
verified that the Air Force initial emphasis was indeed valid.
Rand Corporation
There were several motivations for Rand's participation in this
study. First, although the standard spacecraft procurement decision
Concurrent with the Rand study of the stanAard spacecraft, but
independent of it, the Air Force Space Test Program Office and NASA
Low-Cost Systems Office jointly funded a cost study with Aerospace
Corporation that compared the MMS and STPSS for one of the upcoming
missions, i.e., the Solar Maximum Mission (SMM).(30) The spacecraft
cost estimating approach used by Aerospace relied upo_ the SAMSO cost
model (29) directly without adjusting the results for the use of flight-
proven subsystems or other low-cost experience; this resulted in a
unit cost for the MMS about twice as high as that used in the Rand ca_e
study (Fig. 6, Sec. IV). Although we were not privileged to the re-
conciliation of these divergent cost estimates by the Air Force and
NASA, we understand that the Aerospace cost estimates were accepted
as being very conservative and could be considered as an upper bound,
assuming that these spacecraft are purchased in the normal manner that
other DoD spacecraft are purchased, The successful experience of the
Air Force Space Test Program in acquiring individual spacecraft at a
cost considerably less than that estimated using the SAMSO model tends
to validate the magnitude of the Rand cost estimates. A recent check
with the NASA ._S Program Office confirmed that the industrial cost
proposals for the development and production of the three major systems
of the MMS are in fact close to those estimated by Rand.
I
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was not a major factor in the Air _otcets role in carrying out its na-
tional securltv mission, it represented a decision involving several
millions of dollars; a savings of a few percent, especially during an
era of tight budgets, would make more funds available for other Air
.,_p Force projects. Second, the study was in an area where Rand had rec-
ognlzed competence, i.e., technologlcal-economlc analyses of space
systems, and the objectivity needed to evaluate the alternatives. Fur-
thermore, the availability at Rand of the analytical skills needed for
the study made it possible for the study to be undertaken within a very
short time frame. Third, as is the case in many studies, Randts par-
ticipation in this study provided the opportunity for updating and ex-
panding our cost and technical data bases for unmanned spacecraft; an
area that clearly has become the main Air Force and NASA approach in
space research and operational systems since the near-term prospects
for U.S, manned spaceflight (except for the space shuttle) have dinned
from what they were during the 1960s.
ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS AFTER THE FIRST PHASE OF THE STANDARD
SPACECRAFT STUDY
As indicated in Sec. IV, the first phase of the case study did
not include the Boelng-deslgned L-AEM spacecraft. The results from
this phase of the study indicated that the Air Force's preferred pro-
curement option consisted of a combination of MMS and an upgraded AEM
design. If the upgraded AEM design did not become available, as de-
scribed in Sec, IV, then our results indicated that the Air Force could
pursue the development of its STFSS design without encountering an
economic penalty.
Armed with this conclusion, plus a healthy skepticism of the will-
ingness of NASA (I) to provide the MMS on the schedule necessary for
meeting the Air Force's shuttle flight and at a cost approaching that
used in the Rand study, and (2) to upgrade the AEM spacecraft as In-
dlcated, the Air Force Space Test Program Office sent forward through
,
Although the study took eight months to complete because of the
study extension (consideration of the L-AEM), the Air Force needed re-
sults within four months; this corresponded to the end of the first
phase.
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Air Force Headquarters to NASA a M_or_r_wn of Ag_ee_# on the Peo-
_ement of U_ Deep.ted _na_ _Zti-_Kasion _&Zc_ b_paoe_aft
Sget_s Betueen the _Vatio_Z Aero_tios and _aoe A_nistz_tion and
_he Depo_ent of Defeue (See Appendix d).
This memorandum essentially called for t_SA to underwrite the de-
velopment of the SMMS having capabilltles compatible with the Air Force
requirements but determined Jointly by NASA and VoD. The DoD agreed
to purchase a block of the SMMS for the STP missions, paying only the
recurring costs of the SM_S. The A_Lr Forc_ agreed to make payments to
NASA three years in advance for s'absequent spacecraft delivery. The
purpose of an advance payment of $i million was to relieve NASAes im-
mediate budget problems that prevented NASA from initiating the develop-
ment of the SMMS with FY 77 _4ASA funds. Such a delayed development
would Jeopardize the Air Force Space Test Program's initial shuttle
schedule.
_L_SA's rejoinder to the: ,_ir Force-proposed Memorandum of Agreement
stated that (I) a Joint NASA/USA£ working group reviewing the SMMS con-
cluded that an agreement can be reached on a set of Joint technical
requirements; (2) NASA is in no posltto:a to initiate the S_4S program
because NASA mission requirements will not support new-start funding
for either FY 77 or FY 78; and (3) based on the results of the first
plmse of the Rand study, 1_ASAwould make available the _IS to meet the
Air Force's March 1979 shuttle launch date, and would consider upgrading
the A_ to meet the Air Force requirement, but that :IASAwas unable to
fund such a modification. It should be noted that no soeclfic mention
was made about the Air Force-proposed advance(i funding of $I million.
As of September 1976, the Air Force was not intending to follow up
,_{ASA'soffer because NASA apparently was not willing to quote a price
for the _S and because NASAes offer left the Air Force wlt.hout assurance
that the upgraded AEM would ever be developed _y NASA. In the latter
case, the Air Force could be facing a total program cost of about $I00
_k
million more than if the upgraded AE_!was developed. Given a procurement
_t
The estimated program cost for the _S/upgraded AE_Ioption is $146.
million, as compared to $222 million for the pure STPSS optlon, $263
million for the _S option, or $240 million for the AEM/MMS option (see
Sec. IV, Table 12).
I
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cost of this magnitude, the pure STPSS option would appear more attrac-
tive to the Air Force simply because, as an Air Force-run program, it
minimizes the need for interagency coordination.
While the Air Force Memorandum of Agreement was clearly an effort
to gain NASA's commitment to provide a standard spacecraft capable of
meeting the Air Force requirements and schedule, it was also an impor-
tant organizational step demonstrati._ to O_B and the AACB that the
Air Force was not necessarily comltted to developing its own standard
spacecraft, providing a Joint NASA-DoD agreement could be reached. The
significance of this bargaining position is reflected in the alteration
in NASA's position regarding the availability of new-start funding to
support the development of the SHNS. As mentioned above, NASA's ini-
tial response was that new start funding would not be available until
FY 79. At the August meeting of the Unmanned Spacecraft Panel of the
AACB where the Air Force presented its requirements and support for
the S_S, NASA's response was that new start funding might be avail-
able in FY 78--one year earller than its first posltlon--and that
interim solutions to meet the Air Force needs for the first space shuttle
launch were being examined.
ORGANIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS AFTER THE FINAL PHASE OF THE STANDARD
SPACECRAFT STUDY
As indicated in Sec. IV, the incorporation of the L-AEM spacecraft
as designed by Boeing created a dominant solution for the Air Force
Space Test Program missions that used the L-AF_ spacecraft and drastically
altered the results of the first phase of the study by ellminatlng the
from the preferred procurement option. While this result had little
impact on the progress of the ._S program, it provides the AEM Program
Office with some justification for the early start of a new spacecraft
development. Unfortunately, NASA had already taken a negative position
on the S,'._4S(or L-AEM), as discussed earlier, and the A_! Program Office
was somewhat concerned about the suitability of the L-AF2!design. As it
During the summer of 1976, the approval for the ,'_ISProgrsm Office
to secure proposals for the three major subsystems was forthcoming.
While use of [he HMS by the Air Force would have been beneficial for the
MMS Program Office, it was not essential.
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turns out, NASA had agreed to the Air Force specifications for the L-AEH
design without apparently realizing that the resultant Boeing design
might resemble the STPSS design rather than reflecting the A_! heritage
as an upgraded AEM. Consequently, even the A_! Program Office was not
interested in pursuing the development of the L-A_I as specified by
Boeing.
As for the Air Force, the sLmilarity of the L-AEM spacecraft to
the STPSS has reintroduced the possibility that the Space Test Program
Office should develop its own standard spacecraft, especlally since NASA
was reluctant to pursue the development of tne S_S or L-AEM without
first Justifying it for NASA missions. Following the conclusion of the
Rand study, the Air Force Space Test Program Office issued a request for
proposals for the spacecraft to support its first shuttle-launched
missions. Whether or not the spacecraft designs for these missions will
represent the beginning of an Air Force standard spacecraft design mu_t
await the outcome of a number of future Air Force decisions. For example,
the Air Force has informed the contractors bidding on the spacecraft for
their next two Space Test Program missions that the criteria for evaluating
their proposals will include special credit for designs that reflect evidence
of standardization. While the value of this additional credit was not
available to Rand, it is not exactly clear how much of a spacecraft weight
and cost penalty the contractors are willing to risk to provide the excess
performance capability needed for a standard spacecraft design. Furthermore,
Boeing, the designer of both the AEM and L-AEM, is reexamining its corporate
position on continuing to design and develop unmanned spacecraft. In any
event, it appears that the possibility of procuring NASA spacecraft for
the Air Force Space Test Program will be determined on an individual basis
and will certainly depend on whether the Air Force follows a procurement
strategy that evolves into a standard spacecraft of its own design.
SPACE SHUT'rLE-RELATED ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLF_[S
Aside from the spacecraft procurement issue, the Rand case study
touched on a couple of space shuttle-related issues. Beginning in 1980,
the Air Force is committed to the use of the space shuttle as its prl-
mary launch vehicle. W11ile the Air Force has considered the procurement
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of two shuttles for i_s own use, it appears at this time that the Air
Force will mainly contract for NASA to launch Air Force payloads on-
board NASA-operated shuttles. For many Air Force missions this will
simply mean flying aboard a shuttle dedicated exclusively to Air Force
_ payloads. For others, such as the Space Test Program missions, the
sh_Jttle will be shared with non-Air Force payloads. In these cases,
the issue of prorating the cost of the shuttle will be important. As
discussed in Sec. IV, a variety of shuttle tariff formulas were evalu-
ated to determine their impact on the procurement option selection.
While the shuttle tariff formulas examined in this study did not sub-
stantially affect the procurement option selection, they did represent
a large impact on the absolute cost of carrying out the Air Force Space
Test Program missions. And of particular interest to the Air Force was
that none of the NASA shuttle tariff schedules dealt with the secondary
payload concept. As mentioned in _ec. IV, this concept involved not
specifying the mission inclination, altitude, or launch time and select-
ing a spacecraft design that would fit into a nonpri_ary payload portion
of the shuttle bay. Given these characteristics, the Air Force Space
Test Program Office felt that some compensation should be incorporated
in the _ASA shuttle tariff schedule; however, no such compensation was
ever made, and it appears from the latest NASA shuttle tariff schedule
available at the time of this study that it will not be part of the
agreed-upon shuttle operation.
The second shuttle-related issue involved the loss of program
control that the Air Force expects as a result of the conversion to
the use of the shuttle for launching its space payloads. As indicated
in Sec. II, the DoD, frol the beginning of the U.S. space program, has
been deeply invotved in launch vehicle development and the operation of
the vehicles for the purpose of placing payloads into orbit. The Air
Force provided launch services for NASA for many years. With the advent
of the space shuttle, the DoV will relinquish one additional component
of its role in the space program; it will no longer be responsible for
launching its own payloads into orbit. For the Air Force Space Test
Program Office, this transition carries with it the feeling of loss of
program control, mot only will NASA operate the shuttle, but it will
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also avaluate whether or not adequate testing has been accompllshed to
make the payload safe for shuttle opceatlon, henc_ the feeling cf direct
invasion into the Air Force development program. Furthermore, one ob-
Jectlve of the Space Test Program has been to shorten the time delay
between deciding to conduct an experiment and getting the results from
the experiment. With the NASA shuttle in the loop, this delay time not
only promises to be longer than if expendable boosters were used, but
the length of the delay is largely a function of NASA rather than the
Air Force.
ORGANIZATIONALFACTORS AFFECTING THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF
THE CASE STUDY
In retrospect, a number of organizational factors affected the
successful completion of the procurement analysis of the Air Force
standard spacecraft decision. Of these, the principal factors include
(i) the acceptance of Rand's credibility, (2) the ripeness of the ,It
Force procurement decision, (3) the tractability of the study, and
(4) the short schedule and low budget constraints. Each of these is
briefly discussed below.
Acceptanc _ of Rand's Credibility
From the outset of this study both NASA and the Air Force felt
that Rand met the criteria for "he type of organizat£on that could
produce the independent, objective, and sound study needed for guiding
their procurement decisions. They se_ted Rand on a sole-source basis.
It is recognized that this may have been a self-servlng acceptance
given the underlying motivations of both _IASA and the Air Force to use
the results as a basis for Justifying, at least partly, their future
course of action within their own organizations and with the OHB and
the AACg. Even so, the rellaace of NASA and the Air Force on Rand for
this study implied a willingness to defend this choice to Congress,
the ONB, and the AACB. Regardless of whether .he notlvatlon was self-
strvlng or not, the NASA and Air Force acceptance o_ Rand provided
See footnotes on pp. 2 and 5.
I
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the basis for a cooperative working relationship at all levels. It also
yielded an understanding of the impact of the time and budget constraints,
a number of producti-e informal progress review sessions, and expedient
_, resolution of problems having to do wlth data, ground rules, and other
inputs.
Ripeness of the Air Force Procurement Decision
At the outset of this study it was quite apparent that the Air Force
Space Test Program Offl.e was on the verge of making a procurement decl-
r
sion to buy or develop a standard spacecraft. There x_:re several reasons
for _,is impression. First, the Space Test Program Office is an operat-
ing office having the responsibility of providing spacecraft for experi-
mental missions. Second, the Air Force had selected the Space lest Pro-
gt:m Office for one of the first Air Force payloads to fly on the space
shuttle (Orbital Flight Test -5). The schedule for this shuttle flight
would require a FY77 spacecraft procurement decision. Third, its past
experience with designing low-cost spacecraft had been noticeably suc-
cessful and had influenced NASA's AEM and MMS programs. The application
of this experience to the STPSS tended to support its position that a
low-cost standard spacecraft was the approach to follow during the space
shuttle era.
Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that the Space Test
Program Office was anxious to move forward with the study regardless of
whether or not the preferred procurement option included the STPSS. This
contributed to the Air Force cooperation and interest in the study•
Tractability of the Problem
Although this case study included a wide variety of uncertainties
that ranged from the spacecraft descriptions to the space shuttle
launch costs, it had the characteristics of a problem that could be
handled using conventional analytic methods. Because of these uncer-
tainties, one of the largest risks that threatened the study was as-
sociated with having the results be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the
uncertainties so that no guidance could be given. The other major risk
had to do with becoming so involved in the details of the spacecraft
i
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design, mission model, cost estimating relationships, etc., in order to
minimize the uncertainties, that guidance for the procurement option
would not be provided. Recognition of these extreme outcomes at the
beBlnnlng of the case study provided the guidance and assurance that
a'_ the study direction, while oscillating between micro and macro analyses,
would not deviate to either extreme at the expense of the other.
Short Schedule and Low Budget Constraints
The schedule and budget constraints were both a problem and an asset.
The problem centered on managing the study so that it remained sufficiently
focused to allow the study to be completed within the time and budget
limitations and yet broad enough to assure that the conclusions were valid.
An example of this focusing problem is the initial concern for the
technological comparability of the various standard spacecraft. The
Alr Force had not had an opportunity to examine in detail the _S
technology but felt that because of its greater performance and its
being designed for in-space servicing, it might incorporate substan-
tla]ly more advanced technology than that being used in the STPSS. The
inclusion of the AEM In the study was encouraged because it represented
a spacecraft wlth known cost and technology and thereby serves as a
benchmark for assessing the technologies employed in the STPSS and MMS.
To explore thls uncertainty concerning the relative technology of the
various spacecraft, a relatively large portion of the budget was expended
on technology assessments and comparisons of the spacecraft subsystems
(Appendixes B to G). It turned out that th_s assessment demonstrated that
all o¢ the spacecraft designs drew on essentla]ly the same technological
base, thus simplifying the problem of estimating the relative cost for the
spacecraft. Conceivably, the large expenditure of resources on the
technology assessment could have left the project with a misallocated
budget, but £n fact it tu_zed out the added u_Ze_sta_Zin_ of the teah-
n,_ogica_ limitations and ope_ztions of each of the spacecraft desijns
prov_ed the bas_s for many of the spacecraft confitluratio,zexaL_rs£0ns.
It ¢_8 throujh these excursions t;_t the p_i,_ipaZ aonc_us£0n of the
ctu_k_ 8urfaced.
, , -. • It
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As a result of the need to focus the study because of the time and
budget constraints, a number of interesting related studies were not
undertaken. For example, the following studies were never addressed:
_p
(i) Whether the continued use of expendable boosters was a
reasonable alternative to the use of the space shuttle;
(2) Whether specialized spacecraft would be competitive, cost-
wise, with standard spacecraft;
(3) Whether the incluslon of a NASA mission model would have
altered the preferred procurement option;
(4) Whether the payload integration costs associated with doubllng
the maximum number of payloads per spacecraft would exceed the
operational savings; and
(5) Whether standard spacecraft could be used for Air Force
operational missions.
On the asset side, the short time frame and low budget reduced the
problem of keeping the clients' interest. This was the case, at least,
for the first phase of the study that lasted four months. Because of
this, many of the normal procedural functions were streamlined, and the
interactions with the clients were informal and oriented toward eliminating
bottlenecks and providing the necessary guidance and inputs for the study
to go forward. There was a commitment by both the clients and Rand to
carry out the study as planned.
This cooperation and commitment began to wane for a number of reasons
after the first phase of the study was completed. First, the introduction
of the L-AEM into the study was initiated as a unilateral NASA decision _,
prior to the completion of the first phase. Rand's response attempted to
retain the study unity between NASA and the Air Force by sponsoring the
inclusion of the L-AEM in the study on the basis that it reflected an
attempt to accomplish the upgrading of the AEM that we had recommended.
At the same time, we encouraged the formulation of a NASA-AIr Force
Joint set of specifications for the L-AEM and that any such extension
of the study be agreed upon by both NASA and the Air Force. Although
a set of joint specifications emerged for the L-AEM and the NASA-Air
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Force interface was retained, there was a subtle shift in sponsorship
from the Air Force Space Test Program Office/MMS Program Office to
the AEM Program Office during the two months between the first and
second phases of the study. This seemed to negatively affect the
participation of the Air Force Space Test Program Office. In addi-
tion, a NASA GSFC reorganization during this period affected the
leadership of the AEM Program Office and resulted in a reassignment
to NASA headquarters of the project monitor in the AEM Program Office.
As mentioned earlier, the MMS Program Office interest in the study
also decreased after the completion of the first phase of the study
because the results had been favorable to the MMS, i.e., tended to
validate the _ cost estimates and included the MMS in the preferred
procurement option, and because there were no inputs required from
the MMS Program Office for the second phase. As a consequence, the
Rand-cllent interaction was substantially different for the two
phases of the study. Clearly, it would have been more desirable for
the study to have collapsed the two phases into one continuous study.
To do this would have meant delaying the Air Force inputs to the FY 77
budget process; the penalty for doing this was uncertain at the time.
In retrospect, it appears that such a delay could proably have been
accepted with a minimum penalty.
I
I
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VI. APPLYING THE NASA-DOD COOPERATION EXPERIENCE TO OTHER SITUATIONS:
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS
_ Section II traced the evolution of NASA and DoD cooperation in
space activities from the development of President Eisenhower's space
policies during the pre- and post-Sputnik era through the mid-1960s.
The cost and organizational implications of DoD utilization of NASA
standard spacecraft designs for the Space Test Prosrammtssions were
Investigated using a case study approach in Sets. III and IV. The
case study examined the process of NASA-DoD cooperation in one area.
This cooperation benefited from experiences gained during nearly 20
years of NASA-DoD interaction.
In a variety of situations, it is often hypothesized chat improved
cooperation between agencies having overlapping areas of responsibility
or between nations having similar interests will lead to increased
economic efficiency. Such cooperation is considered especially impor-
tant during periods of tight financial (budgetary) constraints, where it
is often seen as a means of sharing the costs and risks associated with
a speclflc project. Over the years, numerous attempts have been made
to establish cooperative relationships among agencies or nations, with
varying degrees of success. In general, the more successful coopera-
tive arrangements involved a specific project and were for a few par-
tictpants (agencies or countries) or for a short time. Examples include
the Concorde aircraft oo-development and co-production by France and
England, the Apollo-Soyuz rendezvous project between the USSR and the
United States, and the European cooperation on the space shuttle program
(which has finally centered on the Space Lab Module after many aborted
attempts at much more extensive participation). In contrast, the
NASA-DoD cooperation cited in this study is unusual because it has
dealt with a broad spectrum of projects and problems and has been in
effect for over 15 years.
In this section, NASA-DoD cooperation is reexamined for lessons
that might facilitate future interagency cooperation in ocher situa-
tions. This is done first by reviewing the NASA-DoD cooperation
mm
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experience and by identifying two major categories of factors that
appear to be essential for the NASA-DoD successful experience. Next,
the difficulty of achieving an effective organizational structure to
support interagency cooperation, even when these two essential categories
of factors are present, is illustrated by the review of the NASA-DuD
relationship and by recounting the problems encountered in applying the
apparently successful NACA cooperation model to NASA.
Finally, two possible situations where interagency or international
cooperation appears to be important are briefly examined as candidates
for testing the appllcabili_y of the NASA-DuD experience. It should be
noted that this examination is not meant to do Justice to a topic which
requires extensive analysis, but rather is intended to illustrate the
need for a future study to specifically examine, in detail, the experi-
¢mce of a number of different cooperative arrangements. One purpose
for such research would be to identify the factors contributing to
successful cooperative agreements within a variety of contexts. Such
a study would require significant additional research and is outside
the scope of this dissertation.
NASA-DOD COOPERATION EXPERIENCE
The two primary categories of factors contributing to the continuing
success of NASA-DuD cooperation in space activities have been (I) a com-
mon subset of missions and resources--manpower, data, spacecraft, launch
vehicles, facilities, etc.--where cooperation was possible and desirable;
and (2) a common organizational responsibility to the Executive Branch
(the President and the Bureau of the Budget), which in turn was respon-
,
sible to the Congress.
In the NASA-DoD case, a large subset of common interests and objec-
tives provided natural areas for cooperation, be it in areas of manpower,
launch vehicles, spacecraft, or data. The similarity of interests
provided various cooperative arrangemeflts in the form of Joint projects,
The Congressional responsibility for overseeing NASA and DuD
space activities rested mainly with the permanent committees in the
House of Representatives and the Senate (Set. If, p. 19).
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shared hardware and facilities_ and common management and procurement
procedures. However, even where the interests were common, it was not
easy to achieve a high degree of cooperation, The inclination to create
separate managsment procedures was as strong as the desire to build
, separate facilities and support organizations.
Congress recognized the potential for NASA and DoD to create dupli-
cate capabilities, and thus specified in the Space Act of 1958 that...
in order to keep the costs of the U.S. _pace program as low as possibZe,
u_neoessary duplication of effort, facilitiesj and equipment should be
avoided by close cooperation among Federal agencies .... This statement
of Congressional intent, along with the provision for organizational
,
arrangements to oversee the NASA-DoD relationship, provided the legis-
lative basis for such cooperation.
Even with these factors, it took four to five years before the or-
ganizational structure for cooperation was developed and institution-
alized as part of the NASA and DoD standard operating procedure. Sit-
uations that do not include these two categories of factors could
expect to encounter possibly even more difficulty in establishing a
cooperative relationship.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSFERRING NACAEXPERIENCE TO NASA
The transferral of organizational experience from one situation
to another is generally much more difficult than anticipated. For
instance, during the debate between Congress and the Executive Branch
on the formulation of NASA, it was often suggested that the experience
of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) was directly
applicable to the new space agency and should be used as an organiza-
tional model for NASA. In 1959, NACA, employing 8000 scientists,
engineers, and other personnel and operating several major research
and testing facilities, had already demonstrated many years of service
to the aircraft industry and the military services. In 1952 it began
to study the mechanics and problmms of space flight and was the agency
responsible for such technical contributions as the blunt nose design
,
The Civilian M_litary Liaison Committee (C_C) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Council.
i
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for ICBM reentry vehicles and the X-15 experimental rocket-propelled
aircraft. It had a long history of cordial relationships and coopera-
tion with the Department of Defense, as well as with other goverrauental
agencies. Its main interaction with other agencies had been through
its advisory capacity and the coordination of all the scientific
._._
work in aviatlcn in the government. Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director of
NACA in 1958, viewed its main function as "a coordinating body. ''(13)
It was organized to do this mainly through the 17-member Advisory
Committee and the five major and 22 subordinate committees. The
membership of these committees and subordinate committees was drawn
from experts in industry, government, and military departments.
NACA functioned as a permanent, independent agency in the Executive
Branch, reporting directly to the President and requiriug his super-
vision.
President Eisenhower, in his proposed legislation for NASA, saw
NASA functioning in much the same capacity and way in the space arena
that NACA had functioned in aviation. This accounted partly for his
decision not to provide machinery for resolving disputes short of
Presidential involvement. The opposing view was based primarily on
the observation that continued cooperation could not be assumed, as
NASA was to be a new operating agency with broadened functions and
scope, whereas NACA had been primarily a research agency. (15) And,
as such, NACA lacked the tradition of dlrectin8 and coordinating
major programs. To inculcate a spirit of decislonmaking in an organi-
zation that has lived and thrived on a tradition of peaceful advice-
giving would be very difficult. The expectation was that the inevitable
commingling of civilian and military in the space field would create
(13)
areas of conflict reqqiring organizational machinery for resolution.
As it materialized, the organizational vie_oint of neither the
Administration nor the Congress was entirely correct for NASA. Congress
was correct in its assessment that organizational machinery was needed
to resolve conflicts and to ensure coordination between DoD and NASA.
The Administration was correct in its assessment that working-level
coordinating boards could adequately provide the interaction needed
to solve interagency problems. As described earlier in this section,
both were also wrong in important ways which contributed to the four
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to five years before the NASA-DoD coordination machinery really began
functioning as it has for the past i0 to 12 years.
POSSIBLE RESEARCH AREAS
_# Although it is difficult t) successfully transfer past organiza-
tional experience to new situations, as demonstrated above, It is also
important to thoroughly examLne applicable experience and apply it where
appropriate. But cauclon and considerable additional research should
guide any attempt to apply NASA-DoD experience with coordination
machinery to other situations. Thus, thls section merely attempts to
identify several situations where improved interagency or international
cooperation may be partlcularly important and suggests a study approach
for these situations.
One prospective situation where improved cooperation may be advan-
tageous is between the new Department of Energy and other U.S. govern-
mental agencies whose activities affect the U.S. energy pollcy. For
instance, the Department of Transportation, Envlronmental Protection
Agency, Department of the Intecior, NASA, and VoV will all interact with
the Department of Energy. In this situation, the motivation for coordi-
nation machinery would be to resolve conflicting policies and Jurisdic-
tional questions as well as to minimize dupllcatlon of effort or to
make new programs possible through Joint efforts. Because of the dif-
ferent perspectives and possibly conflicting leglslatlve directives of
these agencies, it is conceivable that--wlthout proper interagency coopera-
tlon--confllcts counterproductive to some broader objectives of the
United States could arise.
Without carrying out an extensive analysis of the transferability
of the NASA-DoD experience with interagency coordination, it appears
that thls situation contains only one of the two principal factors
identified as being important for the NASA-DoD success--that all of
these agencies have a common authority, i.e., Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch. The missing factor is that these agencies _o _t produce
a common specific output (dlta, missions, projects, etc._ whose value
can be measured directly, but rather the output of the Department of
Energy is expected to be plah_, services, and pollcy directives for
J
1
1981006400-119
-103-
the nation and other governmental agencies. Consequently, it does not
appear that the NASA-DoD experience can be applied directly without
additional research.
_ If such a research project were to be undertaken, one of the first
tasks would involve a careful analysis of enabling legislation of the
Department of Energy and other relevant governmental agencies to iden-
tify the provision for cooperation, to assess the potential success and
motives for cooperative efforts, and to identify areas where changes
could be made to enhance cooperation. Another task of this research
project would be a broad study of cases where long-term interagency
cooperation has been attempted. The cases included should be relevant
to the areas and types of cooperation that the Department of Energy
might be involved in as its program progresses. Given the results of
the analysis of past experience with interagency cooperation and the
assessment of cooperation requirements as seen by the Department of
Energy, a first-ordermatching of lessons, experience, and "need" could
take place. A more detailed analysis of the areas where a match occurs
or does not occur could lead to the selection of the organizational
structure and operating procedures to support cooperation between the
Department of Energy and other governmental agencies.
Another situation where cooperation appears to be important is in
the international arena of bilateral and multinational weapons acquisi-
tion programs. There seems to be both political and economic pressures
influencing DoD to get more deeply involved in such programs. The
effective garticipation of DoD in such agreements will depend on
establishing a basis for coordinating and cooperating with the countries
and industries involved in the agreements.
This situation contains only one of the two principal _actors iden-
tified as being important to the NASA-DoD long-term successful cooperation.
In this instance, the factor is the production of a common product where a
Joint effort might yield economic benefits to the countries involved in
the co-production or co-development agreement. But the other essential
factor is absent in this situation: There is no attthortty common to all
participants. Thus, the direct transferral of the NASA-DoD experience to
this situation appears to be inappropriate without further analysis.
J
1981006400-120
!-104-
However, a considerable body of experience--both good and bad--
has been gained with a similar attempts to undertake co-production and
co-development programs. The organizational content of such experiences
should be evaluated am an input to the formulation of a decision crite-
rion for DoV's participation in future multinational procurement pro-
grams. A large number of case studies are available: the Multi-Role
Combat Aircraft, the A-300 airbus, the Coucorde, the MBT-?0 tank, the
space shuttle laboratory module, the F-16, and the I_FfELSAT communications
satellite. In analyzing this experience, one should attempt to identify
the various approaches used to ensure the cooperation and the principal
factors of each, and to assess the contribution of these factors to the
success or failure of the cooperative effort.
In summary, neither of the situations (cited above as potentially
interesting areas where either interagency or international cooperation
is important) satisfies both of the essential categories of factors
underlying the successful experience with cooperation between N&SA and
DoD. Consequently, the NASA-DoD experience does not seem to apply
directly; however, the first step in the research approach outlined [or
both situations suggests the applicability of the organizational analysis
presented in this report for the NASA-DoD situation to a variety of other
situations where intersgency or international cooperation has been a
major component. To the extent that the NASA-DoD experience contributes
to this body of knowledge in interagency cooperation, it can be directly
useful for these new situations.
o- - -
1981006400-121
-105-
Appendix A
ESTIMATES OF COST
by
J. P. Large
a
Spacecraft traditionally have been very expensive to produce be-
cause of stringent weight and performance requirements, heavy emphasis
on reliability, and sam11 production quantities. Various parametric
cost-estiNattng m>dels have been developed from experience over the
past 15 or so years, and those models reproduce the cost of the tra-
ditional spacecraft with acceptable accuracy. Initially, it was
thought that such a model could be used to estimate the costs of the
AEN, L-AEH, STPSS, and _/S. Such a model '_ou[d have insured cost-
comparability among them, perhaps at the sacrifice of absolute accuracy
in some instances.
It developed, however, that models based on 15 years of spacecraft
data estimate costs that are higher than those experienced in the Air
Force Space Te_t Program and those in the AEN contract. The SANSO cost
model, for example, estimates the nonrecurring and recurring cost of
HCA_ at about $14 million, mainly for development; Boelng's ceiling
estimate was approximately $5 million, and at the time of the Rand
study it did not appea= that the ceiling would be exceeded. At the
same time, GSFC was estimating a unit cost of under $10 million for
_tS co_ared to the SANSO model's estinmte of about $t9 million. The
GSFC estimate was based on some hardware development; component costs
were based on vendor quotes and analogy with known costs.
At both ends of the spectrum, then, costs were known to a reason-
able degree of accuracy. The problem was to ensure relative accuracy
between the AEH and ._g4S and to estimate L-AEN and STPSS costs that
i
would reflect their relative complexity. The decision was made to
develop a cost model based on a combination of AEH costs and tradi-
tional scaling curves. That would assume implicitly that if Boeing
could produce an A£H for about $2 million, all spacecraft manufacturers
could be equally efficient in producing lar_er spacecraft usin_ a phi-
losophy of low cost, use of flight-proven componet_ts, etc.
i
1981006400-122
)-106-
Cost-estimating equations for spacecraft subsystems are typically
of the type
y maX b or Y = a + bXc
where Y - cost, anA
X = weight or other subsystem characteristic.
In the SAMSO model, for example, the cost of the attitude control
system is given by
.90
ACS cost in thousands of 1974 $ i 14.72 (ACS dry weight)
In developing a model for this study the b-value, 0.90, was used with
,
an a-value based on AEM. That procedure gave the following equations
(all these costs are in thousands of 1976 dollars):
.74
Structure, thermal control, interstage • 4.8 (weight)
84
Electrical power system = 5.65 (weight)'
9
Attitude control system = 14.7 (weight)"
.9
Communications and data handling = 15.4 (weight)
In addition, the costs of system test and integration, program
management, quality assurance, reliability, etc., must be included,
and they add about another 50 percent to the total. On top of that
are the costs of special components, such as tape recorders, hydraztne
tanks, and solar panels not included in the basic configuration.
Component costs, even those of existing, flight-proven components,
vary considerably and add another measare of uncertainty to the total.
Vendor quotes, for example, can vary by more than an order of magnitude.
As shorn below, the range of b!ds for a PC8 encoder was from $21,400
to $611,000; in that same case the second-lowest bid was $41,200. Also,
It may be noted that ti_e ACS est_aating equation is essentially
the same as the one cited above for the SAbISO model. Apparently, in-
flation effects have been offset by factors such as a low-cost design
approach and the cost-quantity effect.
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RANCE O_ BIDS
Range
I_em ($ thousands) Ratio
S-band transmitter 29.1-39.8 1:1.37
Magnetometers ;7.7-25.7 1:1.45
Rocket motor assembly _.2-31.8 1:1.50
Louvers _.6-28.1 1:2.93
Command decoder and
remote command processor 62.3-1188.0 1:19.1
PC_4 encoder 21.4-611.0 1:28.6
component price ls highly dependent on quantity procured, i.e., the
quantity ordered a_ one time, not the _otal quantit, over time. The
table below shows what may be an extreme case, but it illustrates a
point on which wndors agree--slx S-band transponders bought one at
a time wlll cost _ubstantlally more than slx procured In one buy.
INFLUENCE OF SIZE OF BUY ON COST
Unit Price Cost-Reductlon
_y C$) (_)
I 306,000 0
2 294,000 3.9
3 26?,000 12.7
4 227,G00 i 25.8
i
The same principle obtains at the system level, but the cost
there is more a function of production rate than quantity. A manu-
facturer may have a fixed, sustaining cost of, say, $1 million per
year whether he builds one spacecraft or four. The hypothetical ex-
ample below illustrates the effect of rate in such a situation.
Sustaining Cost
Annual Rate ReLrS_acecraft
I l,O00,O00
2 500,000
3 333,333
4 250,OOO
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The equation used to adjust recurring costs fnr quantity effects was:
-i
f ffi_8 + 1.97 n
_. where f = adjustment factor applied to cost
n = total number of spacecraft procured
f = i if n E I0.
Co_t-Est imating Equations
AEM Cumulati,,e cost = 2.28 n (f).
STPSS
Spin = 2.866 f n + 1.743 fl nl
Low-cost = 2.866 f n + 2.812 f2 n2
Precision = 2.866 f n + 3.995 f3 n3
where n = number of core modules
nI = number of spin models
n2 = number of low-cost modules
n3 = number of precision modules.
MMS
Regular: Cumulative cost = 8.965 nI f
SPS-I = 9.350 n2 f
Calculation of f includes 20 M}ISprocured by
NASA ove_ 10-year period.
L-A_M
Baseline: Cumulative cost = 4.815 nI f
Precision = 5.678 n2 f
Spin - 3.706 n3 f.
The remainder of Appendix A consists of tables showing estimated
10-year program costs of spacecraft and shuttle launches for various
procurement options.
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Table A-I
SPACECRAFT COSTS--NOMINAL CASE
($ millions)
Maximum AEM and L-AEM-BL altitude = i000 n mi
_ AEM and L-AEM-BL orientation = Earth only
Payloads 114 228
13 [ 6 13 6Payloads/spacecraft
Spacecraft Type Cost
AEM 2.3 6.8 11.4 16.0
STPSS
Nonrecurring 22.9 22.9 26.9 26.9
Spin .... 26.2 40.5
Low-cost 57.1 90.7 67.8 110.9
Precision 33.0 3_,3 41.8 47.5
Total 117 155 174 242
AEM 2.3 9.1 11.4 20.5
_S 108.8 162.5 155.6 251.1
Total iii 172 167 272
STPSS
Nonrecurring 22.9 22.9 26.9 26.9
Spin .... 20.0 41.6 i
Low-cost 62.5 109.6 88.4 150.1
Precision 34.5 34.2 43.6 52.1
Total 120 167 179 271
l_S 117 190 176 297
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 9.8 9.8 11.3 11.3
Spin _- -- 14.3 31.1
Precision 86.9 123.9 108.9 168.3
Total 97 134 135 211
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 11.9 11.9 14.5 14.5
Baseline 20.4 29.6 19.0 31.4
Spin .... 15.2 32.4
Precision 29.5 28.7 33.1 36.5
STPSS
Nonrecurring 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4
Low-cost 41.5 73 63._ 106.2
Total 122 162 164 239
• n
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Table A-I (Cont.)
Payloads 114 228
Payloads/spacecraft 13 1 6 13 1 6
Spacecraft Type Cost
L-AEM
Nonrecurring ii.9 ii 9 14.5 14.5
Basellne 18.7 26.8 17.9 29.8
Spin .... 14.3 31.0
Precision 65.1 93.4 88.2 133.7
Total 96 132 135 209
AEM 2.3 6.9 11.4 16.0
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 11.9 ii.9 14.5 14.5
Baselli_e ].4.2 13.6 4.5 4.3
Spin .... 21.5 31.3
Precision 65.8 94.4 88.8 135.3
Total 94 127 141 201
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 9.8 Ii.9 ii. 3 II. 3
Baseline -- 26.8 ....
Spin .... 3.8 10.8
Precision 58.5 93.4 76.6 104.1
_S 33.7 -- 58.5 142.5
Total 102 132 150 269
AEM 2.3 9. I ii.4 20.5
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 9.8 9.8 II. 3 II. 3
Spin .... 3.8 10.8
Precision 58.5 96.2 76.6 104.1
MMS 25.5 ]6.5 34.3 80.4
Total 96 132 137 227
"I
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Table A-2
SPACECRAFT COSTS _llTliADDED CAPABILITIES:
UPGRADED AEM AND L-AEM-I
($ millions)
Haximum AEH and L-AEM-BL altitude = Ceosynchronous
AE:I and L-A_I-BL orientation = Earth and sun
P
Payloads 114 228
Payloads/spacecraft 13 [ 6 13 6
Spacecraft Type Cost
AEM 17.1 33.0 37.8 59.5
STPSS
Nonrecurring 22.9 22.9 26.9 26.9
Spin .... 31.6 27.2
Low-cost 32.3 32.5 25.3 44.7
Precision 38.2 38.4 45.1 53.0
Total III 127 167 211
AEM 12.2 26.7 46.1 66.6
MMS 56.1 73.4 65.4 127.6
Total 68 i00 112 194
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 11.9 11.9 14.5 14.5
Baseline 52.2 85.3 67.6 115.8
Spin .... 14.3 31.0
Pre=ision 27.3 25.9 31.1 34.7
Total 91 123 128 196 •
AEM 2.3 6.9 11.4 16.0
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 11.9 11.9 14.5 14.5
Baseline 47.5 72.7 54.6 91.2
Spin .... 21.6 31.3
Precision 27.4 26.2 31.3 35.1
Total 89 118 133 188
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 11.9 11.9 14.5 14.5
Baseline 35.5 85.1 52.2 72.5
Spin .... 3.8 I0.8
Precision 17.5 25.9 21.0 26.9
MMS 33.7 -- 58.5 142.5
Total 99 123 150 267
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Table A-2 (Cont.)
Payloads 114 228
Payloads/spacecraf 13 [ 6 13 6
Spacecraft Type Cost
AEM 2.3 9.1 11.4 20.5
L-AEM
Nonrecurring II.9 II.9 14.5 14.5
Baseline 35.5 60.3 52.3 72.5
Spln .... 3.8 I0.8
Precision 17.5 27.1 16.4 20.8
MMS 25.5 16.5 34.3 80.4
Total 93 125 133 220
L-AEM
Nonrecurring 9.8 9.8 Ii.3 Ii.3
Spin .... 14.3 31.1
Precision 86.9 123.9 108.9 168.3
Total 97 134 135 211
• m
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Table A-3
LAUNCH COSTS--NOMINAL CASE
($ millions)
Maximum AEM and L-AEM-BL altitude m tOO0 n ml
AEM and L-AEM-BL orientation ,,Earth only
Space shuttle cost/launch = $15.4 million
_ Kick stages = Solid rockets
Payloads 114 228
Payloads/spacec raft 13 6 13 6
I00_ weight attribution
AEM/STPSS 37 51 65 93
AEM/F_S 41 63 68 III
STPSS 37 51 60 94
MMS 41 67 65 112
L-AEM 36 50 58 90
AEM/I.-AEM 36 50 62 90
L-AEM/MMS 14 51 57 96
AF_/L-AEM/I_S 33 50 57 89
50% weight attribution
AEM/STPSS 2b 37 48 69
AEM/MMS 27 44 46 77
STPSS 26 38 42 68
._.S 28 46 43 l_
L-AEId 26 37 42 66
AEM/L-AEM 2b 37 46 67
L-AEM/I_dS 24 31 39 68
AEId/L-AEM/HM,_ 24 37 41 66
Service charge
AEM/STPSS 16 24 30 44
AEM/MMS 14 24 24 42
STPSS 16 _4 25 43
_IS 14 24 22 41
L-AEM 16 24 25 43
AEM/L-AEM 16 24 29 44
L-ADI/_S 14 24 22 41
AF2{/I.-AEM/_S 14 24 24 42
NASA tariff
AEM/STPSS 79 127 157 241
AF_2d/blMS 83 144 149 258
STPSS 79 126 131 235
MMS 83 146 134 252
L-AE_ 85 134 142 24 l
AEM/L-AEM 85 133 167 254
L-AEM/MMS 78 134 129 242
AEM/L-AEM/MMS 77 133 141 242
Modified NASA tariff a
AE_/STPSS 35 47 61 87
AI_/YY4S 60 90 97 158
STPSS 34 46 55 84
mS 61 97 92 lb3
L-AD4 38 51 76 92
A_/L-A_4 44 49 76 99
L-AEM/MMS 42 51 71 92
AEM/L-AE_/_S 38 53 66 95
aAssumes that whenever possible, the spacecraft and its
kick stages will be oriented perpendicular to the shuttle
axis.
.- q
t
• #
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Table A-4
LAUNCH COSTS FOR UPGRADED AEM
($ millions)
Maximum AEM altitude - Geosynchronous
AEM orientation - Earth and sun
Space shuttle cost/launch = $15.4 million
Kick stages - Solid rockets
Payloads 114 228
Payloads/spacecraft 13 6 13 6
100% weight attribution
AEM/STPSS 34 42 61 81
AEM/MMS 29 43 59 93
50% weight attribution
AEM/STPSS 25 33 47 63
AEM/MMS 21 31 43 70
Service charge
AEM/STPSS 17 24 32 46
AEM/MMS 12 20 28 44
NASA tariff
AEM/STPSS 86 126 168 249
AEM/MMS 65 109 152 259
Modified NASA tarlffa
AEM/STPSS 39 50 74 95
AEM/MMS 45 64 89 139
=_
aAssumes that whenever possible, the spacecraft and
its kick stages will be oriented perpendicular to the
shuttle axis.
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Table A-5
LAUNCH COSTS FOR TKE L-AEM-],a
($ millions)
_" Maximum L-AEM-BL altitude = Geosynchronous
L-AEM-BL orientation = Earth and sun
Space shuttle cost/launch = $15.4 million
Kick stages = Solid rockets
Payloads 114 228
Payloads/spacecraft 13 6 13 6
, ,, ,,
100% weight attribution
L-AEM 36 49 57 B9
AEM/L-AEM 35 49 62 81
L-AEM/MMS 33 50 56 91
AEM/L-AEM/MMS 33 49 56 88
50% weight attribution
L-AEM 26 37 41 66
AEM/L-AEM 26 36 45 62
L-AEM/MMS 23 37 39 66
AEM/L-AEM/MMS 24 37 40 65
Service charge
L-AEM 16 24 25 43
AEM/L-AEM 16 24 29 42
L-ADI/blMS 14 24 22 41
AEM/L-AEM/MMS 14 24 24 42 i
NASA tariff
L-AEM 85 133 141 247
AEM/L-AEM 85 133 167 246
L-AEM/MMS 76 133 128 237
AEM/L-AEM/MMS 77 133 141 241
Modified NASA tariffb
L-AEM 38 51 76 92
ADI/L-AEM 44 49 76 90
L-AEM/MMS 41 51 71 92
A_/L-AEM/MMS 39 54 65 95 iJ
aonly the L-AEM-BL configuration is modified to give
it geosynchronous and sun-orientation capability.
bAssumes that whenever possible, the spacecraft and
its kick stages will be oriented perpendicular to the
shuttle axis.
J
• #
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Appendix B
POWER SUBSYSTEM: A COMPARISONOF AEMa STPSSj AND NMS
m
by
N. E. Feldman and P. A. CoNine
BASIC DESCRIPTION OF THE AEM(31)
The AEM spacecraft comes in two versions: Both have a standard
28 V power bus, a single 10 Ah rechargeable nickel cadmium (NiCd)
battery, and are powered by two fixed arrays (not sun-tracking) with
approximately 23 sq ft of solar cells. (For further details, see
Table B-1.) The solar-cell arrays can provide a peak power of 238 W
end-of-life (EOL) when the _m angle is most favorable. Because the
arrays do not sun track, the average power produced during illumination
is about 130 W. However, to optimize power output in the orbit planned
for SAGE, the two solar arrays are driven to an angle of ±50 deg with
respect to the local horizontal. These motors are shown in the power
subsystem diagram of Fig. B-1.
Up to 50 W can be provided to the experiment module with a voltage
regulation of 28 V ±2 percent. Voltage regulation to the experiments
is relaxed for peak pulse loads above 50 W, e.g., the regulation is re-
laxed to ±5 percent when the experiments require a peak pulse load of
120 W.(32) This peak pulse load option is used on the SAGE vehicle,
where the specification states that this 120 W load must be handled for
a maximum of 4 sec. Although the 4 sec time period is the speclCled
value, the spacecraft may be able to handle this amount of exrerlment
power for up to a few minutes.
The HCMMvehicle power budget during normal orbital operation,
i.e., standby, is:
Experiment 22 W
Telemetry 4 W
Attitude control a,_ddetermination 12 W
Power circuitry 12 W
Total 50 W
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Table B-1
POWER SYSTEM COMPARISONS
!
Characteristic AEH (3:) STPSS(2) p_aS(h)
JkP Voltale level 2B _4 V dc at bus 28 _5 V dc at bus 28 _7 V dc m
!2Z to experiments optional 28 V _0.5 V
to expertAent• (_I.8Z)
Array No •tray on base module
AveraBe powe: d sin;
illumination 133 Wa 121_ W Ix !
Averale power over
low-altitude orbit 68 _ 500-600 W nominal i 1200 W max, bus ratlnR n
Hltartal N/P silicon N/P eillcon
Ee•lstlnce 1 to 3 ohm-cm 2 oh_-cm
Sis• of solar cell• 2 " 2 , 0.03 cm 2 • 4 . 0.036 cm
Efficiency 111 -- 10_
Cover flee• thickne•e b mild 6 mils
Total dimensions
of array Each _snll consists of Each panel consists of
2 •trtnls " 82 cell• 2 strinl• of q6 cells
in series _ S In in •eries by 3 in
parallel _ 6 panels on parallel (SO W/panel-EOL
each of two non-sun- max) up to 24 panel•
tracklnR paddles
Total area of array 21,2 sq tt b sq ft/panel
Array powr/ft" EOL 10.} W/ft" 8. J W/ft 2
Total wee|hi ol array
and support structure l_.b Ib 132 Ib
Spacec/a|t power con-
sumption, eac|udln a
experiments _ SO to 80 Wc _2-197 _| I_O W
Power av_ilsblt, tot
eaperiBen(s _O to 50 Wd _ bOO W nominal I 850 W lus
Kind o! _attery Nicd NIC_ NICd
S_ttery r•tir_ I0 Ah ] • 20 Ahk 2 " _0 Ah bl•ellhe or up
to } • 20 Ah or I to }
" _0 Ahc
Battery coef f icllmt.
Ah/Ib 0.4_ 0,}8 0.40
Number o_ batteries 1 _ 1 to 1
Depth of discher|e e l_ (_)L); . 2S_ 2el low earth orbit; $OI p
l_ ::I (F,OL) ! •_nchronou• orbit
Powr avei iablo
durlnl eclipseI _ ;/hw 420 I_r 2BO Whr for 2 " 20 Ah
battery or 1050 _r for
• _0 Ah bltteryq
Weliht o3 battery.
pover condilloninl
and dtstrlbu!3on _1.1 Ih :51,4 3h })_ |b q
Battery char_3n|
meth_ A_ro_s both _,lar _epsrale _m trol 3ol t_e power rl|ulatini unit
arrays 3n parallel eath hatlwrv |or all batteries r
Dlisipalton O|
excess p_er "_hunl re_l_¢ors ''h "_hun[ sm_,slw_ ''l Peak p_el tre_ker, s excess
pover iS left on the array.
shale Is • 2 to 5"C r/u• In
srrav temperature
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NOTES TO TABLE B-I
From Refs. 31 and 32:
aThis is the average power produced by the stationary array during
illumination. At an optimal sun angle, a maximum _f 238 W can be pro-
duced. Assuming a low earth orbit Illumination interval of approxi-
mately 60 min, the solar array power output is 7952 Nmtn corresponding
to 7952/60, or 133 W. Average power available for the orbit is 68 W,
which can be derived in the following way:
7952 W • min
= 68 W42.9 mtn59.1 min + 0.75
where 59.1 min is the period of illumination and 42.9 min is the per_od
of occult_tion during low earth orbit. The factor of 0.75 ia the
derived overall battery efficiency.
bBased on maximum array output of 238 W.
C -.
lne HCSH vehicle, excluding experiments, uses 59 W during a data
pass. The SAGE vehicle uses 47 W to 79 W for the portions of the _Ls-
sion discussed in the text. The remainder of the power produced during
illumination is used for battery charging.
dFtfty watts could be av,_ilable for an appreciable fraction of the
orbit, but the orbital average power that could be made available for
experiments and telemetry or the experimental data is no more than 40 W.
_lis assumes 68 N orbital average available: 12 W for attitude, 12 W
for power subsystems, and 4 W for housekeeping telemetry.
eoepth of discharge is given for the low orbit case, which is the
higher stress one because of the high frequency of occultation. Depth
of discharge for synchronous _bit can be as high a3 62 percent.
fOuring prelaunch, launch, ane completion of the acquisition phase,
the depth of battery discharge reaches 61.5 percent (Ref. 31, pp. 1-26).
This is a one-time condition. The AEM requires only an 8 Ah battery,
but a space-qualified I0 Ah battery was readily available. It proved
to be more practlcal to incorporate the standard battery rather than
to redesign the battery and charging circuits. Thus, the lower depth
of discharge values (0.14 or 0.166 rather than 0.25 as on STPSS and HMS)
reflect over_sign, not high risk, on STPSS or _S designs.
gcalcu_z_ed using depth of dtscha-?e for low earth orbit.
hln silunc loads, based on battery Ah and temperature monitors.
From Ref. 1:
[
Reference 1 (p, 6-1) lists a total nominal orbital average system
power of 500 N to 600 W, with 400 W for experiments. Page 3-5 of the
same report discusses using up to 24 panels, which would provide 1200 W
in the three-axis-stabilized configuration with s,.u-tracking arrays.
In the spin-stabilized configuration, however, the solar arrays are
"198"1006400-'135
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NOTES TO TABLE B-I (Cont.)
mounted to the six faces of the space vehicle; it should be noted that
not all solar cells are exposed to the sun simultaneously on this space-
craft, therefore, about 1200/_ of 382 W are available on this design.
]Electrical power consumption of the standard STPSS modules, exclud-
ing experiments, is determined by the stabilization system used: s_in-
n:ng spacecraft, 92 W; three-axls earth reference, 136 W; three-axls
stellar (and wheels), 185 W; three-axis stellar with hydrazlne, 197 W.
_RW does not recommend using batteries smaller than 20 Ah for
missions requiring less than 500 W because the nonrecurring costs
associated with designing a smaller capacity battery and with Inter-
face redefinition would increase prograta cost by about $200K to $300K.
Recurring battery cost savings due to using the smaller battery are not
substantial, since, typlcally, cell h_rdware contributes only 20 percent
to battery total cost, with the other 80 percent due to test and quality
control requirements.
_Excess power generated by the STPSS solar array is shunted into
resistive modules on the surface of the spacecraft and radiated into
space.
From Ref. 5:
mpage 22 says, "28 ±7 V dc negative ground."
nThe power subsystem can support an orbital average load of 1200 W
in any orbit from 500 to 1665 km and at geosynchronous altitude. This
[ncludau being able to accommodate a peak load of 3 kW for iO min, day
or sight. These determine the peak and average power requirements of
thp power regulating unit and batteries.
¢.
the choice of various numbers of batteries and two sizes allows a
larga variation in battery capacities to be chosen to suit the particular
experiment: 20, 40, 50, 60, 100, or 150 W.
PT_e most recent specification calls for a 60 percent depth of dis-
charge in synchronous orbit instead of 50 percent.
qThe baseline power module weighs about 254 lb, including the case,
l.,uvers, and all module attachment hardware. The heat sink louvers,
which prevent thermal runaway of the switching semiconductors, weigh
12 to 13 lb. The weight of the power subsystem frame or box, i.e.,
without electronics, Just structure, is about 54 Ib; and the attachment
hardware is about 25 lb. Thus, the 254 Ib power system module, exclud-
ing thermal and structural elements, weighs about 262 lb. Each 20 Ah
battery weighs about 50 to 53 lbl each 50 Ah battery weighs about 100
to llO lb. Thus, for the baseline case, the weight of the battery and
power conditioning is about 354 lb; and, for 3 x 50 Ah batteries, the
total weight ca;, be as much as 585 lb. Note that these figures include
some structure but do not include the vehicle harness, i.e., power
distribution.
1
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NOTESTO TABLE B-1 (Cont.)
rWhile all the batteries are connected to a slngle power regulator
unit, the unit has been designed to compensate for loss of a single
cell, or even an entire battery, vithout Jeopardizing the total pover
system.
_- sNASA Goddard's HHS program office has decided to use a peak power
tracker rather than the separate battery charging modules, plus shunt
modules typically used in direct energy transfer systems. The tracker
works by tracking the peak power point of the solar array. When peak
power is not required, the pover regulaCln8 unit forces the solar array
operating point to a lover level. Therefore, no excess power is pro-
duced vhlch vould have co be dissipated. The peak power tracker lends
itself to slmpler interfaces than the direct ener&7 transfer system
with shunt module dissipators.
!
Ap:0,cat,on: I _I_SAGE CR|TJCe'kLDESI6NREVIEW I
E,p_o, I APRIL7 & 3, 1976 I m'_P'flNO
Mma_oe,s I DESIGNADEQUACY lain,cos,s,,mso,,,,s,_
C,,ooo,n,al,T_ce F,,g,'_tC,a_lo,I I
i
Fig. B-I--Power and dishibution subsystemblock d;ogrom
m .
1981006400-137
-121-
The duration of the data pass is 10 mln during illumination and 15 _In
during occultstlon. The HCNN vehlclt power budget during data pass Is
roughly as follows:
Experiment 24 /
_ Telemetry 35 W
Attitude control and determination 12 W
Power circuitry 12__._WW
Total 83 W (I0 to 15 _Ln)
The remainder of the energy produced during 111umlnatton is used for
battery charging and thls energy Is later used by the _pacecraft during
eclipse. During the eclipse, 46 Whr of energy are avallable from the
battery; this is about 75 percent of the energy used in charging the
battery. Exaalnatlon of the power system performance for the HCI_, and
SAGE alsslons Indlcates that about half the energy out of the arrays
is used for battery charging.
On the SAGE vehlcle, there are some hlgh short-duratlon loads
**
(le_s than 4 sec) from the experiment and from the tape recorder.
The timing for the experiment module is such that the tape recorder
peak dewumds and experiment peak demands do not occur at the sane time;
the power system Is not adequate for this. The teleme_ ry subsystem
requires 18 W to 21 W, except during tape dump (once per day), Hen
thls subsystem uses 51 W of power (500 sec duration). Te_ total SAGE
po_er demand during tape dump is:
Standby power _o experiment 9 W
Telemetry 51W
Attitude control and determlnatlon 16 W
Power circuitry 12_._WW
Total 88 W (500 sec)
Tables of subsystem electrlc load demands provided by Boeing show
an HC_04 payload total power consumption of 34 W durlnF a data pass.
However, a total of the entries adds only to 24 W. Either there ts an
error In a table entry, or else there Is a mistake In sddltlon.
**
One such load is the 120 W pulse option (2 to 4 sec duration) to
the experiments. The experiment module, which IncludeF the experiment
and a tape recorder, requires only 9 W during standby but can draw a
ratxilum pulse power of 117 W dttring acqulsltlon (4 sec duration).
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The maximum experiment power for durations of more than a few
seconds is required by the SAGE experiment (during the track il_terval),
not the HCMM experiment. The power breakdown for the SAGE vehicle for
the 180 sec track iiLterval during ddLa taking is as follows:
Experiment 43 W
Telemetry 19 W
Attltude control and determination 16 W
Power system circuitry 12 W
Total 90 W (180 sec)
The power consumed by experiments plus telemetry can be high for short
periods of time, e.g., it is 59 W for i0 to 15 min and 62 W for 3 mln.
DESCRIPTION OF STPSS (I) AND COMPARISON WITH AEM
The STPSS spacecraft also has a 28 V bus, but its voltage regula-
tion is not quite as stringent as the AEM (±5 V rather than ±4 V, as
shown in Table B-l). Additional power regulation equipment (±1.8 per-
cent regulation) can be added if the experiments require it (optional),
but the associated weight and power loss are not mentioned. The STPSS
spacecraft is equipped with three 20 Ah batteries and up to 24 solar
pm.els may be used in two arrays. These arrays can provide up to 1200 W
maximum (during illumination) in the three-axis-stabilizatlon configura-
tion with sun tracking. Use of the same 24 panels around a spinning
spacecraft will generate only about 1200/_, or 380 W. Spacecraft sub-
systems, excluding experiments, require approximately I00 to 100 W, de-
pending on which one of four stabilization techniques is used. A block
dlagram of the STPSS power subsystem is shown in Fig. B-2.
The STPSS spacecraft can supply substantially more power for ex-
periments than the AEM, i.e., 400 W compared to 40 W. Short-term peak
load data comparable to those available for the AEM are not available
for the STPSS. Other characteristics, shown in Table B-I, are rela-
tively standard.
,
The average power available for experiments over an orbital perioa
also depends on the orbit.
° °-
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Fig, B-2 --STPSS power subsystem
DESCRIPTION OF MMS (5) AND COMPARISON WITH STPSS
The MMS is the largest spacecraft of the three. The MMS base
module does not include an array and the assumption is made that any
array that is adeqnate for each payload can be easily incorporated.
The bINS power regulation system has been designed with an emphasis
on slmpllfied interfaces and substantial redundancy. The spacecraft
is designed to be able to handle orbital average powers up to 1200 W
(this would require a peak power from the array of 2400 W or more in
a low altitude earth orbit). Power to the spacecraft loads and the
batteries is controlled through a switching type of series regulator--
the PRU, or power regulating unit. The PRU is designed to adapt to
power array levels between 500 and 3600 W; its efficiency ranges from
about 0.88 to 0.96. The nominal battery configuration is two of 20 Ah
each. llowever, one to three batteries with either 20 or 50 Ah ratings
can be accommodated.
II
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When the MMS is shuttle launched, there should not be a large
cost impact associated with integration and testing for every new array,
since the shutt]e Imposes fewer size constraints and lower stresses
(vibration, acoustic) than previous launchers.
All of the MMS batteries and spacecraft loads are controlled by
a single PRU (see Fig. B-3). In the event of a single battery cell
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Fig. B-3mMMS block dlagram--_wer subsystem module
failure caused by a short circuit, the PRU can change its (voltage/
temperature) operating point to accommodate the lower battery terminal
voltage; while this will underutilize the undamaged batteries by one
cell out of 22, the total energy available will still be more than if
the battery with the failed cell were placed off line. In the STPSS,
In the three-battery case, two cells out of 66 are sacrificed be-
cause of the one cell failure, while open circuiting a single battery
sacrifices 21 cells.
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each battery has its own charge control unit. The latter is frequently
considered a more reliable system in the event of a single point failure
and has been the system considered preferable by tlleAir Force. Re-
placement of the MMS power system wlth one slmilar to that used on the
_,_._ STPSS would require a substantial amount of redesign•
The PRU, however, has considerable redundancy: two peak power
tracking circuits, two bias supply circuits (bias converters with
separate fuses), three control logic circuits, and six switching regu-
lators (each rated for 600 W or 18 A maxlmum). With little additional
cost or time, it Is possible to arrange two regulators in parallel to
supply each of three batteries, with separate logic control for each
pair of regulators. The battery outputs would be diode-lsolated from
the load bus. These modifications would result in a battery charging
system more analogous to that of the STPSS.
The unregulated bus voltage (28 ±7 V) was selected to permit ex-
traction of the full Ah rating from the battery, even after several
years of aging when the discharge voltage may have decreased to as low
as 21 V. On the hlgh side of the voltage rangy, the batteries require
a maximum of 33.4 V at the terminals under worst case charging condi-
tions (highest current level and a battery temperature of OOC). Be-
cause the PRU has a voltage clamp at 35 V, the tolerance was set at
±7 V for symmetry. The ±7 V tolerance requires that the experiments
incorporate a preregulator with a larger dynamic range than would be
required for the AEM or STPSS (±4 V and ±5 V, respectively). The PRU
locates the peak power point by hunting around the equilibrium value
at a _0 Hz rate• The resultant 0.5 V peak-to-peak 70 Hz ripple (at a
7 A load) that the PRU imposes on the bus also must be removed by the
preregulator at the input of each experiment (it Is not practical to
filter out so io_:a frequency).
The PRU is a series regulating element and thus tends to provide
lower effJclency than the conventional shunt regulators, e.g., the
direct energy transfer systems used on the AEM and STPSS. At syn-
chronous altitudes, this shows up as about a 5 to I0 percent lower
efficiency for the PRU approach. In addition, _he PRU approach may
be as much as i0 percent heavier than the direct energy transfer sys-
tems. It has been clalmed that in low earth orbits, e.g., altitudes
• &
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around 300 n mi, an optimized PRU may provide up to 30 percent more
power than the direct energy transfer systems for arrays with long
thermal time constants (T). This is because the array is more effi-
cient at lower temperature when it first comes out of eclipse and the
i_ PRU takes full advantage of this. For an array like Skylab, the thermal
constant is about 20 min. Thus, it takes 60 min (3T) to get to 90 per-
cent of the final AT, and this is the whole illumination period. For
lightweight arrays such as the Flexible Roll Up Solar Array (FRUSA),
the thermal time constant is only a few minutes and the improvement
over a direct energy transfer system in low earth orbit may be no more
than 5 to i0 percent.
OVERVIEW
Because many maximum or average power levels can be defined for
each space vehicle, Table B-2 summarizes some of the more useful values.
Shorter-term peak power levels available for experiment packages may be
limited by a variety of considerations unrelated to the factors that
dominate in Table B-2. The regulated 28 V ±2 percent power supply for
experiments on the AEM, for example, is limited to 50 W maximum; how-
ever, the regulator can supply 120 W at 28 V ±5 percent for up to 4 sec.
Short-term peak power levels may be limited by the excess output of the
solar array, by the battery energy storage capacity, by the surge cur-
rent limit of the battery, or by the peak power handling capability of
some component in the power conditioning subsystem. Short-term power
levels--that is, those lasting seconds to minutes--are generally only
a factor of 2 to I0 times the average power level, but only penalties
such as cost, weight, or reliability inhibit the use of larger factors.
Because the complete power subsystems of the STPSS and MMS are not as
well defined as for the AEM, and no power-time profiles are available
for each experiment, no short-term peak power suunary is shown.
There is no doubt that the peak power tracker design of the HNS
can squeeze more power out of a given array in a low altitude orbit
than a direct energy transfer system, but the primary Justification
for its use on the MMS is that the array characteristics and array in-
tegration into the space vehicle need not be optimized--any handy over-
sized array is acceptable and can easily be integrated. In this case,
1981006400-143
-127-
Table B-2
POWER SUMMARY
Characteristic AEH STPSS HHS
Peak array power possible, W 238 a 1200 _3600 b
Average array power available
to space vehicle during
illumination, W 133 1200 3600
Average power available over
a low altitude orblt, c W 68 500-600 1200d
Average spacecraft housekeep-
ing power, excludlng ex-
periments and associated
telemetry, W 28 100-200 350
Continuous or average power
available for experiments
over a low altitude orbit_ W 40 400 850
aThe 238 W is the peak of the power curve which
roughly resembles a positive half sine wave, since the
array is not sun-tracking.
bThe 3600 W is set by the peak power handling capa-
bility of the PRU; actually, there is no maximum since
still higher power arrays would merely be used less
efficiently. The excess electrical power would not be
drawn from the array, which merely results in a slightly
higher array temperature.
CThis assumes that power is supplied at a constant
rate to the spacecraft loads over the entire low alti-
tude orbit and that the battery capacity is adequate to
store the energy required over the perlcd the array Is
occulted.
dThe power bus is rated for 1200 W maximum, limiting
the total load that can be supplied.
however, optimizing the array powLr output is not likely to prove neces-
sary. Thus, there is a clear dichotomy in emphasizing peak power track-
ing for efficiency in a multipurpose vehicle.
Some of the z7 V variation of the MMS bus must be due to series
voltage drop in the PRU. In addition to this slow dc variation, there
is a superimposed 70 Hz ripple caused by hunting of the peak power
tracker about the optimum. While this has been measured to be about
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0.5 V peak to peak at a 7 A lo_d (it Is limited by the low impedance
of the batteries), it may be as much as 3 V peak to peak around the
maximum 40 A load. Virtually all experiment packages will require their
own preregulators to remove both variations, i.e., the ±7 V de and _ V
_ peak-to-peak 70 Hz ripple. Series type preregulators are simple, light-
weight, and reliable, but excess power must be available, since their
efficlencies over so large a range is poor, i.e., 50 to 60 percent.
Furthermore, the additional preregulator dissipation at each experiment
package increases thermal problems. Switching regulators (dc-to-dc
converters) are more complex, heavier, and require more filtering to
control electromagnetic interference but offer efflciencles of 85 to
90 percent or more.
The entire problem can be eliminated by installing one large pre-
regulator (e.g., 28 V t2 percent) for the entire spacecraft. Where
this decision has been made late in a program, it has resulted in space-
craft with unnecessary dupllcation--the experiments already contained
preregulators and too much expense and delay was involved in removing
them once they had been designed into the experiment packages. A new
MMS specification, which provided for only a one year llfe and less
extreme battery and ripple conditions, would place much less burden on
the experiment packages.
• R"
1981006400-145
-129-
Appendix C
COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA HANDLING SUBSYSTEM:
A COMPARISON OF AEM_ STPSS_ AND _4.S
by
P. A. CoNine
Table C-I summarizes the cormnunlcations and data handling sub-
systems for the AEM, the ._IS, and the STPSS. It can readily be seen
that the three C&DH systems are substantially different and not com-
patible. Major differences include frequencies, modulation, formats,
data rates, polarization, and security equipment. None of the C&DH
equipment on the three spacecraft is beyond or even pushing the state
of the art. Most of the equipment on the AEM and STPSS has been used
on previous spacecraft. While some of the MMS equipment will be new,
the overall spacecraft is in the latter stages of development. Because
the STPSS missions are not concerned with cross-llnklng data to another
spacecraft, it is not necessary to pay any further attention to the TDRSS
transponder.
DESCRIPTION OF THE AEM
The AEM spacecraft is currently being built by Boeing in two ver-
sions: the HCMM and the SAGE. The HCMM has a VHF conrmand and house-
keeping telemetry system and an S-band telemetry unit for experimental
data; the SAGE vehicle has all communications at S-band frequencies.
The command and telemetry formats are compatible wlth the NASA-STDN
satellite tracking and telemetry system. The HCMMspacecraft is the
only one in this study with a VHF co=anand receiver and housekeeping
transmitter; however, the comnunlcatlon system has been designed so
that it can become S-band-compatlble (as on the SAGE) merely by changln8
the transponder/transmitter-diplexer units. No further consideration
will be given to the VHF system.
The AEH telemetry system has a low data rate of 1 or 8 kbps, al-
though on the SAGE tape recorder playback can be as high as 1Mbps.
The command rate is a low 600 bps. The memory is small and is used
t
"I
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Table C-I
C&DH CHARACTERISTICS OF AFJI, l-g_S,AND STPSS
_'k_ Characteristic A]_q.HC_94a ( II ) &E'I-qAt,F ( I] ) _ g '_ _1F'_,g t l )
Teleu_trY and Co_nd
Band VHF S-band S-band S-band S-band
Trat king System
Cot_pa t i bi I i t y STDN STDN STDN STDN S(;LS
Uplink Frequency, MHz J48 2025-2120 2025-2120 2025-2120 1750-1850
Uplink Subcarrier
Modulation FCH/FSK/AH//_t n.a. PCH/F'qk/A.'I'F_I PSK Ternary FSK with AM
Coelsmnd Format bO bits n.a. bO bits 96 bits f 43 bits j
(.om_utnd Eat Rate 6OO bps n.a. bO bps 2K. IK, 125 bpa g 2 kbps
Down Iink Frequency,
_[Hz 136 2280 2200-2300 2200- 2300 2200-2300
_- lemet rv Forsmt :
Wurd length 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits _' 8 hits
Minor fra_ length 256 words 118 words 128 words d 128 words Variable (21
_talor frame iengttl 64 _tnor frays 64 minor frames 64 minor frar_es 128 minor frm_-*s Variable _-'3
Maximum Bit gate 1.02', kbpa b _.192 kbpa I Mbps e 64 kbpa 8-128 kbpa k
power Output I/4 W 2 W I W, housekeeping 1,7, ].5. _.r
2 W, experiment 7._ l: h(_) 2 W t
Co_nlcations Security Not available Not available Not available Not available Available
Antenna Polarization RHCP RNCP RHCF I with RHCP and Rtlt ;'(2_
1 with .LHCP I _
Memory Si_e 25b w_rd_ _ 32 bit_/word and 256 words * 32 bits/ lbK bits _ 18 8K words x
156 words • I6 bits/word c word and 256 words bits/word I ]2 bits/word m
16 bit a/word
Tape Recorder ('apacltv None None 4.5 • 108 bits Up to 9 _ IO 8 or 10g bite
up t." fl _ IOq
bits (optional)
a't_o verJions of the AEM spacecrait are currently being designed by I_einR: H_ and SAGE. The HC_q vehicle uses
the VHF band for commands and for housekeeping telemetry and S-tend fo¢ dosrnlink experimental data. The SAf;E mission
umea S-band for come, hall. rate, try. and data.
bData rate during the hi,oat phase is 8192 bps.
CcomMnds are compared with wordN in a _56 w,3rd, 16 bits/word PROM (Progratmlmble Read o,ls Memory). Dciayed coi_nda
are stored in the remote comnand processor, which conaiqts of a 256 word, 12 bits/worJ (:MOS/RAM (Complementary Hetal
dAssttmed the same as the HC_I vehicle because no chasnge ia indicated.
eTape re.older playback rate. Real tim" data rate is limited to I kbps cr g kbps. A new en_oder would be required
it highar bit rates ate needed.
tReteren_e It lia_m the t,_Blt_tat_i*,_r1_._411 _IRPd at t#_ httl_ (_ hit Intr_,ductlon avd _ hit ,'o_and word). Paise }4 o!
R_i. '_ |l_t_ the _omlan,l ter_at a_ _ btta (_hi,h _an he aasumed t_, he only the c_lsand word portit,n _,! the total iormat).
KWith use ol the "_OO bps co_nd tats, a single 5 sin comnd contest per day la required for loading of comaanda in
the on-b_rd computer. Thia comand lo_d will allow the conput_r to operate the spacecralt for period_ of 24 to 72 hr.
thq.i_. ion selectlbie.
tThe _S CtDH computer includes storage for attitude control informtion, aa _ell aa cow, MS. The SIPSS C&DH co_uter
is used only for ate.ring commands, and a aeparale computer handles attitude control. Therefore, th, apparent large di|-
ference in the capacities of the two CkDH colputeta ia ome of definition not actual capability.
JS(;LS itself haa _artable c_mumd formats. Page Ro] of Ref. I ahoww a 4l bit format am TRW'B conception of *'hat i_
required.
klv changinlt subcarriers, thi_ can be increased to .)_b kbpw. ]'_la is St;LS'a _utximum capacltv.
tit afpteciablv higher data fatal or more aervices are desired, there is provision for the standard 2 W transmitter to
be used to derive a higher po_r transmitter (e.g.. 20 W) in the pavlt_td se_'nent.
_ord length deduced from data bus supervisory line forlmtm, p. 8-S o! Rcf. L.
t
r • r"
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chiefly for storing commands for later processing and for verifying..
received commands with those stored in memory.
DESCRIPTION OF STPSS AND COMPARISONWITH AEM
The STPSS spacecraft is designed for Air Force missions. It has
an S-bar4 communication system which can handle a maximum command rate
of 2 kbps and telemetry rates of 256 kbps. It is SGLS-compatible and
uses ternary frequency-shift keying (FSK) coding. An on-board computer
can handle stored commands, telemetry storage, format control, and
memory dumps. Data a,td commands can be encrypted if necessary.
The CbDH for the STPSS spacecraft is far more sophisticated and
has a much greater capacity than that on the AEM (see Table C-l). It
is doubtful if experiments of the size that would be carried on the AEM
would require as sophisticated a system as presently envisioned for the
STPSS. However, currently planned AEM telemetry and control equipment
probably could not be used because of the basic incompatibility of the
NASA-STDN and AF-SGLS systems.
To _ake the AEM compatible with the SGLS system requires replacing
the S-ba_,d trans,_itter and the S-band transponder, the command demodu-
lator, and modifying or replacing the PCM encoder and the command
decoder/processor. Personnel at Boeing indicate that the "black boxes"
can be replaced one-for-one with SGLS-compatible equipment without
causing major spacecraft redesign. It appears that SGLS-compatible
equipment exists that could be used on the ^EM. Encryption and de-
cryptton units can be added to SGLS equipment if required, but not to
STDN. There is some question whether the &EM ran meet the signal isola-
tion requirements of encrypted missions. However, Boeing personnel
state that an SGLS-compatible AEM can have encryption capability. Items
such as the sequencer timer and remote command processor are one-time
programmable, with the programming dependent on the spacecraft and
mission, and could be used with the proper programming. The STPSS's
bus controller, computer, and data interface units are more sophisti-
cated than anything currently on the AEH. The functions that these
would handle on the AEM are done as part of the PCH encoder and the
command decoder/processor, although those done on the AEM are simpler.
m
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Changes required to make the AEM compatible with SGLS are summarized
in Table C-2.
DESCRIPTION OF MMS AND COMPARISON WITH STPSS
_ The MMS is a large NASA multlmlsslon modular spacecraft. Like
the STPSS, the C&DH system is capable of transmitting high data rates
and has a computer on board for data processing and formatting. How-
ever, as is shown in Table C-l, the MMS and STPSS C&DH systems differ
substantially because of the STDN-SGLS incompatibilities. Thc uplink
frequency, upllnk subcarrler modulation, antenna polarization, communi-
cation security protection, and command format differences necessitate
the following changes:
I. Replace the STDN transponder with an SGLS transponder.
2. Replace the phase-shlft keying (PSK) demodulator with an
SGLS sln_le conditioner (includes PSK demodulator).
3. Modify the signal condlt_oner output, modify the command
decoder input, or add a suitable piece of equipment between
the two to make the signal conditioner and the connand de-
coder compatible.
4. Redesign the MMS omnl antenna.
Further details on interchanging STDN/SGLS communication components
are summarized in Table C-3. While the differences between the two
C&DH systems are substantial, it is possible that proper preliminary
design of the spacecraft would enable com_unlcatlon black boxes to be
interchanged with minimal impact. However, if a decision is made late
in the design cycle, substantial problems will most likely occur.
Available STPSS equipment could be used directly on the _S. Capabil-
ities ace similar, so sizes, weights, and power requirements should be
also.
h"
1981006400-149
-133-
Table C-2
C&DH CHANGES REQUIRED TO RUN STP MISSIONS ON THE AEM
Changes to AEH for
A_• EquLpment STP Comp•tlbillty STPSS Equlpment
Antennas Usable Antenna
Hybrid Usable Hybrid
S-band tr•nsmltter _ Repl•ceb I ReceiverTransmitter
S-band transponder I
Cosmand demodulator Replace c Dual signal conditioner
Add (if necessary) d DecryptLon unlt
Comnd decoder/processor Modify or replace e Co--rid decoder
PCH encoder Modify (if necesssry) f Dual baseband unit
Add (if necessary)8 £ncryptlon unit
Tape recorder Usable h Tape recorder
Bus controller (data
for_tter) i
Sequencer timer i Modify (if necessary)
Not on AEHJ Computer
Remote comumd processor Modlfy j
Not on aDI k Data interface unit
Usable _ Harness
• Only AEM S-band equipment as on the SAGE will be considered.
bThe AElq spacecraft uses one antenna and transmitter for experl_nt•l
data transmission a_4 another antenna and a transponder for receiving com-
sands and broadc•stlng housekeeping information, kc•use of differences in
the upllnk frequencies, at least the receiver portion of the transponder suet
be replaced. If the current _ communlc•tlon configuration Is to be main-
talned, a transponder and • transmitter or two tr•ns.itters end one receiver,
are required. It uy be possible to use STPSS receivers •no tr•nsaltters on
the A_. Otherwise, several other SGLS-cosp•tible tr•nsaitter/recelwrs have
flown or will fly on Fleet Satellite Communication Systea. P72-1, P72-2, and
the S-3.
CThe STDg-co,p•t,_le A_q comnd demodulator operates with binary FSK
coding. SGLS uplinks •re ternary FSK so this unit most be replaced. The
r,_cetver-demodul•tor unit on the S3 vehicle may be In appropriate replace-
mant for the receiver and demodulator on the AEM (capacity is IOOO bps).
dAEH requ_remants do not include • secure uplink. If • secure uplink Is
required, then • decrypter most be added between the signs1 conditioner and
the command decoder and these items iodified accordingly.
.
!
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NOTES TO TABLE C-2 (Cont.)
eThe command decoder processor can be retained for clear upllnks.
However, the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) cow_nd for-
mat would have to be compatible with the decoder and new software would
_ be required. This affects the STPSS.
fThe SGLS ground system can process PCM signals, however, some mod-
ification may be necessary because the AEM uses blphase L Manchester
coding and the STP blphase M. However, the current AEH encoder has no
provision for dual baseband, which may or may not be necessary for small
STP missions run on the AEM. The STPSS dual baseband unit is not di-
rectly substitutable on the AEM because it does not include encoding
provisions. The P72-I, I'72-2, and S-3 spacecraft have had PCM encoders
with bit rates of 8, 32, and 16 k_p,s, respectively. These could prob-
ably be used on the AEH if higher data rates are desired.
gBoeing personnel state that encryptlon is possible for the AEH trans-
missions; there appears to be some question about signal isolation,
however.
hThe optional AEM tape recorder has a larger capacity than STPSS.
IData formatting on the AEH occurs in the PCH encoder. Timing is
provided by the sequencer timer. There is no item as sophisticated as
the bus controller on the AE_; and for small experiments, it is probably
not required. There should be little impact in setting the sequencer
timer for STP missions. The AEH is not capable of transmitting data
rates as high as the STPSS. Therefore, experiments with real time data
rates over 8 kbps cannot be run on the AEM.
JThe AEH remote command processor is not the same as the STPSS com-
puter. The AEM processor is used simply for verifying commands and
storing them for future execution. Modifying the remote control pro-
cessor for SGLS-type commands should not be a major undertaking because
commands are unique to a given spacecraft and its mission anyway.
kExperlmental data on the AEM go directly to the PCM encoder. Data
interface units are not really necessary on the small spacecr4ft.
ZBoeing says that the AEH spacecraft can be modified for SGLS com-
patablllty merely by replacing black boxes.
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Table C-3
6&DH :HANGES REQUIRED TO RUN STP MISSIONS ON THE _C_S
Chanses to HMS for
_._ I@/S Equlpsent STP Cospatibil:ty STPSS Equipment
Payload module" Antenna
Psylos,' module a Hybrid
Diplsxer I _iplexer
I Replaca b Receiver
Tran ponder Tranami tte r
Payload nodule a Switch
PSK demodulator Replace c Dual signal conditioner
Add (if necessary) d Decryption unit
Central cosmand decoder e Modify o_ replace f Cmmand decoder
(software chanse)
Premodulation processor Replace s I_Jal ban•band unit
Add (if necessary) h Encryption unit
Tape recorder Usable i Tape recorder
Data bus controller e
Clock and format generator s Usable j Bus controller (data
formatter)
Standard computer interface
Computer Usable k Couputer
Remote unit Usable L Data ttlterface unit
Harness and connectors Usable with proper HarneaA
deal8 nn
n
SilLmal conditionin8 anJ Unique and naceas_;ry
control unit to MHS vehicle
• The antenna or antennas and their coup••ants are considered payload-unique
on the MMS. The requirement for hybrids and switches vm,ld depend on the exact
placement and deaLS• of the HI4S antenna system. It can be assumed that for
Space Test Prolra,t missions that the STPSS antenna can be used on the HHS.
bkcause of differences in upllnk frequencies, the STDH _r6nspondar cannot
be used for SGL.% Reference 1 shove a rer_tver and transmitter rather t_n an
in•ear•ted transponder; however, these c"J_d be combined into an SGLS transponder.
CThe nodulation differences necessitate replactn8 the PSK dsnodulator with
an SGLS s/an51 conditioner, which includes an FSK demodulator.
dt'TPSS system requireuent8 do not include 8 secure uplink. However, if •
secure upltnk ts to ba considered, it ta then necessary to add 8 decrypter
D
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NOTES TO T_BLE C-3 (Cont.)
between the signal conditioner (that replaces the _IS PSK demodulator)
and the command decoder. A KIR 23 would be considered appropriate for
STPSS missions. The KIR 23 output and the decoder input would have to
be made compatible by modifying the decoder input or adding a suitable
_,_
piece of hardware. Further, ,pllnk communications security equipment
imposes constraints on the command word format, which in turn influences
the decoder. Hence, if a secure uplink is employed, it would be neces-
sary to modify the _IS decoder so that it is compatible with the com-
munications security unit.
eThese items form the STACC (Stan3ard Telemetry and Command Compo-
nents) central unit as shown in Ref. 35.
fThe MMS command decoder can be retained for clear uplinks. However,
the AFSCF command format would ]mve to be compatible with the decoder
and new software is required. The decoder could also be replaced with
the STPSS one.
gThe premodulation processor (PIP) generates a 1.024 M_lzsubcarrier,
which is modulated by the telemetry data stream. The _R_S ranging signal
is not combined with the subcarrier in the PMP but is combined in the
transponder; SGLS transponders usually do not accomplish the combining
in the transponder (unless the transponder performs the baseband as-
sembly function). The PMP can be retained if the SGLS transponder in-
corporated in the MMS departs from normal practice and combines the
ranging signal with the subcarrier. If the SGLS transponder selected
performs the baseline assembly function, the P_ will not be required.
The PMP also includes electronics for TDRSS compatibility which would
serve no useful purpose on satellites communicating with the satellite
control facility. It is desirable that a baseband assembly unit be
substituted for the PMP.
SGLS has a capability of using _wo subcarrlers. The need for two
subcarriers at most is infrequent; the penalty for the capability of
having two is also small. While it cannot be demonstrated at this time
that two subcarriers are necessary, the capability of having two sub-
carriers available as an option is desirable.
_ost STP missions do not require secured downlink; thus the basic
_S configuration for STP application need not have communications
security equipment. However, Lhe communications system design must be
such that it can readily accept communications security equipment with-
out costly modifications. For those missions requiring secured down-
link, commu_icatlons security equipment must be added to the _MS be-
tween the telemetry format g_nerator and the premodulatlon processor
for downlink protection. A KG-46 is considered to be appropriate for
STP programs and is expected to be available in time for use on the
MMS. The spacecraft must comply with Tempest requirements to protect
the classified data. Proper design p_actlce will provide a high de-
gree of confidence that Tempest requirements can b_ satisfied with
little or no modification. There should be 90 dB isolation between
the data and the clock, the input and output signal leads should be
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NOTES TO TABLE C-3 (Cont.l
well shielded, and the input and output signal leads should be run in
separate cables and connectors. The encryption unit would be GFE.
iThe MMS tape recorder has a larger capacity than the STPSS one and
so should satisfy all Space Test Program missions.
JThe MMS telemetry format and data rates offer a great deal of flex-
ibility and can be used by STP; they will probably accommodate a large
percentage of the payloads. However, there may be some penalties in-
volved in accepting the fixed minor frame length (128 words), the fixed
number of subcommutated words (4), and the fixed major frame length (128
minor frames). Supercommutation of the minor frame words and/or of the
subcommutated data is provided in the MMS design and will add the flex-
ibility. A recent change to the MMS clock will permit data rates of 128
and 256 kbps.
kThe MHS computer is larger r lan that of the STPSS because it handles
attitude control as well as CbD8 However, there is adequate room in
the MMS computer for STP data handling.
£The MMS remote unit is usable for STP missions assuming that the
data bus controller, clock and format generator, and standard computer
interface used is that of the MMS. Using the STPSS bus controller rather
than these units would require using an STPSS data interface unit.
mAssumes an initially compatible design.
nlnvolved with solar panel deployment on MMS and is required. The
STPSS vehicle has nothing comparable. It can be assumed that the changes
that must be made in the decoder will not Jeopardize this function.
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Appendix D
ATTITUDE CONTROL AND STABILIZATION SUBSYSTEM:
A COMPARISON OF AEM t STPSS I AND MMS
by
T. B. Garber
The function of the attitude control and stabilization system is
to provide the means of orienting the satellite in some specific atti-
tude and then to maintain that orientation with acceptable angle and
angular rate errors. In addition, the stabili:ation and control sys-
tem should also be able to provide the information necessary for after-
the-fact attitude determination.
Table D-I presents the performance specification and the physical
characteristics of the attitude control systems that have been proposed
for three spacecraft, NASA's AEM and MMS, and the Air Force's STPSS.
In the case of the STPSS design, three different attitude control sys-
tems can be incorporated into the spacecraft depending upon the level
of performance required.
Of the three spacecraft designs, that of the AEM is the most firm.
As can be seen from Table D-I, the performance requirements of the AEM
attitude control system are quite modest. The performance of the AEM
control system should, under normal conditions, exceed the specifica-
tions, with pointing errors roughly one-half those shown.
Basically, the AEM spacecraft is inertially stabilized in roll
and yaw by virtue of the angular momentum of a wheel spinning about
the pitch axis, normal to the orbital plane. Control of the spacecraft
about the pitch axis is achieved by modulating the pitch wheel's angular
rate. Errors in the spacecraft's pitch and roll attitudes are detected
by a horizon scanner.
To remove the small roll and yaw errors that result from both ex-
ternal and internal disturbances, electromagnets are used to generate
the necessary torques. A three-axis magnetometer provides the required
knowledge of the earth's magnetic field vector. In addition to damping
precessional and nutational spacecraft motion, the electromagnets also
provide the necessary torque to unload the pitch wheel (desaturation).
w
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Table D-1
ATTITUDE CONTROL AND STABILIZATION SYSTEHS
STPSS
Characteristics and
Speclflcatlons AD4 ! I! Ill MMS
__ Type of Precision Precision
Stsb_llzatlon Three-Axls Spin Three-Axls Three-Axls Three-Axls
Performance:
Attitude control ±l" pitch, 10-2" I"-2" 0.1" Less than
roll spin axis all axes all axes 0.01"
±2" ys_ all axes
Kate control ±0.Ol°/sec -- 0.01"/sec 0.003"/set Less than
all axes lO-6"/sec
all axes
(long term)
Attitude ±0.5" -- i0.2"-0.4 ° 0.02" --
determination pitch, roll
22" yaw
Control Torques:
RCS None Cold gas, Cold gas, N2; N2H4 Hydrszine
N2 N2 option (optional)
Momentum wheels Pitch bias None None 3, re- 4, reaction
wheel, roll action wheels
wheel option
Electromagnets 3 None Option Option 3, pitch,
roll, yaw
Nutatlon damper None 1 None None None
Sensors:
Earth Mounted on I 2, conical None None
pitch wheel scan
Sun 3 head sun 1 2 2 Both tlne
sensor and coarse
(solar array)
Star None None None 2 strapdown 2 strapdown
trackers trackers
Magnetic 3 axis None Option Option 3 axis
magnetometer magnetometer
Gyros None None 2 rate 4 rate 3 axis +
(1 standby) redundancy
Accelerometers 1 None None None None
Miscellaneouq:
Computer Minims'[ None Yes, dedl- Yes, dedi- Yes, shared
cated cared
Control system weight 29 Ib 95 lb 165 lb 289 lb 253 lb (not
including NTH4
RCS weight)- -
!
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The AEM attitude control system does not include reaction Jets as
a means of torque generation. Thus there are no limits on operational
lifetimes due to fuel considerations. However, magnetic torques are
relatively weak and as a consequence control time constants tend to be
, _" large--on the order of an orbital period. Also, magnetic torques de-
crease with increasing altitude and for the AEN design, they become
ineffective for altitude in excess of 1000 n mi.
The simplest of the STPSS designs utilizes spin stabilization.
Thus, ideally, the spin axis of the vehicle is inertially fixed. No
provisions are made for a despun platform. A mechanical nutation
damper is provided to remove unwanted spin axis wobble and cold gas
Jets are used to reorient or stabilize the direction of the splu axis.
Sun and earth sensors are used for attitude determination.
The second STPSS design is a low-cost, three-axis system with per-
formance specifications similar to those of the AEM spacecraft (see
Table D-I). The attitude control system of this version of the STPSS
differs from that of the AEM in that a pitch momentum wheel is not
used to provide roll-yaw stabilization and cold gas reaction Jets are
the primary means of generating control torques. Two conical scan
earth sensors provide pitch-roll attitude information, while a rate
gyro is used to detect yaw attitude errors.
Since, without a pitch momentum wheel, this version of STPSS does
not have any inherent stability, disturbances from either internal or
external torques must be countered by the reaction control system.
For low altitude orbits where aerodynamic and gravity gradient dis-
turbance torques can be large, control system fuel requirements for
a one-year mission might be excessive. This situation could be al-
leviated by adding electromagnetic torques and a magnetometer to the
control system so that almost continuous use of the reaction Jets
would _ot be necessary.
The _hlrd version of the STPSS is designed to attain precise
pointing accuracies and rate control. To improve performance relative
to the low-cost three-axls design, two star trackers, two rate gyros,
In essence, the body of the AEM spacecraft is a despun platform
with the pitch wheel inertlally stabilized.
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and three reaction wheels are added to the stabillzatlon and control !
system and the two earth sensors are removed. Also, with the addition
of the star trackers, a star catalog and the spacecraft's ephemeris
must be ground-supplied periodically and thus an on-board computer
,_ becomes mandatory. Pointing accuracies of 0.05 deg per axis can be
expected from the precision STPSS design.
Unlike the AEM design, the three reaction wheels of the precision
STPSS have no momentum bias and are used only to provide reaction con-
trol torques. The primary function of the cold gas reaction Jet system
is to unload the wheels when they approach saturation. As in the case
of the low-cost STPSS design, electromagnetic torques and a magnetometer
could be added as a supplement to the cold gas system if secular dis-
turbance torques become a problem,
The final spacecraft design to be considered is MMS. The attitude
control system of this spacecraft is very similar to that of the pre-
cision STPSS. The major difference is that the MMS uses electromagnetic
torques to unload the reaction wheels rather than a Jet reaction system.
However, a hydrazlne Jet reaction system can be added as an option.
The pointing accuracy specification of the MMS is ±0.01 deg per
axis, which is better by a factor of five than that claimed for the
precision STPSS. Since the same model strap-down star tracker assembly
is proposed for both the MMS and the precision STPSS, the superior per-
formance projected for the MMS must result from either a better gyro
reference unit or more frequent stellar updates.
Considering the relatively modest STPSS attitude control perfor-
mance specifications, it is apparent that all five spacecraft designs
of Table D-1 are well within the state of the art. In all cases ,e
major components that have been selected, such as earth sensors, re-
action wheels, or star trackers, are developed items of equipment with
a history of previous spacecraft use. The AEM and the STPSS spin-
stabilized configuration have the least complex attitude control systems,
while the precision STPSS and MMS vehicles have the most complex systems.
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Appendix E
REACTION CONTROL/PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM:
A COMPARISON OF AEM_ STPSS_.AND MMS
by
J. R. Hlland
Comparative technical evaluations were made for the reaction
control/propulslon subsystems contained in the three basic spacecraft
designs discussed in this study. There are two versions of the AEM
spacecraft: HCMM and SAGE. The STPSS designs encompass three basic
configurations: (i) spin stabilized, (2) three-axls stabilized (low-
cost), and (3) three-axis stabilized (precision). The MMS spacecraft
is a single three-axis stabilized design that can employ several sub-
system options within thio basic categorization.
The reaction control/pro_ulslon subsystems discussed herein use
either cold gas (GN 2) or hydrazine (N2H 4) as the propellant and per-
form functions such as spacecraft stabilization, reaction wheel un-
loading, orbit adjustment, and orbit transfer. Solid propellant rocket
motors, which in some cases are also used for stabilization and orbit
transfer, are considered separately and not included ic this discussion.
Cold gas and hydrazine RCSs consist, essentially, of the same basic
components, i.e., tank(s), fill and drain valves, isolation valves,
pressure regulator and/or transducer, filters, thrusters, plumbing,
and, in cases where the RCS is a separate module, some mounting struc-
ture and electrical harness. In this analysis, when the RCS is a
secondory subsystem to a particular spacecraft module (usuully orienta-
tion or attitude control system), the structure and harness is assumed
accountable to the primary subsystem. The primary difference in cold
gas versus hydrazine system components is in their relative complexity
and hence cost. Other potential differences in degree of technologic_l
development within a given propellant type have essentially been nulllfled
In this study, the stable of solid rocket motors described in
Ref. ! were used for the kick stages to provide orbit translation and
clrcularlzatlon.
t
• j
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by the con_only adopted design goal of using fllght-proven components
where possible for the RCSs evaluated.
Table E-1 shows component breakdowns of the RCS for the various
versions of the three spacecraft and is used as a basis for the dis-
cussion that follows. The development status of a component is indi-
cated by either a P for fllght-proven, PM for fllght-proven but requiring
some modification for the subject applications, or N if the item repre-
sents new hardware, such as plumbing or structure. For costing purposes
in this exercise, however, new plumbing or structure can probably be
treated as flight-proven, since the technology involved is not new; only
the tailoring of these items for each specific configuration is required.
DESCRIPTION OF THE AEM REACTION CONTROL SYST_I
Only the HCMM version of the AF_ uses a reaction control system
and it is a small hydrazine system packaged as a separate module. This
orbit adjust subsystem provides a nominal 262.4 ft/sec velocity correc-
tion capability with the maximum spacecraft weight of 255.5 ib to cir-
cularlze the orbit and minimize nodal drift. All components are flight-
qualified and currently in production. The single 0.287 Ib thrust
chamber is from the NASA/GSFC IUE program and the propellant flow con-
trcl valve (included as part of the total thruster assembly) will consist
of two single-seat Wright Components, Inc., valves welded together in a
series redundant configuration, each valve seat being controlled by a
separate coil. The dual version valve, while a minor modification, has
been tested by Hamilton Standard and is expected to meet all require-
ments. The hydrazine tank with elastomeric diaphragm is from the IUE
program and needs only very minor modifications to the plumbing and
mounting connections. The rest of the RCS is quite straightforward.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STPSS COLD GAS REACTION CONTROL SYST_!
AND COMPARISON TO AEM
There are two cold gas RCSs contemplated for the STPSS. The three-
axis version shown in Table E-I uses twelve 0.I ibF thrusters in both
the low-cost and preclslo_ orientation modules for on-orblt control a_]
reaction wheel unloading. The spin control module of the spln-stabtllzed
'I
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Table E-I
RCS SYSTEM COMPONENT BREAKDOWN
l J l Unit ITotal lTotal
l Weight Weight Cost
Item Size I Statusa[ (Ib) {Ib) ($)
_ Quantity m |
AEM-HCMM, Orbit Adjust Module, Hydrazine
Tanks l 9.6" dia. P [ 2.7 ] 2.7
(400 psi)
Thrusters 1 0.287 Ib F PM I 0.8 I 0.8
Valves I
Drain and fill 2 P [ 0.15 I 0.3
Isolation
Miscellaneous !
Press. regul.
• iPress. transd 1 P ] 0.6 0.6
Filters
Plumbing N • I 0.7
Structure N 3.8
Total dry weight, ib 8.9
Propellant weight, Ib ! 10.6
Total wet weight, Ib 19.5
h , i
h
STPSS ]-Axis, Orientation Module, Cold Gas
Tanks 2 13" did. P [ 17.0 34.0 3OK
(4000 psi)
Thrusters 12 0.1 lb F P ! 0.5 6.0 60K
Valves I
Drain and fill 1 P O.l 0.1
Isolation 4 P ! 0.4 1.6
Miscellaneous 6OK
Press. regul. 2 P 1.2 2.4
Press. transd. 1 P i 0.2 0.2
i
Filters I P ! 0.3 0.3
Plumbing N 2.0 2.0
Structure
Total dry weight, lb 46.6 150K c
Propellant weight, lb 18.4
Total wet weight, Ib 65.0
STPSS 3-Axls and Orbit Transfer, Transfer/Orlentatlon Module, Hydrazine
Tanks 1 36" dla. PMd 56.0 56.O I 80K
Thrusters 12 0.I lb_ pe 0.5 6.0 I 240K
4 4 Ib F Y P 0.6 2.4 I 10OK
1 300 lb F P 50.0 50.0 [ 125KValves
Drain and fill 2 P 0.25 0.251
Isolation 3 P 0.8 2.4 I
Miscellaneous loOk
Press. regul.
Press• transd. 1 P 0.4 0.4 1
Filters 1 P 0.3 0.3 I
Plumbing N 6.0' 6.0 I
Structure
Total dry weight, It 124.0 I 645 f
Propellant weight, lb 666.0 I
Total wet weight. Ib 790,0 I
|
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Table E-1--Contlnued
Unit I Total Total
WeiRht I Weight Cost
Item Quantity Size Status'l tz_ i (lb) ($)
n
I_qS-SPS-I, Propulsion Module, Hydrazlne
1
Tanks I lg P 10.2 10.2 2OK
Thrusters 12 0.2 lb_ P 0.6 7.2 144K
4 5 lb F _ P 1.25 5.0 48KValves
Drain and fill 2 P 0.25 0.5 4K
Isolation 4 P 0.7 2.8 2OK
Miscellaneous
Press. regul.
Press. transd. 2 / 0.5 I.O ]OK
Filters 2 P 0.25 0.5 4K
Plumbing 25 ft N 5.0 5K
Harness N 14.0
Structure N 29.0 h
Total dry weight, lb I 75.2
Propellant weight, lh I 55.0
130.2
Total wet weight, lb [
n
_¢4S-SPS-II, Pro)ulsion Module, Hvdrazlne
Tanks 1 36" dla. I_ 1 125.O I 125.O lOOK
• 55.5
cylindri-
cal
Thrusters ii 0.2 Ib_ P 0.6 7.2 144K
4 5 IbF F p 1.25 5.0 48K
Valves
Drain and fill 2 P O.15 O.5 4K
Isolation 4 P 0.7 2.8 2OK
Miscellaneous
Presa. regul.
Press. tranad. Z P 0.5 1.O IOK
Filters 2 P 0.25 0.5 4K
Plumbing 25 ft N 5.0 5K
Harness N 14.0
Structure N 81.0 h
Total dry weight, lb 242.0 [
Propellant weight, lb 1050.0 i
Total wet weight, lb 1292.O II I
ap . fltsht_proven; PH - flight-proven but requires some modification;
N " new hardware.
bspin _dule cold gas system is same as three-axis except uses 8 thrusters
of 4 lb F each, which weigh and cost the ,ante (0.5 lb/$SK each). System dry
weight is reduced by 2 lb.
cTRW eatimttes that SIOO-150K should be added to this value for integration
and test coats.
duses 2 end forglngs from Viking Orbiter tank and existing elsstomeric
diaphragm.
eFlight-quallfied but have not flo_m.
tTRW eat l'tes that $2OO-3OOK should be added to this value for integration
and test costs,
IS?S-I can employ 1, 2, ), or 4 rinks providin| propellant weights of 55.
II0, 165, or 220 Ib and corraspondin| system dry wel|hts of 75, 87.2, 99.4, or
111.6 Ib,
hlncludes propulsion module ltructura, drive electronics, remote interface
unit, GN2 and miscellaneous.
iExistin| fli|ht-qualifiad tank developed for Viking Orbiter (VO-75) but
_rLll replace surface tension expulsion device vSth an elastoueric (AW-E-332)
bladder.
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version of the STPSS uses the same cold gas system, except that the
twelve 0.1 lb B thrusters are replaced with eight 4 lb F thrusters of
the same basic configuration. The unit weights and costs of these
thrusters are estimated to be the same as the three-axis units. All
components in both cold gas systems are flight-proven.
_ While the component development status of both the AEM h_,drazine
system and the STPSS cold ga_ systems appears to be about the same, dif-
ferent costing bases will be required to reflect the relative degrees
of component complexities between them, particularly for tanks and
thrusters. Hydrazine tanks typically use diaphragms or bladders for
propellant expulsion and gaseous nitrogen (GN2) for pressurization and
require two drain and fill valves per tank. Cold gas tanks simply con-
tain GN2 under high pressure (in this case, 4000 psia) thus eliminating
the diaphragm/bladder and one drain and fill valve. Hydrazine thruster
assemblies typically consist of propellant flow control valves, injector
thermal standoff and capillary feed tubes, catalytic decomposition
chamber, injector, thrust nozzle, heaters (for thrust, chamber, valves,
and catalyst bed), temperature sensors, and in some cases, filters and
cavitating venturis; whereas cold gas thruster assemblies consist
essentially of solenoid valves and a thrust nozzle. Hence, a sizable
component cost differential is justifiable between these two types of
RCSs, as well as some anticipated difference in system integration and
test costs.
DESCRIHION OF THE STPSS ALTERNATIVE HYDRAZINE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
AND COMPARISON TO AEM
An alternative to the STPSS three-axis version spacecraft is to
use a transfer/orientation module in place of the cold gas equipped
orientation module and solid rocket propulsion for orbit transfer.
This transfer/orientation module cootatns (in addition to attitude
control system equipment) a hydrazine RCS to perform all of the space-
craft functions, such as three-axis stabilization, reaction wheel un-
loading, and orbit transfer and adjustment. Table E-1 shows the com-
ponent breakdown for this system.
The 36-1n. diameter spherical tank will be fabricated using the
end forgings from the Viking Orbiter tank and incorporating an existing
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flight-proven elastomeric diaphragm. The 0.1 lb F thrusters are flight-
proven. The 300 lb F thruster, as purchased, has a very heavy valve and
gimbal mount assembly, which will be removed for this application. The
$125K cost shown in Table E-I is the estimate after these changes.
_" In comparison to the AEM hydrazine system, this RCS is larger
(employs more components and of larger unit size) but is basically the
same technologically; the required fabrication modifications and the
indicated deviations from fllght-proven status appear not of significant
magnitude to warrant much, if any, variation in the costing basis
employed.
DESCRIPTION OF THE HIdSREACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
AND COMPARISON TO STPSS
Two hydrazlne RCS/propulslon systems have been configured to accom-
modate the various missions being considered for the MHS. The first,
SPS-I, meets the orbit adjust and reaction control requirements for
spacecraft in the 2500 Ib class that would be launched by a Delta 2910.
The second, SPS-II, meets the requirements of orbit transfer, orbit
adjust, and reaction control for spacecraft in the 4000 to I0,000 ib
class and would be used only by missions that are shuttle-launched.
Component breakdowns of each system are shown in Table E-I.
The SPS-I syst, m can use I, 2, 3, or 4 of the tanks shown to prc-
vide propellant capacities of 55, II0, 165, or 220 Ib, depending upon
specific mission requirements. Two additional fill and drain valves
and a filter and pressure transducer (totaling 2.0 Ib) are required
,
with each additional tank. As indicated, all comporents in the SPS-I
system are flight-proven or fllght-quallfled except for plumbing,
harness, and structure, and for costing purposes these items can prob-
ably be treated as flight-ready per earlier discussions. The total
SPS-I system is estimated to have a nonrecurring cost of $9OOK and a
recurring cost of $6OOK.
The SPS-II system is the same as SPS-I except that it uses a large
single cylindrical tank and, hence, requires more structure. The tank
Efforts are under way to do without these items as tanks are
added.
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(36 in. in diameter by 55.5 it. in length) is an existing flight-
qualified design that was developed for the Viking Orbiter (VO-75)
program. It presently has a surface tension device for propellant
expulsion, whlch will most likely be replaced wi_h an elastomerlc
_ (AF-E-332) bladder. Such replacement would entail about a 25 percent
modification to the overall tank assembly. As indicated in Table E-I,
the structure weight is increased from 29 Ib to 81 Ib compared to
SPS-I. However, it should be noted that these weights include propul-
sion module structure, drive electronics, remote interface unit, GN2,
and other miscellaneous items; hence, some care in cost bookkeeping
appears warranted for both the SPS-I and SPS-II systems. The total
SPS-I system costs are estimated to be $500K nonrecurring and $750K
recurring on the basis that the SPS-I system will be built flrst.
In comparing these two MMS hydrazlne systems with the STPSS cold
gas systems_ the same comments apply as presented earlier in the com-
parison of STPSS cold gas systems and the AEH hydrazlne syste_ i.e.,
a different cost base is required for cold gas hydrazlne compo.:_nts.
With respect to the STPSS hydrazlne system, the same cost base should
apply with perhaps some minor adjustments for the required component
modifications noted herein. Moreover, the 0.2 Ib F and 5 Ib F thrusters
of the MMS systems are estimated at $12K each compared to $20K and $25K
each for the 0. IIb F and 4 Ib F thrusters in the STPSS hydrazlne system.
This difference is probably reconcilable on the basis that the MMS
thrusters have slngle-seat/slngle-coll propellant flow control valves
versus dual-seal/dual-toll valves in the STPSS thrusters and perhaps
less contractor testing and paperwork required, since the Y_S thrusters
are standard NASA items.
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Appendix F
STRUCTURAl, SUBSYSTEH: A COHPARISON OF ADI, STPSSj AND M_IS
by
H. H. Baldban
AEM STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM
The principal elements of the AEM(31'36'37) _tructural subsystem that
are of interest for a shuttle application consi_* _f a base module and
an instrument module. The base module structure contains support sub-
systems for the HCMMand SAGE uissions, includln_ all appendages and
mechanisms to support these subsystems, the differences between these
missions have no effect on the primary structural subsystem.
The base module consists of an 18 in. long hexagonal body with
six longerons tied to a 7 In. conical structure that mates with a _tand-
ard Scout series 25E adapter. Open truss bulkheads rlgidlze each end
of the hexagonal enclosure. This design provides approximately 7.3
sq ft of usable fla_ surface for experiment mounting.
The structural elements of the base module are primarily sheet and
stringer aluminum. Side panels of the hexagon are 0.012 in. thick clad
2024-73 aluminum sheet riveted to the six corner longerons. Panel edge
members, equipment support stiffeners, and trass-type bulkheads are also
formed from 2024-T3 aluminum sheet. The longerons are s -'_ard Burner
IIA extrusions, specifically shaped for hexagonal structure corners.
The truss-type bulkheads at either end of the hexasonal body pro-
vide structural rigidity, with good acces_ibllity to the interior.
These bulkheads are 2024-T3 formed parts attached to the body longerons.
The forward bulkhead tl_s to the four longerona that serve as attach
fittings to the Instrument module. The center diagonal Is easily re-
moved by disconnecting fasteners at each end so as to provide better
access for Installing or removing interior components.
Thp aft bulkhead supports the modular orb/t-adjust _ystem _or
HC_ missions. The orblt-adJust system, which is fabricated, tested,
and serviced as a separate module, is bolted to the aft bu}khead at
three points. Shims are bonded to the aft bulkh,_a6 to provide proper
y -,,-
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lateral and angular alignment once the spacecraft mass properties have
been determined.
The instrument module contains the mission instruments and the
_ supporting electronics. This module is connected by low-heat-conductlon,
bolted-in fittings at four of the six longeron forward ends so as to
provide direct load transfer. Fiberglass blocks and thermal blankets
reduce heat conduction to less than 0.2 W/°C. This type of attachment
fitting was used in the Burner IIA and P42-I units. The four structural
attach p_ints feed acceleration loads directly into the base module
longerons.
The total weight of the AEM structura" subsystem is 47.7 Ib, con-
sisting of 27.2 ib of primary structure, 17.5 Ib of secondary structure,
and 3 Ib of mechanisms.
MMS STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM
The primary structural elements of the MMS (38'39)" for shuttle opera-
tion are the module support structure and the transition adapter. The
power, attitude control and stabilization, and C&DH module skins are
secor_ary structaral elements in that they support elements of the
space_raft subsystems.
Module Support Structure
The module support structure provides structural continuity between
the transition adapter, subsystem modules, and propulsion module. Its
constructiun is baqlcally a three-dlmenslonal truss, with the six cozners
as the primary load points. (Electrical connectors and other insignif-
icant loads may be hung on the struts themselves.) The Rockwell tech-
nical proposal for fabrication shows the structural elements to be
primarily sheet, angles, and channels. The _orner fittings appear to
be 60 deg V-shaped channels especially designed for triangular corners.
Transition Adapter
The transition adapter is the interface between the module support
structure and the mission adapter. During shuttle boost, it Is also
the element that connects to the fllgLt support system. The attachment
%
t
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points are provided by three load pins. The drogue point is the attach-
ment element to the remote manipulator system of the orbiter, used for
initial contact in the retrieval operation. The transition adapter
also supports operational or mission-unique elements such as solar
arrays (and associated mechanisms), booms, and antennas.
Structurally, the transition adapter is a ring with an 1-beam cross
section. It contains automated machined fittings, formed extrusion, and
sheet metal components. Flanges and webs are formed from annealed ma-
terial then heat treated to the T-6 (temper) condition. Standard mech-
anical fasteners are used for component joining. Final machining of
mating surface and drilling of subsystem attach holes take place after
structural assembly.
Spacecraft and Structural Wei h_
Table F-I shows the weights budgeted for MMS subsystems in their
baseline configurations. The MMS total weight including payload will
be defined by GSFC for each mission on the basis of spacecraft and
launch vehicle configuration.
Table F-I
BASELINE MMS STRUCTURE WEIGHT SUMMARY
Baseline Configuration
Weight (Ib)
Structural and
Subsystem Total Thermal Components
Module support structure 168 150
Transition adapter 115 115
C&DH module 199 103
Power module 358 107
Attitude control and
stabilization module 371 117
Thermal control 3 3
Electrical integration 98 0
Total 1312 595 a
h
aThe thermal weight breakdown is as follows:
louvers = 39 ib, blankets - 6 Ib, other - 3 lb.
Total thermal weight = 48 lb. The net structural
weight is then 595-48 - 547 lb.
- r, ,°. •
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STPSS STRUCTURALSUBSYSTEM
The description of the STPSS structure presented here provides(1)
only the overall dimensions and configuration. Additional details,
such as individual member materials and thicknesses, are not available
because no actual design has yet been undertaken. The STPSS consists
mainly of a core module and an orientation module.
Core Module
The core _dule has the shape of a thin hexagonal nut. It con-
i nects to the shuttle orbiter at two trunnions and a stabilizing fit-T
ring. Box beams spread the load from the trunnion to the central ring,
which is the primary load-carrylng member. Honeycomb panels define
the hexagonal perimeter of the core module. They also provide mounting
surfaces for equipment oD the interior and thermal radiators on the
exterior. The panels transfer the load to the trunnions and directly
to the central ring via the webs.
Orientation Module
Each orientation module is also hex-nut shaped and mates with the
core module at the central ring. The two versions of the three-axis-
stabilized module (i.e., the "orientation" version and the transfer/
orientation version) have identified structure except for brackets
that connect the appropriate propulsion unit. The spin-orientation
module is thinner because its equipment does not require as much
volume.
Spacecraft Weight_ s
Table F-2 summarizes the spacecraft structural component weights.
: The TRW estimate of structural weight was deduced from HEAO data. The
._ HEAO spacecraft, which carries a 7000 lb payload with a safety factor
_ of 3, weighs about 20 ib/axial length (in.). Taking a 1500 lb payload
_" weight for the STPSS spacecraft, and a safety factor of 2, TRW deduced
a structural weight of 25 Ib/sq. in.
High Energy Ast'onomlcal Observatory--a spacecraft that was
: actually designed and analyzed by TRW.
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Table F-2
STPSS STRUCTURAL COMPONENT WEIGHT SUMMARY
Structural Component
Component Weight (Ib)
_ Core module ........................... 240
Spin-control-orientation module ....... 70
Three-axis-orientation module ......... 150
Precision three-axis module ........... 150
Solar array
Standard 50 W subpanel
(19" x 45") ....................... 3.0 ea.
"Picture frame" (boom, hinges,
etc.) ............................. 2.0-2.6 ea.
SOURCE: Ref. i.
COMPARISON OF STRUCTI;RAL SUBSYSTEMS
The AEM is primarily aluminum sheet and stringer construction,
using standard Burner IIA extrusions for longerons. The conical shell
that interfaces between the spacecraft and the Scout F booster is prob-
ably the most "exotic" structural element from a structures standpoint.
However, it too is formed from aluminum sheet, and fabrication appears
to be well within the state of the art and, in addition, will not be
used on STPSS missions.
The module support structure of the MMS is a simple 3-D truss.
The subsystem modules utilize honeycomb panels that frame into aluminum
stock edges. The transition adapter is of more ,iex construction;
however, the fabrication procedures appear to be ed on proven
techniques.
The basic structure of the STPSS appears to use more nonstandard
components, i.e., rings and diverging box beams. The structural weight
is also a higher percentage of the instrument payload weight than it is
in the AEM and _S. Additionally, alignment may be a more critical
aspect of STPSS construction because loads have to be transferred be-
tween the inner cylinders of the core module and orientation module
with minimal edge mon_ents. The additional complexity of the STPSS
structure will be reflected primarily as a fabrication cost, rather
than as one of development risk.
#"
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In summary, the AEM and F_S structural subsystems appear to use
proven techniques and, for the most part, standard members. The STPSS
certainly ks no simpler in construction and is probably more costly on
a relative basis.
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Appendix G
THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM: A COMPARISON OF
AEM, STPSS, AN__.MMS
by
' W.D. Gosch
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM ON
THE STPSS AND AEM SPACECRAFT
There are two major differences between the thermal control sub-
system of the STPSS and that of the AEM (Table G-l). First, the AEM
design uses louvers, while the STPSS relies on radiators and heaters
for controlling spacecraft component and structure temperatures.
Second, the STPSS requires high temperature insulation around the
Table G-I
THERMAl. CONTROl. ELEMENTS OF THE AEM, STPSS, AND MMS SPACECRAFT
Spacecraft
AEM STPSS MMS
3-Axls 3-Axls
l
Element Type I Type II Spin Low-Cost Precision 3-Axls
Spacecraft weight (Ib) 214 274 888 1043 1107 1312
Thermal control weight (Ib) _ 3 3+a (b) (b) (b) 39
Thermal control elements:
• Louvers 1 2 ...... 6
• Radiators X X X X X X
• Heaters X X X X X X
• Hultllayer insulation X X X X X X
• Thermal coatings X X X X X X
• High-temp. insulation X X X
• Interface insulators X X X X X X
aA second louver and radiator are added for this mission.
bstructure and thermal control weights combined: core middle = 250 Ib, spin
module - 75 Ib, orientation (low-cost and precision) = 160 lb. TRW did not de-
termlne actual weights of the thermal control elements but they indicate it would
be on the order of I0-15 lb.
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solid rocket kick stage motor. This motor is imbedded inside the hex-
agonal modules and must be thermally isolated during and after firing
to prevent excessive heat transfer to the spacecraft modules.
The louvers specified for the AEM were flight-qualifled on the
Mariner '64 and '71. The Boeing STP 72-1 and the $3 programs used
a total of 17 louver assemblies identical to the ones proposed for the
AEM spacecraft.
Multilayer insulation blankets for shielding the spacecraft from
the heat generated by the solid rocket motors during and after firing
are made of materials that can withstand the higher temperatures, such
as titanium.
The "low temperature" multilayer insulation blankets are used to
decouple the spacecraft from the external environment. For the AEM
the blankets consist of an outer layer of aluminized I mil Kapton, I0
layers of doubly aluminized 1/8 mil perforated mylar separated by silk
net spacers, a single layer of Dacron plain-woven cloth to act as a
filter, and an inner layer of aluminized I mil Teflon (Teflon side
facing the base module). The STPSS uses insulation blankets on the
entire outer surface of each module with the exception of cutouts for
the radiator panels.
On the AEM, heaters are used in the thermal control system solely
for maintaining the orbit adjust system component (thruster valves and
catalyst bed) temperatures within the design limits during the initial
velocity trim. The heaters are ,mbsequently commanded off and remain
inactive for the remainder of the mission. They could be reactivated
at any time by ground command if required. The total heater power re-
quired during velocity trim is 3 W.
The STPSS uses a heater for the solid rocket motor. It is thermo-
statically actuated to ,ms are adequate temperature levels at the time
of firing. The STPSS also uses thermostatically controlled component
heaters with sufficient power to maintain component temperatures above
the minimum allowable under the coldest conditions.
Thermal control coatings used on the AEM and STPSS provide interior
and exterior radiation control. Interior coatings enhance the internal
radiation heat transfer from bay to bay. Coatings are used on the ex-
ternal surfaces to reduce the temperature effects of direct or reflected
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sunlight. These surfaces Include the backside of the solar array, the
loux,er rLdlator surface (AEM), the thermal control trim radiator, the
shunt disslpa_er panel, solar array and antenna appendages, and the
S-band antenna.
Radiators for dissipating heat generated inside the spacecraft
are used on both the AEM and the STPSS. In the case of the STPSS
(which has no louvers) the control of component temperatures within
the spacecraft is achieved with a combination of radiators, second
surface mirrors, and thermostatlcally controlled heaters. On the AEH,
component temperature control is achieved with louvers and thermal-
control trim radiators. The baseline design radiator for the AEH
spacecraft radiator is sized to satisfy the HCHM mission requirements
and is painted white. The radlator_s properties can be adjusted by
paint stripes to attain the desired trim.
Since most of the elements of the AEM thermal control subsystem
have been flight-proven on previously designed Boeing spacecraft, they
should be considered at least state of the art if not off-the-shelf.
The same holds true for the TRW-proposed STPSS design.
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE STPSS AND MMS SPACECRAFT
To date, contracts have not been awarded for the design, develop-
ment, or production of either the MMS or the STPSS. Consequently, the
information available for making a comparative evaluation of the MMS
and STPSS is less detailed than for the AEM-STPSS evaluation. However,
based on the information from GSFCt Aerospace Corporation, and TRW,
thermal control subsystem concepts are sufficiently well defined that
a reasonable comparative technical evaluation can be made.
The same two differences between the AEM and STPSS are indicated
for the STPSS and MNS (Table G-l). The HMS spacecraft uses two louvers
on each of three modules: power module, ACS module, and the C&DH module.
As previously stated, the STPSS relies on radiators, second surface
mirrors, and thermostatically controlled heaters for maintaining the
spacecraft structure and components within specified temperature limits.
Louvers arc generally considered to be more expensive than heaters.
Howe_er, personal contact with a thermal control system engineer at
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GFSC revealed that their analysis of the spacecraft heat balap_a, using
louvers rather than heaters and radiators, indicated it is more economical
to use louvers. The propulsion module for the MMS spacecraft (either
SPS-I or SPS-II) is mounted at the base of the spacecraft structure
and is thermally isolated from the structure and modules. A small
quantity of heat is transferred at the interface between the structure
_" and propulsion module and is accounted for in the thermal control
analysis of the entire spacecraft. As noted previously the STPSS
spacecraft uses a solid propellant rocket motor for propulsion and
must be thermally isolated from the modules with high temperature
multilayer insulation to prevent excessive heat transfer into the
modules during and after firing.
The design objectives for both spacecraft, from a thermal control
point of view, are generally the same, namely, thermally isolate each
individual module from the environment and other parts of the space-
craft. The same basic design philosophy of using low-cost, proven
elements for the thermal control subsystem appears to apply to the
MMS and the STPSS. Thermal control elements for the MMS can be con-
sidered as at least state of the art if not off-the-shelf.
I
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Appendix H
PROGRAM OPTIONS FOR THE SAMSO SPACE TEST PROGRAM
by
S. H. Dole and L. N. Rowell
Alternative approaches (i.e., different mixes of spacecraft,
orbits, and payloads) to carrying out a complete Space Test Program
during the 1980-1990 period were generated so that different sets of
total program costs could be computed and compared. This appendix
includes only a representative sample of the alternatlve program op-
tlons that were examined in this study. First, the STPSS mission
model is dlsrussed and disaggregated into eight categories of orbits,
and then the various standard spacecraft configurations considered in
this study are identified with the payloads in these orbit categories
according to their ability to accommodate the payload requirements.
After this, the procurement options are determined for a variety of
conditions.
ANALYSIS OF PAYLOADS IN THE STPSS "BLUEBOOK ''(26)
We adopted the premise that we could consider the payloads given
In Ref. 26 to be "representative" of those that would be orbited, thus
the payloads in the bluebook were analyzed, as follows. Of the 51
payloads l!_..ed therein, four were ellmlnated because they required
special spacecraft, ol because they had already been launched into
space (Nos. 4, 5, 9, 45), and one (No. 42) was eliminated because the
orbit was not clearly defined. The remaining 46 payloads were cate-
gorized according to their orbital orl,mtatton and apogee altitude
and perigee altitude requirements. The standard orbits that were
selected to provide a means of grouping payloads (and the number of
bluebook payloads captured by each) are:
The numbers are those of the bluebook p_gcs where the payloads
are described.
"4
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Orbit
Number Description
I-S Sun-synchronous (98.4 deg _ncllnatlon), 250 to 300 n mi
circular, sun-orlented [8]
I-E Sun-synchronous, 250 to 300 n ml circular, earth-orlented [13]
2 Elllptlcal, 7000 x 200 n ml, polar [13]
3 Geosynchronous (19,372 n ml) circular, low inclination,
sun-orlented [4]
4 i0,000 n ml circular, low inclinat_on [?]
5 12 hr orbit, 21,000 x 900 _ ml, 63.4 deg Incllnatior [_
6 Geosynchronous circular, low inclination, earth-orlented [I]
7 3200 × 150 n mt, 30 deg inclination [1]
8 180 n mi circular, polar fl]
The veloclty increments required to place the spacecraft Into the
above standard orbits are given in Table H-I. These AVs were used for
the selection and sizing of appropriate kick stages.
The payloads were also ordered according to the spacecraft capa-
bilities that are needed to accommodate the payload. In _ddltlon to
mls_lon altitude and orientation, we also used payload w_ght, power,
data rate, stabilization requirements, and pointing accuracy as filters
for assigning spacecraft. These assignments are given in Tables H-2
to H-5 where the letters "x" or "y" indicate a compatibility between
spacecraft capablllty and payload requirements. The letter "y" In the
AEM spacecraft row applies when that spacecraftts maximum altitude
capabillty is assumed to be geosynchronous rather than its current limit
of 1000 n mt; this was one of the spacecraft design excursions that was
examined in the study.
PROGRAM OPTION DEVELOPMENT
On the basis of information provided by SAMSO, It appeared that
the Space rest Program would be orbiting approximately 114 payload pack-
ages during the 1980-1990 time period. Since there were only 64 rerre
sentatlve payloads in the sample we had available Co work with, it _:.s ._
Numbers in brackets are the number of the bluebook pa load_
acconmodated by the orbit.
m
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Table H-2
ORBIT l-S: PAYLOAD ASSIGNMENTS
"" Orbit 1-S: Sun synchronous, 250-300 n mi circular, sun-orlented
Payload number 15 19 20 27 33 37 48 51
WetEht (lb) 50 10 76 !250 1 12 135 3
...... ,,,,,
Candidate Space.r.a f,t
AEH ya Y Y
J
STP_S-_ x
]
SrP,%_-LC x x x x x
• . q
_'_[P_-i' _r '_'_ x x X x x x X x
a
y applies when AD_ maximum altitude is geosynchrono,'s (19,382 r, mi).
Table H-3
ORBIT l-E: PAYLOM) ASSIG_IENTS
Orbit I-E: Sun-synchron ,.,s. 250-300 n mi circular earth-orie.ted
T
23 26 28 29 34 35 36 38 39 40 at 41 t9Payload nuler 18
t
- __ L--,
Wei|ht (lb) 13 9 13 525 53 13 40 60 6 5 331 135 25
Candidate.Spacecraft
AEH xy xy xy xy x7 x-/ xy xy xy xy
: :_ _-
"_['PSS-S x x x x x
!; ['}'qS- 1.(" x x x x x x x x x z z sr X
_]z)_S-P or _l[_ X x x X x x X X X X x x x
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Table H-4
ORBIT 2: PAYLOAD ASSIGNHENTS
• o --
Orbit I" Elliptical (7,000 x 200 n mi), polar
Payload number 1 6 11 12 13 14 17 21 22 31 32 46 _ 50
Weight (lb) 17 16 4 8 1._ 8 4 44 70 18 1 5 110
Candidate Spacecraft _ .......
AKM y y y y y y y y y y y
• , - ..... . . . =
qFPSS-S x x
S_PSS-l.C ( x x x x x x x x x x x x x
4
' = P T |
STPSS-P oz"_'tSj X x X X x x x x X X [ X ._ x X
'Fable it-5
ORBITS 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8: PAYLOAD ASSIG_IENTS
Orbit 3a 4b [ 5c 6d 7_ 8f
, j,.
Payload ntmber 3 1_ _ 44 52 2 24
7 10 43 8 25 30
Waisht (lb) !2 3 1_7 13 29 2 25 19 475 (30) 43 30
Candidate Spacecraft
AZM y y y y y y Y Y "
srPSS-S x x x x
r
S FPSS-I.¢' x x x x x x x x x x
,, ,, , .... •
srPSS-P or ,_MS x X x x X x x x X x [ X ;I
aGeosynchronoum (19,372 n mi) circular, low inclination, sun-oriented.
blo,OO0 n mi circular, low inclination.
Cl2-Vour o:hit, 21,000 x 900 n el, 63.4 dell inclination.
dGeoaynchronous cLrcular, low inclination, earth-oriented.
e3,200 x 150 n =i, 30 de| anti'nation.
flSO n ml circular, polar.
'1
J
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necessary to scale this number up by a factor of 2,48 to yield a
closer approximation of the complete program. Consequently, both the
numbers of payloads and their aggregated weights taken from Tables H-2
to H-5 were multiplied by 2.48 in developing the program options.
Other numbers of total payloads in the ten-year period, 92, 138, and
,_" 228, were assumed in some of the cases to test the effect on results.
As above, appropriate multiplying factors were used.
Groups of payloads (for a given orbit) were assigned to specific
spacecraft with the following limits being observed:
i. Maximum paylcad weight_ that can be loaded on a single space-
"rd__ AEM = 150 Ib; STPSS ffiI000 Ib or 1500 ib; MM3 =
4u00 lb.
2. Maximum circular orbital altitudes reachable by the space-
craft: AEM(x) = i000 n mi; AEM(y) ffi19,372 n ml; STPSS and
MMS = 19,372 n mi.
3. The maximum number of payloads that can be loaded on a single
spacecraft in separate program options was assume_ to be 6,
8, i0, or 13.
4. Maximum experimental power: AEM = 50 W; STPSS-S - 290 W;
STPSS-LC and STPSS-P _ 45_ W; MMS =_850 W.
5. Maximum data rate: At24 - 8 kbps; $TPSS - 128 kbps; MMS
- 64 kbps.
The number of spacecraft flights for six different cases, four
d_fferent program options, and four different assumed upper limits on
the number of payloads that could be placed on a single spacecraft are
summarized in Table H-b As may be seen from Table H-6, the total
number of shuttle flights required to place all of the STPSS payloads
into c_blt ra_Lged from a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 26. The ranges
in uumbcrs of launches, as a function of the ,_smned payload limita-
tions, are shown below:
The power ]imitation affected only the payload packages for the
AEM and STPSS-S spacecraft' for all others, different limitations were
more er{tical.
w
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Maximum number of payloads
per single spacecraft 13 10 8 6
Number of launches 12-17 14-19 16-23 20-26
, _ Each of the cells of the matrix represented by Table H-6 is ex-
panded in Tables H-7 through H-23. In these tables, the total number
of spacecraft required are disaggregated by orbit so that one can i
determine the appropriate kick stages that would provide the velocity
increment necessary to translate the spacecraft from the nominal shuttle
parking orbit (150 n mi) to the mission orbit. Tables H-7 through H-23
also tabulate the maximum number of payloads actually assigned to a
spacecraft in a given orbit.
INTEGRATION COSTS
The costs of integrating and testing a complete spacecraft appear
to be predominantly a function of the complexity of the individual pay-
loads themselves rather than of the characteristics of the spacecraft
on which they are mounted or of the number of payloads that have to be
integrated into a single spacecraft. Some information provided by Mr.
W. A. Myers, of Rockwell International, indicates that mission inte-
gration costs might include the costs of about three engineering man-
months per payload at the low-cost end, up to total costs of possibly
$1,000,000 per payload for highly complex payloads. A typical mission
integration Job would require one engineer per payload over a period
of six to nine months. He indicated that there should be very little
difference between the STPSS and the MMS relative to mission integra-
tion. The test procedures might be slightly more complicated with the
MMS so the nonrecurring costs (of developing procedures) could be a
little higher.
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Table H-7
CASE I (A)a
PROGRAM OPTION I: USE LEAST EXPENSIVE SPACECRAFT AND MINIMIZE NUMBER
OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 I0 8 I 6i
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
1-S STPSS-LC 0 - 0 0 - 0 1 - 5 2 - 5
I-S STFSS-P 2 - !0 2 - I0 2 - 8 2 - 5
I-E AEM 1 - 3 1 - 3 2 - 5 3 - 5
I-E STPSS-LC 3 - I0 3 - i0 3 - 8 3 - 6
2 STPSS-LC 3 - ii 4 - 9 5 - 7 6 - 6
3 STPSS-LC 1 - i0 1 - i0 2 - 5 2 - 5
4 STPSS-LC 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
5 STPSS-P 2 - 4 2 - 4 2 - 4 2 - 4
6 STPSS-LC i - 3 I - 3 I - 3 i - 3
7 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 i - 3 I - 3
8 STPSS-P 1 - 3 I - 3 i - 3 i - 3
TOTAL
NUMBER A_4 = 1 1 2 3
OF
SPACECRAFT STPSS-LC - IU II 14 16 t
FLIGHTS: STPSS-P - 5 5 5 _ , •
TOTAL NUMBER OF
F[,IGHTS : 16 17 21 24
aRoman capitals correspond to those in Table II-6.
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Table H-8
CASES I(G) AND If(G)
PROGRAM OPTION 2: USE AEM AND MMS AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 I0 8 6
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS -- NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
I-S MMS 2 - i0 2 - I0 3 - 8 4 - 5
1-E HMS 2 - !0 2 - 7 2 - 5 2 - 5
I-E AEM 1 - 13 2 - i0 3 - 8 4 - 6
2 _ 3 - 11 4 - 9 5 - 7 6 - 6
3 MMS 1 - I0 1 - I0 2 - 5 2 - 5
4 MMS 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 I - 5
5 MMS 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 2 - 4
6 MMS 1 - 3 I - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 MMS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 1_4S 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL NUMBER
OF AEM - i 2 3 4
SPACECRAFT
MMS - 13 14 17 20FLIGHTS :
TOTAL NUMBER OF
FLI(;IITS: 14 16 20 24
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Table H-9
CASES I(K) AND V(K)
PROGRAM OPTION 3: ALL PAYLOADS ON STPSS AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF
FLIGHTS BY COMBINING PAYLOADS ON SAME ORBIT
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 I0 8 6
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS -- NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
I-S STPSS-LC 0 - 0 0 - 0 1 - 7 2 - 5
I-S STPSS-P 2 - i0 2 - I0 2 - 7 2 - 5
I-E STPSS-LC 4 - 9 4 - 9 5 - 7 6 - 6
2 STPSS-LC 3 - II 4 - 9 5 - 7 6 - 6
3 STPSS-LC 1 - i0 1 - i0 2 - 5 2 - 5
4 STPSS-LC 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
5 STPSS-P 2 - 4 2 - 4 2 - 4 2 - 4
6 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 STPSS-P 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL NUMBER
OF
SPACECRAFT STPSS-LC = il 12 16 19
FLIGIITS STPSS-P = 5 5 5 5
TOTAL NUMBER OF
FLIGIITS: 16 17 21 24
m
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Table H-IO
CASESi(o),ii(o),v(o),ANDVI(O)
PROGRAM OPTION 4: ALL PAYLOADS ON _ AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF FLIG'HTS
MAXIMUMNUMBEROF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
i ,_,
4 MMS 1 - 5 1 - 5 I - 5 1 - 5
5 l_IS 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 2 - 4
6 MMS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 MMS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 MMS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL NU31BER
OF
SPACECRAFT
FL ICII'I'S: ,MMS= 14 16 20 24
TOTAl NU?4BEROF
FLICIITS: 14 16 20 24
i
• , |
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Table H-11
CASE II(S)
PROGRAMOPTION I: USE LEAST EXPENSIVE SPACECRAFT AND MINIMIZE NUMBER
OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUMNUMBER 'OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 I0 8 I 6
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS -- NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
l-S STPSS-LC i - I0 1 - i0 i - 5 2 - 5
I-S STPSS-P i - I0 1 - I0 2 - 8 2 - 5
1-E AEM 1 - 8 2 - 7 3 - 6 4 - 6
1-E STPSS-LC 2 - 13 2 - 10 2 - 8 2 - 5
2 STPSS-LC 3 - 11 4 - 9 5 - 7 - 6
3 STPSS-LC i - i0 1 - I0 2 - 5 2 - 5
4 STPSS-LC i - 5 i - 5 i - 5 i - 5
5 STPSS-P I - 8 1 - 8 I - 8 2 - 4
6 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 I - 3 i - 3
7 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 i - 3 i - 3
8 STPSS-P I - 3 1 - 3 i - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL qUMBER
OF AEM = 1 2 3 4
SPACECRAFT STPSS-LC " I0 ii 13 15
FLIGIiTS: STPSS-P -- 3 3 4 5
TOTAL NUMBER OF
FLIGHTS: 14 16 20 24
I
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Table H-12
CASES II(L) AND VI(L)
PROGRAM OPTION 3: ALL PAYLOADS ON STPSS AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
BY COMBINING PAYLOADS ON SAME ORBIT
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 i0 8 6
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS -- NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
I-S STPSS-LC 1 - I0 1 - iO 1 - 7 2 - 5
1-S STPSS-P 1 - 10 1 - 10 2 - 7 2 - 5
I-E STPSS-LC 3 - II 4 - 9 5 - 7 6 - 6
2 STPSS-LC 3 - 11 4 - 9 5 - 7 6 - 6
3 STPSS-I,C 1 - I0 1 - I0 2 - 5 2 - 5
4 STPSS-LC 1 - _ 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
5 STPSS-P 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 2 - 4
6 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 I - 3
8 STPSS-P 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
C
TOTAL NUMBFR
OF STPSS-LC = 11 13 16 19SPACECItAFT
FLIGHTS: S'"PSS-P 3 _ 4 5
TOTAl. NL_BER OF
FLIGHTS: 14 16 20 24
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Table H-13
CAS_. III(C)
PROGRAM OPTION I: USE LEAST EXPENSIVE SPACECkAI'_"AND MINIMIZE NUMBER
OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 i0 8 6
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
l-S STPSS-LC 1 - 8 1 - 8 I - 8 2 - 5
l-S STPSS-P 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 6
I-E AEM 0 - 0 0 - 0 1 - 2 2 - 4
I-E STPSS-LC 3 - 9 3 - 9 3 - 8 3 - 6
2 STPSS-LC 2 - 13 3 - 9 4 - 7 5 - 6
3 STPSS-LC I - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 2 - 4
4 STPSS-LC I - 4 1 - 4 1 - 4 1 - 6
5 STPSS-P 2 - 3 2 - 3 2 - 3 2 - 3
6 STPSS-LC i - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
7 STPSS-LC 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
8 STPSS-P 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
TOTAL
AD/ " 0 0 1 2NUMBER
OF STPSS/LC = i0 11 12 15SPACECRAFT
FLIGHTS : SYPSS/P = 4 4 4 4
TOTAL NUHBER OF 14 15 17 21
FLIGI[TS:
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Table H-14
CASE III (N)
,_" PROGRAM OPTION 2: USE AEM AND MMS AND MINIMIZE NUMBER cF FLIGHTS
• . . ,,
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGH_
13 10 8 6
, . , ..... j
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - ICUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
I-S MMS 2 - 8 2 - 8 2 - 8 3 - 6
I-E MMS 1 - 12 1 - 10 1 - 8 1 - 6
I-E AEM 2 - 7 2 - 8 3 - 6 4 - 5
2 _S 2 - 13 i 3 - 9 4 - 7 5 - 6
3 M_; I - 8 I - 8 I - 8 2 - 4
4 Ml_ 1 - 4 1 - 4 1 - 4 1 - 4
5 Mk3 1 - 6 1 - 6 1 - 6 1 - 6
6 ._MS 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
7 _ 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
8 HMS 1 - 2 I 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2|
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF AEM = 2 2 3 4
SPACe.CRAFT
FLIGHTS: HMS = I] 12 13 16
I'O'['ALNUHBER OF
FLIC,IITS: !3 14 16 20
1981006400-191
-175-
Table H-15
c k_E III (M)
ab _
PROGRAM OPTION 3: ALL PAYLOADS ON STPSS AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
BY COMIIINING PAYLOADS ON SAME ORBIT
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 I0 8 6
. t , , , ,m
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
.... j .,,.,. ,,,,,
I-S STPSS-LC I - 8 1 - 8 i - 8 2 - 5
l-S STPSS-P 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 6
[-E STPSS-LC 3 - 9 3 - 9 4 - 7 3 - 6
2 ETPSS-LC 2 - 13 3 - 9 6 - 7 5 - 6
3 STPSS-LC 1 - fl 1 8 1 - 8 2 - 4
4 STPSS-LC 1 - 4 1 - 4 _ - 4 1 - 4
5 STPSS-LC 1 - 4 1 - 4 i - 4 1 - 4
5 STPSS-P 1 - 2 I - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
6 STPSS-LC 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 [ I - 2
7 STPSS-LC 1 - 2 [ - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
8 STPSS-P 1 _ 2 1 - 2 I - 2 I - 2
TOTAL
NUI_ER
OF
SPACECRAFT STPSS/LC = 11 12 14 18
FU!GIrI's: STPSS/P = 3 3 3 3
¢ ? .
TOTAL NUHBER OF
FLIGHTS: 14 I5 17 21
m
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TaJ,le H-16
CASE II" (P)
PROGRAM OPTION 4: ALL PAYLOADS ON MMS AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
7 MMS 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
8 MMS 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2 1 - 2
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF
SPACEC,_Ar
FLIGHTS : HMS = i2 14 16 20
rorA1. Nt_I_ER OF
FLhilrrs: 12 14 16 20
J
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PROGRAMOPTION 1: USE LEAST EXPENSIVE SPACECRAFT AND MINIMIZE NUNB_ OF
FLIGHTS
NAXIMUNNUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
ORBIT SPACECI_IT NUMBEROF FLIGHTS - NIMBZR OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
l-S STPSS-LC 1 - 12 2 - 8 2 - 6 _ - 6
1-.S s'rPSS-? 1 - 12 I - 9 2 - 6 2 - 6
I-E AEM 0 - 0 0 - 0 2 - 5 3 - 5
l-g STPSS-LC 4 - I0 4 - I0 4 - 8 4 - 6
=-
2 STPSS-LC 3 - 13 4 - 10 5 - 8 7 - 6
3 STPSS-LC I - 12 2 - 6 2 - 6 2 - 6
_'rPSS-LC Z - 6 1 - 6 1 - 6 i - 6
5 srPss-P 2 -- 5 2 - 5 2 - b 2 - 3
6 STPSS-LC I - 3 I - 3 I - 3 I - 3
7 srPss-I,C 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 s'rPss-P 1 - 3 $ - 3 1 - 3 ; 3
TOTAL
Nb,¢SER A_ = 0 0 2 3
OF
SPACECRAFT STPSS-_C = 12 15 16 18
FLIGHTS: STPSS-P - 4 & 5 5
FOTAL NUHBER OF
FLICH'fS: 16 19 2} 26
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Table H-18
CAS_. IV(I)
._ PROGRAM OPTION 2: USE AEM AND MMS AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF FLIGHT5
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 10 8 I
m
6
L
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIG'HTS - NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
1-S MMS 2 - 12 3 - 8 3 - 8 4 - 6
1-E _S 2 - 12 2 - 9 2 - 8 2 - 6
1-E AEM 2 - 8 3 - 7 3 - 8 5 -- 6
2 MMS 3 - 13 4 - !0 5 - 8 7 - 6
3 MMS 1 - 12 2 - 6 2 - 6 2 - 6
4 l_S 1 - 6 1 - 6 1 - 6 1 - 6
5 _4S 1 - 9 1 - 9 2 - 5 2 - 5
6 MMS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 MMS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 MMS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF
AE2'I = 2 3 3 5SPACECRAFT
FLICHTS : _'MS = 13 16 18 21
TOTAL I_,IBER OF
FLIGHTS : 15 19 21 26
i
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Table H-19
CASE IV(N)
PROGRAI_OPTION 3: ALL PAYLOADS ON STPSS AND MINIMIZE NUMBEROF FLIGHTS
BY COMBINING PAYLOADS ON SAME ORBIT
MAXIMUMNUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 I0 8 6
i. , | H •
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBEROF FLIGHTS - NUMBEROF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
1-S STPSS-P 1 - 12 1 - 9 2 - 6 2 - 6
1-S S'I'PSS-I.C 1 _ 12 2 - 8 2 - 6 2 - 6
I-E STPSS-L(" 4 - i0 4 - i0 5 - 8 7 - 6
2 s'r"ss-LC 3 - 13 4 - 10 5 - 8 7 - 6
3 STPSS-L(" 1 - 12 2 - 6 2 - 6 2 - 6
4 STPSS-LC 1 - 6 1 - 6 ] - 6 1 - 6
5 STPSS-P 2 - 5 2 - 5 2 - 5 2 - 5
6 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 STPSS-LC 1 - 3 I - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 s'rPss-P 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
,.. - • _.
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF
s'rPSS-LC = 12 15 17 21
SPACECRAFT
_- FLIGRTS : STPSS-P = 4 4 5 5
TOTAL NUMBER OF
FLIGIiTS: 16 19 22 26
['_]-"'qt'
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Table H-20
cxsE IV(Q)
,a
PROGRAMOPTION 4: ALL PAYLOADS ON _ AND MINIMIZE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUMNUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
'- | "" ,, . • • •
13 10 ! 8 6
ORBIT SPACECI_ T NUMBEROF FLIGHTS - NUMBEROF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
L • ,. . .....
1-S )4qS 2 - 12 3 - 8 3 - 8 4 - 6
l-E MMS 3 - 13 4 - i0 5 - 8 7 - 6
2 HHS 3 - 13 4 - 10 5 - 8 7 - 6
3 PRS 1 - 12 2 - 6 2 - 6 2 - 6
4 HMS 1 - 16 1 - 6 1 - 6 1 - 6
5 HMS 1 - 9 1 - 9 2 - 5 2 - 5
6 l_S 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 HHS 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 I'R'IS I - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF
SPACECRAFT
FLIGHTS: MMS - 14 18 21 26
_OTAL NUMBER OF
FLIGHTS : 14 18 21 26
r
s
":4
i
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Table H-21
CASE V(E)
PROGRAM OPTION 1: USE LEAST EXPENS VE SPACECRAFT AND MINIMIZE NU/_ER
OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUMNUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
13 10 8 6
rim, ,, J i
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT
,..... i
1-S STPSS-LC 0 - 0 0 - 0 1 - 5 2 - 5
1-S STPSS-P 2 - 10 2 - 10 2 - 8 2 - 5
I-E AEM I - 3 I - 3 2 - 5 3 - 5
I-E STPSS-LC 3 - I0 3 - I0 3 - 8 3 - 6
ADI 3 - 7 3 - 8 4 - 7 5 - 6
2 STPSS-LC 1 - 13 1 - 10 1 - 8 1 - 5
3 STPSS-LC 1 - 10 1 - 10 2 - 5 2 - 5
4 AEH 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
5 STPSS-P 2 - 4 2 - 4 2 - 4 2 - 4
6 AEM i - 3 I - 3 I - 3 I - 3
7 AEH 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 srPss-P I 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL
NUMBER AEM • 7 7 9 11
OF STPSS-LC m 5 5 7 8
SPACECRAFT
FLIGHTS : STPSS-P - 5 5 5 5
| ,,
TOTAL NUMBEROF"
FI, I(;HTS : 17 17 21 24
, m
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Table H-22
CASES V(J) AND VI(J)
•'_ PROGRAMOPTION 2: USE AEN AND MNS AND MINIMIZE NUMBEROF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUMNUMBEROF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
ii • , J i ,, | m
13 10 8 6
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBER OF FLIGH3S- NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/FLIGHT _t
i
........ , ,, ,. ,J
I-S HMS 2 - I0 2 - I0 3 - 8 4 - 5
1-E AEM 1 - 13 2 - 10 3 - 8 4 - 6
I-E HMS 2 - 10 2 - 7 2 - 5 2 - 5
2 AEH 3 - 7 3 - 8 4 - 7 5 - 6
2 HHS 1 - 13 1 - 10 1 - 8 1 - 5
3 MS 1 - 10 1 - 10 2 - 5 2 - 5
4 AEH 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
5 HMS 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 3
5 AEM 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 1 - 5
6 AEM 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 AEM 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 _4S 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL
NUMBER
OF AEM - 7 8 10 13
SPACECRAFT
FLIGHTS : HHS " 8 8 i0 II
TOTAL NUMBER OF
FLIGHTS: 15 16 20 24
1981006400-199
-183-
Table H-23
CASE Vl (F)
PROGRAM OPTION i: USE LEAST EXPENSIVE SPACECRAFT AND MINIMIZE NUMBER
OF FLIGHTS
MAXIMUMNUMBER OF PAYLOADS PER FLIGHT
, ,,,, , ,
13 10 8 6
ORBIT SPACECRAFT NUMBEROF FLIGHTS - NUMBER OF PAYLOADS/PLIGHT
I-S STPSS-LC 1 - 8 1 - i0 1 - 5 2 - 5
I-S STPSS-P l - 13 1 - i0 2 - 8 2 - 5
1-E AI_ 1 - 8 2 - 7 3 - 6 4 - 6
I-E STPSS-LC 2 - 13 2 - i0 2 - 8 2 - 5
2 AEM 2 - 10 3 - 8 4 - 7 5 - 6
2 STPSS-LC i - 13 I - I0 I - 8 I - 5
3 STPSS-LC 1 - 10 1 - 10 2 - 5 2 -
4 AEM 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5 1 - 5
5 STPSS-P 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 8 1 - 5
5 AEM 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 I - 3
6 AEM 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
7 AEM 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
8 STPSS-P 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3 1 - 3
TOTAL
NUMBER AEM " 6 8 I0 13
OF
STPSS-LC = 5 5 6 7SPACECRAFT
FLIGHTS : STPSS-P = 3 3 4 4
TOTAL NUMBER OF
• FL IGIITS: 14 16 20 24
i
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Appendix I
L-AEM SPECIFICATIONS
STAT_IENT OF WORK FOR A SHUTTLE LAUNCHEDADAPTATION
._._ OF THE AEM FOR LARGE DIAMETER PAYLOADS THAT
RESULTED IN THE L-AEM DESIGN
5.0 CONTRACTORTASKS
5.1 BASELINE DEFINITION
The Contractor shall design a baseline adaptation of the AEM base module
for comparison with other vehicles by the Contractor. The baseline
design shall be consistent with the following requirements:
• The payload interface shall be hexagonal 60 in. in maximum
diameter.
@ The spacecraft shall be three-axis stabilized with control
capability to 0.5 de E in pitch and roll and 1 deg in yaw,
with capability to be modified to control to 6 arc minutes
or spin stabilized with control capability to ±i deg.
s Solid propulsion shall be provided to inject the spacecraft
into a circular orbit at altitudes up to geosynchronous alti-
tude (orbiter altitude 150 n mi}.
• A SGLS-compatlble telemetry, timing, and control shall be
provided using Carrier I with capability to also incorporate
Carrier II for transmitting payload data at high data rates.
• Provision shall be made for payload weights up to 1000 lb.
• The power system array shall be one-axis with setable angle
with 100 sq ft of array area. Two 20 Ahr batteries will be
provided.
• The thermal system shall use louvers and heaters with a max-
imum power input from a payload of 10 W (insulated).
• No single-string failure modes.
5.2 SHUTTLE INTERFACE
5.2.1 The shuttle interface shall be defined including an adapt_r
to support one or more spacecraft with payloads in the shuttle
over the short or long spacelab tunnel or over Orbltal Maneuvering
System kit.
5.2.2 IUS interface shall be defined.
5.2.3 Mixed DoD payloads shall be considered.
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Append ix J
os P_oPosBM_o_ oFAGUn_
Wollovtn8 the conpletton of the first phase of the cue study
(see Section IV for the results), the &t¢ Force sent forward throush
Air Force Headquarters to NAS_ a proposed Hemorandum of Agreement con-
cerning the procurement of the NASA Small Hultlmission Hodular Space-
craft. This appendlx contains this proposed memorandum of agreement
and the correspondence between NASA and the Air Force concerning it.
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COPIED
12 July 1976
Dear John:
For over two years, the Space and Missile Systems Organization (SANSO)
has been studying the needs, concepts, and utilities of free-flyer spacecraft
to be flown on Orbiter missions. We have concluded that there is a need for
_ a standard spacecraft with capabilities greater than your Applications
Explorer Mission (AEM) spacecraft, but considerably less than your Multi-
Mission Modular Spacecraft (_MS) to fly POD Space Test P_ogram exptrlments
in the Space Transportation System (STS) era. We have also concluded that
significant cost advantages can be achieved by adopting a standard space-
craft configuration which could be used by NASA, PoD or other government
agencies.
In April of this year, we briefed General Snavely and Mr. E. Z. Gray
on our concepts and plans. In May 1976, Goddnrd Space Flight Center (CSFC)
informed us that NASA plans to develop a spacecraft with capabilities similar
to our standard spacecraft. We informed CSFC that we would use the NASA
standard spacecraft if it would be developed on a schedule which meets our
needs.
I believe it is time to formalize our intentions. We have prepared a
proposed Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which outllnes our standard satellite
requlremevts (attachment I). It alsc presents our views on the managerial
and financial responsibilities of each agency in the development and procure-
ment of the spacecraft.
The Space Test Program is plannlng to fly the first of these spacecraft
on the Orbital Flight Test-5 mission. To meet this schedule, development of
the spacecraft would need to commence in FY 77. We are prepared to provide
NASA $1.0M in FY 77 funds to assist in this effort to assure the timely
availability of the spacecraft.
I would appreciate any assistance you can provide in obtaining a rapid
response to our proposed MOA. I would also welcome your thoughts on the
appropriate NASA signature level to the agreement to assure commitments are
fulfilled.
Sincerely,
(Signed) .John Martin
Assistant Secretary
Research and Development
I Attachment
Memorandum of Agreement,
w/l attachment
Mr. John F. Yardley
Associate Administrator for
Space Flight
Code M
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
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MEMORANDUM OF AGI_E_4F/_T
ON
THE PHOCUR_4ENT OF
USAF D_IGNATED SMALL MULTI-
MISSION MODUIAR SPACECRAFT
SYST_Y_S
BETWEF_
THE NATIONAL AEHONAUTICS
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF D_FF.NSE
1981006400-204
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l.O PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1.1 PURPOSE: This agreement defines the responsibilities and polleles
that will govern the development, production and acceptance of the
,_ Small Multi-Misslon Modular Spacecraft (SI_4S) and support'.nF =:...,.,:m
for use on Space Test Program (STP) missions wlth the Sp_ce Trans-
portatlon System (STS). This a_reement Is directive in nature and
will serve as the governing agreement for more _etailed policies u
developed by the Implementlng agencies: Gcddard Space Flight Center
(GSP_) for th_ National A.. onautlcs and Space Administration (NASA)
and the Space Test Program for the Department of Defense (DOD).
Amendments or revisions to this Memorandum nt%y be made only by the
mutual consent of the DOD and NASA,
1.2 t'COP_____E:ffective and efficient use of the STS demands an environment
of intera_ency cooperation and avoldan-e of duplicative efforts. 8TS
joint development and use is covered by presidential directive issued
in ,T_nuary, 1972. This a_recment ad.lresses _olnt NASA and DOD
responsibilities and financial liabilities for the. development_
production and use of a S'PS compatible spacecraft ,S)@4S, and
supportln_ systems,
_..0 KXPI,ANA'_"I,_NOF '?F_RMS: The following explanatlons are provided to
clerlfy :_l_cific terms used in this a_rcempnt.
2.1 _PACE TRANSPORTATION :_YSr_ (R'rs): The STS is Ime re, sab|e launch
vehicle system consist In_,of tw,, cnl _d rocket _z)tors, an expendable
£uel t._nk, and or|,it_r v.hirlu w_th |is p._yload bay. Att,.ndsnt
.'upport t;y_tems, lau.ch tuwcr .n,l up_.ratlons services are Incluled
as part of the ow, r,11 .,.,._.,m. vxi:_tln_ Nk.°_AtermInolo_g for the
S'_ will !,- used.
t
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2.2 DODSPACE 'I_T PRO_,_: The _pace Test Program (STP) ts •
Department of Defense (IX)D) activity under the executive management
of the United States Air Force (_AF) to provide space_lt#,ht
opportunities £or IIODexperimenters vho are not authorised their own
_eans £or spacefltsht.
2.3 SI4AT,L MU%'T'I-_SSIOW MOIX_R _ACF,CNO_I' (Sa_4S): Presently. the S)@B
can be eate6orized as a proposed OSFC development for • lov cost,
multi-purpose spacecra£t bus vhtch is compatible vith the 8_8.
,qupporting systems iL_lude the flisht support systea and the 6round
handling n_d checkout systems.
3.0 POLICI_ AND PRTNCIPLES: The £ollovln_ policies an4 principles
will 8overn the relationship between the DOD and NASA relevant to
S_'P procurement and use of the Small Multi-Misslon Modular _pacecraft
and support systems.
3.1 D_'LN_,ATIONOF AUTHORITY: The authority to decide matters vhtch are
binding on GSFC and STP in executing this aKreement and an7 other
supplement al a_rcements, except vhere specifically reserved by the
undersiKned, is hereby delegated to these directors:
l_or the DOD Space Test Program:
The _trector of the _p&c_ Test Program
Heft,l., l_rters. _p_ce and 14_._sile ,_ystems Ort;anlzatio_
P.O. 'k_x 929_0
_orld_ay Postal Center
Leo Angeles, CA 90009
2
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For the NASA Goddard Space Fltsht Center:
The SHH$ Prol;ram Director
Gnddard Space Fllsht Center
Greenbelt, HI) 20771
._ All _tters vbich cannot be resolved by these or|antzatton| shall
revert to the undersisned or their destinates for resolution.
3.2 r,ENEAALPINANCIAL POLICY: The DOe will provtde funds for S_MS systems
and eqt, tl,ment for STP missions on a firm-fJxnd price basis. NASA is
li_,:, for the developmental costs of the atandard SHMS systems and
equipment confilurstions. Pendin$ definition of SI_P mission require-
manta and acceptable lease policies, STP may enter into lease aires-
ments with GSFC for reusable equipment. Specific financial schedules
rill be developed on • mission by mission basis eccordln$ to the
specific guidelines in parasraph 5.
4.0 ORGANIZATIONRESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE S_S SYSTENS
4.1 SMHS SYSI MS RE_RF_ENTS PREPAP.qTIONAND PROPOSALEVALUATION
4.1.1 _eneral .%_I£ requ£re_nts are provided in the S_S Requirements
Attachmunl_ to this Hemorandum of Al?,rec.ment.
6.1.2 _;SFC and STP are responsible Jointly for the estublisl,ment of
the detailed S_qS systems requirements, related exhiblt_ and
data requirements.
4.1.3 GSFC wlll develop specifications, teat _nd qualification criteria for
th_ SMHS_y.qtems, subsystems and conq)onents.
_.I.4 STP wlll ,cvi_ the._e specifications, t,,.qt and qualification criteria
for compltance with s'rP ,',',i-lrt'm_'nts.
4.1.5 CSFC and ._rP are r_.:l,,,,_lble J,_i.tly for the preparation of all SHHS
_',y._t,.ms itc,-..pta.ve t,'_t , rltvr|_l.
4.1.6 (;SFC _lil pr,.p:,re the rvqut._t fur proposal (RFP) accordin$ tO NASA
,,;otJrre :,t.Jt,('t JL,n.prt,¢ t.L|zzr,,.q.
3
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4.1.7 STP viii review the HFP documents for compliance with STP systems
performance, qualification and acceptance requirements. Deviations
will be assessed a.._ resolved with OSFC before release of the RFP
to industry.
4.1.8, GSFC will conduct the proposal evaluation according to established
NASA procedures.
4.1,9 STP will advise GSFC on pertinent 8TP requirements during the
proposs/ evaluation period.
4.1, lO NASA wi]l award the SMMSsystems contract(s) from amon_ those bidders
which s_tisty STP requirements.
4.1.11 STP will concur in the selectlon(s).
4.2 SMMS SY._TP_S DEVEIDPM_T
4.2.1 GSFC is responsible for the development of the S_S systems to the
baseline set of requirements and specifications as established at
the award of the SMM_ development contract(s). These systems
include:
4.2.1.1 Spacecr_ rt (S_4S)
4.2.1.2 SMMS _l_ht Support System (FSS)
h._-.I.3 S_BMSGround Support F_lu_pment(GSE)
4.2.1.4 SMMS Z,y,,ternsSoftware
4.2.1.5 SMMS _y"ternsDocumentation
4.2.2 DesiEn chanEes to the SM_S systems baseline which have resulted
from NACA or STP mi_slon unique requirements will _ the respon-
sibility of the originating asency.
4.2.3 Sq_ imp,sed des|_,,nch:in£esto the ,_4_,Ssystems w111 be a NASA
responsibility and fiscal liability.
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h.2.b CSFC is responslble for gez,erating, reflnlng and maintaining ali
design documentation pertaining to the S_ systems. STP rill
have direct access _,o contractor documentation.
h.2.$ NASA will notify STP for all S_4S system level reviews and important
subsystem desifln meetings.
4.2.6 STP will l,e responsible for maintaining the currency of STP require-
ments as related to the SMMS systems.
4.3 STP ACCEP"ANCE POLIC/F/_ F_R SMMS SYSTE%_S
4.3.1 :;TP is the DCD authority for the acceptance of any Sb94S system.
_.3.2 :;pecific conditions for acceptance will be established by GSFC for
each t;t4MS system, The gener_l crlt-,ria _uidelines for acceptance
of _S systems include:
4.3.2.1 conformance with system requirements,
4.3._.2 conformance with approved acceptance test procedures,
1
4.3.2.3 subsystems operating histories, and l,
b.3.2.4 component quali£1cation status. I!
Software .cceptance iv conditional on planned verification test cases I
and Joint _X3 and STP validation requirements.
4.3.3 After STP acceptance of an S_S system, STP and its mission contractor
will ns:;u,e primary resIw_n._ibllity for the hardware and the mls:_ion
Int_f:rati,,n and checkout activities.
b.3.4 After STP acccptmlce of 'JMM._sy:;t¢.ms,NASA will retain responsibility
And fln_n,,lal liability f',,r;.surin_: th,,se sy.;t_ms are compatible
with the :,'P3.
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5.0 N4:_AAND DOD FINANCIAL IK)I,CIES: The following fln_nclal policies
,rodprinciples sh_ll apply to the Small Nulti-Misslon Modulax Space-
craft _md supporting flight, ground handling and checkout system.
It is the intent of this section to em_erate financial liability of
each ascncy with respect to St4t48expendable and reuse&ble equipment,
software _nd documentatlon.
5. l EXPk:NI_ABI,_',EOUIPMENT
5.1.1 Sm_ll Mu]ti-Misslon /_)dular_pacecraft ISt_48)
5.1,l.1 NASA has developmental responsibility and non-recurring flsc&1 liability
for the _b_MS.
5.1.1.2 NA£A has production responsibility per the Intera4zencyprocurement
model and ass_tmesrecurring flscal liability for all NASA missions
using the S_IS.
5.1.I,3 rOD has fiscal llsbility for the recurring costs of the St4NSneeded
to support STP mlssions, Such tlabillty shall be a function of the
Joint _cncy cost model, rOD payment will commence to NASA three
years before scheduled launch on a TBDD TBD and TBD reimbursement
has Is.
5.1.2 Other OXl,c,nd_blc eqtllpmontused to satis£y a specific STP mission
shall bt, proctlrudon _ cost reimbursement schedule as mutually
!
a6reed by ,_'rPand GSFC. ]
+_.2 _+_+tt_^.m.EE__:__.tP_ym.'r__ I|
+
+s.2, z ,,,_.+ _+')i+_ht._S__o.,'t..,+,+v,,;t.:..m+(,.'::s_). +
t
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5.2.1.1 Nh%'A h_s developmental responsibility and financial liability for
the fli_ht support system of the SMI_. DOD wi]l fund NASA for the
recurrln_ production costs of FSS for STP use.
_ 5.2.l .2 B:_sed on the STP mission frequency, cost and availability of NASA
equipment, DOD is liable for user eharses for the le_e of fllght
support equipment at a mutually neceptable rate.
5.2.2 Ground Suvport EouIvment
5.2..2.1 NASA has developmental responsibility and financial liability for
the ground support equipment (GSE) of the SMMS. DOD will fund NASA
for the recurring production costs of GSE for STP use.
5.2.2.2 Based on the STP mission frequency, cost and availability of NASA
equipment, DOD is liable for user charges for the lease of grouncl
support equipment at a mutually acceptable rate.
5.3 _;MMS ::YST_MS SOFTWARE AND DOCUMFNTATION
5.3.1 NASA is responsible for the costs attendant to the development and
test o£ ell tRMMS systems software and SMMS documentation.
5.3.2 IX]D is r,. ik_nslble for the cost _-equlred to tailor the SMMS software
and docum<ntstion needed to satisfy unique STP mission requirements.
5.h _MS SY,qTI.MSDESIGN CI{ANC,_
5.h.l Pre-,lw_rd Ph,se: NASA bears the responsibility and financial
liability rot the costs o£ _]esiMn ch_n_es durln K the pre-_ward phase.
5.h.2 I_.ve]olme,,t P%_,se: NASA and ]kqD ,ire responslb]e and cost liable
_U_p]ic_bl,. for :;MMS :_),._temsde.nlf;n('h,u]deswh|ch originate from each
res|ectlw" _q,eney.
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5.h.3 Post Deliver_, Phase: NASA and DODare responslble and cost liable
as applicable for SN_dSsystems design changes which originate from
each respective agency.
6.0 SCHEDULh_S: STP will identify SI_dSand supporting systems delivery
requiremehts to NASA on a mission by mission basis. Delivery and
destination schedule requirements for those systems shall be basea
on STP mission requirements, integration lead times and launch dates,
NASA will consider these schedule requirements and recommend 8MM_
and supporting systems purchase, lease arrangements and associated
systems costs within sixty (60) days. Based on the mission needs
and budgetary constraints, STP will determine the preferred procure-
r
ment or lease arrangements for the Sb_4Sand supporting systems.
The final mission specific agreement will form a mission annex to
this memOrandum. NASA will retain full responsibility for meeting
the performance, cost and delivery schedules of each coordinated
mission annex.
7.0 This a6rc.ementis effective upon the date of the si6natures below.
Cban6es to or cance]latlon of this agreement may be made only by
mutual consent of the signatories.
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COPIED
AuSust 24, 1976
#" Honorable John J. Martin
Asslstan¢ Secretary of the Air Force
(Research and Development)
NMhlnston, D.C. 20330
Dear Hr. Hartln:
The Joint USAF/NASA workins sroup revlevln S the Small Nulti-N_eelon
Spacecrdft (S_MS) has completed their study and concluded that asree-
ment can be reached on a Joint set of technical requlremonts. I belleve
there is an opportunity here for both asencies to initiate such a Joint
prosrms that will be cost effective to each.
Ne, however, are in no position to initiate such a pro&ram at ¢hls ilme
since NASA does not have any missions that require new start fundiv_
for SNHS in either FY 77 or FY 73. ge, therefore, cannot meet your
schedule req,llrmsent of March 1979 with such a spacecraft.
There is an alternative which Bay be atttactlve to you. The recent Rand
Study conducted for the USAF showed that the Space Test Prolram (STP) can
use a colblnatlon of the larser NASA Hulti-Hission Spacecraft (}@L_)and
upgraded Applications Explorer Rtsslons (AEH) of $60-80H. We can Jointly
study the feasibility of provldlnB you one or two of the lariat NNS and
use of the NASA planned F1Jsht Support Systems to meet the March 1979 date
for your Yea1 Ruby mission. Since both the USAF Teal Ruby spacecraft and
the second NASA )MS flisht are planned for the fifth Shuttle Orbiter Test
Fllsht, this approach would be an efficient use of cmmmn hardware by
both qencles.
Another possible alternative to meet your near tent objectives is the
uplradln 8 and adaptation to the shuttle of the AEN spacecraft now under
NASA contract to Boeln$ for tvo Scout-lJuncbed missions. Ne wlll be pleased
to consider modifyln| this contract to meet your requirements, but we have
no funds to support any such modifications at this _hse,
Please let me know of your Interest in either of these alternatives, and
we will be prepared to discuss costs and schedules. From our standpoint,
the most attractive approach to a Joint SNHS prosramvould be that th_
USAF meet its short-tent objectives by one of the alternatives above, and
Join NASA in a 1onset tense developHmt prosran to meet both of our 1on|-
tern requirements. NASA is ready to work toward this objective. Please
let me know of your desires on this matter.
Sincerely,
John E. Naulle
Associate Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space A_inistration
Nashin6ton, D.C. 20546
!
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